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A Documentary Study of the
Internecine Rivalry between
India, Tibet and China

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PARSHOTAM MEHRA

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For Pradip

who has unwittingly taught me a great deal

Acknowledgements

This 'Documentary study' grew up as an adjunct to my larger work on the McMahon Line¹ and steadily but surely gathered in mass, and momentum, to emerge eventually in its present shape and form. Over the years as I lived with more and more of it, the fascination and usefulness of the material I was working with grew on me. The pages that follow make an attempt, however inadequate, to share part of that satisfaction and pleasure with a larger clientele in the hope that it proves infectious.

Contrary to popular belief, the scholar and the researcher are by no means the sole beneficiaries of documentary source-material. That would be too narrow a view to take. It has always seemed to me that the layman too gains in breadth of vision and in depth, for the whole opens out facets which the scrupulously selected and sometimes sedulously pruned parts deny or withhold from view.

Of necessity, a large work such as this entails a host of obligations and it is pleasant to record some of them here. As may be evident, I have drawn heavily on the published works of such outstanding and painstaking compilers as MacMurray, Hertslet and the like. These apart, my principal quarry for source-material has been the India Office Library and Records as well as the Public Record Office in London. To a lesser extent, I have made use of the National Archives in New Delhi and even though I have had the privilege of working at the Department of State Archives in Washington, D.C., the material I have used here is from published sources. Apart from New Delhi's White Papers on exchanges with Peking, I have also had access to the private papers of Sir John Jordan and Viscount Hardinge.

A host of friends helped me in my work in New Delhi. It would be well-nigh impossible to list all yet Sourin Roy, Tilak Raj Sareen and R. K. Perti stand out among those who never grudged time or effort to help me pick up my threads and locate my sources. In London, at the India Office Library and Records, Martin Moir was not only of help but proved to be a good friend and guide.

It is pleasing too to record my deep debt of gratitude to the Indian Council of Historical Research for their generous grant to

¹*The McMahon Line and After*, Macmillan, 1974

make the publication of this work possible. I found Professor R. S. Sharma, then Chairman of the Council, Professor B. R. Grover, its Director, Mr. N. Chatterjee, its Publication Officer, and Mr. Raj Kumar, its Research Officer, at once sympathetic and understanding.

In my publishers, I have been singularly lucky. My editor has been more than a friend; to be sure, he was a source of much-needed encouragement. More, he took upon himself the thankless task of straightening out the myriad problems that go with putting a large manuscript such as this into cold print.

In typing bits and pieces, Vishwa Mohini Dogra has been a great help but the major brunt of giving the manuscript shape and form has fallen on Ved Parkash. To both, I am extremely beholden.

My debt to my wife is not easy to qualify. Her silent prayers and sacrifice while I have been engaged on these 'endless pursuits' have alone sustained me through the years.

A word here on the broad plan of this work may not be out of place. The 'Introduction' in each volume is designed largely to put the whole mass of material surveyed therein into sharp focus. Each document has a small heading while an annotation indicates the source from which it has been drawn. The sections into which the volumes fall have been carved out solely for convenience of grouping and of subject-matter and are thus purely arbitrary. The notes and the biographical sketches appended towards the end help to explain and elucidate both men and affairs.

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Abbreviations

BD IV	G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (Editors), <i>British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914</i> , Vol. IV, <i>The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement</i> , London (first published 1929)
Bell, Tibet	Charles Alfred Bell, <i>Tibet, Past and Present</i> , Oxford, 1924
CAB	Charles Alfred Bell
CIE	Commander of the (British) Indian Empire
Encl	Enclosure
FO	Foreign Office, Foreign Office Confidential Prints
Foreign	Foreign and Political (Department) Proceedings, National Archives of India
HMG	His (Her) Majesty's Government
IO	India Office
IOR	India Office Records
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Pol	Political
Proc	Proceedings
PRO	Public Record Office

Introduction

In another volume,¹ we have traced the sequence of events leading to the tripartite convention on the McMahon Line and of the events that followed in its wake. The present study is a compilation of the documentary source-material on which the larger volume draws so heavily. For a proper appreciation of this mass of details, it may be useful to take a panoramic view of the entire ground covered so as to fit in a larger whole in their proper place the smaller bits and pieces of the texts of conventions, of epistolary exchanges, and of a host of memoranda. The evolution of boundaries as of the men who make them, and of the people who live on either side, is in a state of flux—as extraneous factors intervene. In the case of India's North-East Frontier, these factors are very complex, for not only India and Tibet but also China are directly involved. This would largely explain why it is necessary at every stage to take into account the developments in all the three countries. Understandably therefore the source-material ranges widely; we shall rummage the documents containing the early British arguments on the Inner/Outer Lines of Assam and on the fascinating skein of tribal legacies; the records of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and his unseemly wrangle with the Panchen; and the dossier on the redoubtable Chao Erh-feng and his incompetent and warring successors. For a better perspective, and a clearer understanding, the following pages provide a brief introductory summary which is shorn of the historian's principal stock-in-trade consisting of references, citations and foot-notes. An effort has also been made to draw some tentative conclusions through a juxtaposition of the past with the present; the purpose is not only to delineate what happened but also to define the historical perspective.

II

Towards the closing decades of the nineteenth century a certain movement is noticeable in the hitherto placid waters of India's eastern frontier. Despite the early introduction of imperial rule in Assam, it continued to be neglected. Besides, there was the manifest fact, which the two Opium Wars and their unhappy aftermath had clearly demonstrated, that Manchu China was a moribund state. Is it any

¹Parshotam Mehra, *The McMahon Line and After*, Macmillan, 1974.

wonder then that, despite Jack Needham and his tireless travels, Curzon at the end of the century was quite emphatic that he did not want to be burdened with a new frontier, a new policy—or a fresh charge? And yet the great pro-consul, unwittingly perhaps, was responsible for setting in motion a variety of forces that led slowly, but surely to the birth of a new frontier for Great Britain's Indian Empire.

Indirectly, a start had been made in the planning and execution of the Younghusband expedition itself. Whatever the verdict on the British Commissioner's performance at Lhasa, and his subsequent repudiation in some vital respects by his political superiors at home, the results that flowed from his mission were momentous. Nor was the spate of explorations that followed confined to the forbidden land. It may be recalled in this context that Younghusband had been charged with opening a mart at the head of the Mishmi country, somewhere around Rima. There is also the interesting fact that Noel Williamson, who succeeded Jack Needham as Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, took to exploring, with remarkable zeal and enthusiasm, more and more of the land that lay beyond the Inner, and Outer, Lines on Assam's periphery.

Nor was the Raj's acquaintance with these lands by any means confined to the Mishmi country. For O'Connor, who later was to accompany Younghusband to Lhasa, compiled, around 1903, a report that furnishes a fairly accurate description of the Kameng division and the trade route through Tawang.

Not long after O'Connor's report, a great fillip to exploration in this part of the frontier was given by two significant developments. The first was the ghastly murder in 1911 of Williamson, and his companion Dr Gregorson at Kabang. Even though the tour that took the Assistant Political Officer there did not bear the stamp of official approval, its aim and objective were close to the heart-throbs of the empire-builders. Nor was the spirit of adventure that animated it frowned upon by Authority. The Abor Expedition that followed the murder was designed ostensibly to carry rack and ruin to the tribes responsible for the crime and may be rated, in the then well-worn code of imperial conduct, as a routine operation.¹ And yet the expedition served as a convenient peg on which were hung a number of exploratory missions—the Mishmi and the Miri, to mention only

¹*Inter alia*, General Bower was to exact 'severe punishment and reparation' for the two murders. For his instruction see McMahon to Bower, 25 September, 1911, pp. 27-9.

two. The aim here was to map out as much of the frontier as possible by determining the extent of Tibetan influence and the line where it met the tribal belt. General Bower's major expedition and its subordinate adjuncts may be rated, however, as only partially successful in achieving this objective and thereby exploring what was until then *terra incognita* to India's British rulers. It is clear nonetheless that given the circumstances in which the Raj expanded, here was a significant watershed—a growing awareness of the importance of laying down a frontier that would remain inviolate from the other side. The nub of the new policy was 'loose political control', besides a 'minimum of interference' with the tribes or their life, and yet affording them protection against 'unprovoked aggression'. It is of the utmost significance that the new frontier was not to be laid under a cloak of secrecy. For

in addition to such local measures as may eventually be decided upon, it is essential in our opinion that, as soon as the boundary has been roughly decided, a formal intimation should be made to China of the limits of the authority under our control.

The need was urgent. Nor did it present itself for the first time out of the blue. For after Younghusband's march to Lhasa in 1904, Manchu China, even though wheezing out its last gasps, rallied well to retrieve what it could from a well nigh lost position. The battle was joined, and on two fronts. In Tibet, in 1906, a strong and overbearing pro-consul was installed in the person of Chang Ying-tang who set himself the task of weeding out, and in the process humiliating, all those Chinese and Tibetans alike who had been associated in the least degree with the British Commissioner or the Convention he had concluded two years earlier. In the process, steadily but surely, he superseded Tibetan functionaries until the term 'Tibetan Administration' became synonymous with Chinese administration in Tibet.

Another of Chang's achievements was the cutting to size of the British Trade Agents functioning at the marts. For long they had lorded over the Tibetans and behaved as though they were the real masters of the land. Chang's task in this respect was rendered easier by the Adhesion Agreement of 1906, followed by the Trade Regulations of 1908.² Even a cursory glance at the texts reveals that the

¹For the 'new' policy see India to Crewe, 21 September, 1911, pp. 29-35.

²For the text see pp. 1-4 and 8-14 respectively.

British had made significant concessions to the Chinese position and thereby surrendered some of their principal gains written down with such fanfare in the Lhasa Convention. Adhering strictly to the letter of the law, if often violating its spirit, Chang insisted that the area of the trade mart, and of the Agency, be restricted to well-defined limits; that commercial operations should be fair and above board; that the Agents did not have the right of untrammelled access to Tibetan functionaries; that the Chinese position, as Tibet's overlords, must be recognized, and accepted, without qualification. The British who, in the wake of the Lhasa expedition, had governed Tibet as an occupying power in the Chumbi valley and behaved as Tibet's virtual masters in the absence of an effective Tibetan administration, felt irritated and were, understandably, very ill at ease. Used to palmier days and a regime in Lhasa that rarely asserted itself, they felt outraged. Viewed in this context, the running battle between O'Connor and Chang-Kuo (more familiar as Gow) at Gyantse is not exceptional but perhaps typical. It is true that it did not end in a complete vindication of the Chinese position, but at the same time it may be conceded that the British lost, and disastrously. Much of the glamour of Younghusband and his men marching to Lhasa wore off; among the Tibetans, O'Connor and the 'Great White Sahibs' lost 'face'.

The importance of the 1960-8 period, however, cannot be gainsaid for, above all, it is symptomatic of what China would do to the Tibetans if it ever held sway in Lhasa. It is also revealing to see how easy it was for Peking to beguile British diplomats—and Sir John Jordan, by any yardstick, was a man of extraordinary ability—by loud protestations about the observing of treaties. In reality though, it was plain as a pikestaff that the very basis of the Lhasa Convention was being steadily eroded, a Convention to whose terms China had 'adhered' by the compact of 1906!

More important still, these years conclusively demonstrate that complete lack of understanding, or appreciation, by the India Office—not the Government of India—of the grave threat which the Chinese posed to India's frontiers whenever they controlled Tibet. This menace grew in the years following the signing of the Trade Regulations, and so, also, did British smugness!

Chang's efforts to buttress and build up the hitherto weak, if uncertain position of his country in Tibet was only one side of the coin. The other, more impressive, if no less ephemeral, was the 'grand design' of Chao Erh-feng to reduce the Marches to some semblance

of orderly government. Comprising districts which Lhasa had traditionally viewed as part of its amorphous, if ill-defined, domain, the March country was full of tribes whose loyalty to Peking, or the Tutu in nearby Szechuan, was dubious at best. What was important to Chao, and to his masters in Peking, was the fact that this twilight, in-between land held the key to mastery over the Dalai Lama's kingdom. And he set about his task with masterly skill. As a first-hand, percipient observer of the scene put it, Chao was

busily engaged, after having pacified Derge in establishing the supremacy of China in the Chamdo region as well as territory between that and Assam. So far the regions north and west of Batang are being quietly, but surely forced to tender in reality allegiance long tendered in theory. Just how it is being done is a mystery; but this conquest of Eastern Thibet is being accomplished with little or no bloodshed. . . .¹

Nor was the 'mystery' so very difficult to unravel. The basic objective was that Lhasa be firmly subdued. To ensure that, it was necessary that the line of communication to the Tibetan capital should be held securely by Peking. This had become the more indispensable in view of the thirteenth Dalai Lama's well-known penchant for contumacy; his open defiance, on the eve of the British expedition, of the Emperor's writ, culminated in the Imperial Edict of 1904 deposing him. Nor, as later events were to demonstrate, was this the last occasion.

III

The subjugation of the March country was not easy, and this was so not only because the tribes were turbulent. That they were to a degree. However, more important was the fact that they were lama-ridden, for the stranglehold of Tibetan gompas which dotted the entire landscape was firm and deeply entrenched. What was more, Chao's best efforts to break it by reducing the size of the monasteries; by inducting into their ranks a leaven of progressive, if pro-Chinese, lamas; by propagating widely that they had no control over divine dispensations such as birth and death, famine and pestilence, achieved little, if anything. Essentially the lamas remained superficially quiescent, though at the same time deeply disgruntled. What was more to the point, the lamaist spell over the tribes remained strong, unbroken.

¹For the full text see 'Extract from a private letter', 18 July, 1910, pp. 15-17.

To say all this is neither to deny nor yet underestimate Chao's achievement. It is true that he started with considerable assets. From the very beginning, his rear—Szechuan and its tutu—was more than fully protected; after 1908, when his brother Chao Erhsun took over as Viceroy at Chengtu, this became doubly reassured. Chao also enjoyed, and to a rare degree, the confidence of the Imperial government in Peking, the more ungrudgingly vouchsafed because of his series of unbroken successes. For from the day he was inducted into office in 1905, to his elevation to the Viceroyalty of Szechuan six years later, Chao did not spare himself in reducing the Marches to complete submission. His achievement was the more remarkable in that the number of troops he employed was woefully small when considered against the tasks he had set himself. His men were, however, part of a new Chinese army, well-drilled and well-equipped. Added to this was Chao's ruthless, iron discipline. His hold over his men was firm, his grip tight. Was it any wonder then that revolts among his men were suppressed with a strong hand and that below a seemingly peaceful surface, there was a seething cauldron of discontent.

However, to all outward appearances at any rate, Chao had succeeded in converting almost the entire March country into Chinese-ruled districts. As on the mainland under the C'hing, central control was remarkably light, a fact which made it palatable to the tribal chiefs and their local landlords. The Frontier Commissioner's objectives were, however, long-range; he visualized large-scale transplanting of Chinese colonies and not only in the Litang-Batang region but also, next door to India, in the Tibetan districts of Pemako and Po-yul. These colonists would constitute, Chao argued, the solid sub-stratum on which the strength and durability of Chinese rule may safely rest. To attract them, he praised to the skies these new lands of promise and the prospects that they held out; to diversify the economy, he set up small industries; to make them good husbandmen, he had thrown the bait of marriage with local women of vigorous and virile stock.

Chao's plans, attractive as they may have looked on paper, proved in practice to be unworkable. His dreams mostly went awry. Chinese administration did not strike roots; the few colonists that arrived did not stay long—those that did, melted into the nondescript mass of local inhabitants; his hurriedly set-up industries proved to be expensive failures. And yet, despite these disasters, in one respect

Chao succeeded to a remarkable degree. He had planted the Dragon flag far to the west of Chamdo and, what is more pertinent to this study, on the heights across the Assam Himalayas. These new political contours on China's map which Chao had helped to etch proved a permanent legacy of Empire, which every succeeding regime—be it the Kuomintang or that of Chairman Mao—felt honour-bound to demand. Large chunks of what was Tibet thus became part of an irredentist claim. So did areas on India's long-forgotten north-eastern frontier.¹

Another aspect of Chao's empire-building deserves to be noticed too. And it related to his stationing of a Chinese force in Lhasa, under the young and redoubtable General Chung Ying. This was a necessary concomitant to the Imperial Commissioner Chang, and later of Amban Lien Yu's herculean effort to build up their country's lost position in Tibet. Apart from a contingent in the capital, the troops fanned out over Gyantse and Yatung, across Nepal's borders and in far-off Po-me and Pemako. They provided proof, if such were indeed necessary, that China's paper proclamations from Lhasa were no mere empty threats but were backed by *force majeure*. China meant business.

An important factor that had helped Chao's plans was the absence from Tibet of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and the British (Liberal) Government's decision, after 1905, to yield all the gains so painstakingly secured by Younghusband and his political mentor, Curzon. The thirteenth Dalai Lama's was a powerful, if intriguing, personality and his nearly five years of exile had synchronized with the advent of a major Chinese come-back to his land. What is more, these were years of his exposure to the harsh realities of life, a political education outside the gilded cage of the Potala. *Inter alia*, it was evident to the Lama that the Bogdo Hutukthu in Ulan Bator did not quite welcome him despite the fact that he was low in the lamaist hierarchy and owed a great deal to Lhasa's political patronage. The Russians too, with their effusive friendship made vague promises which proved singularly unavailing. It is thus not without significance that by the time the Dalai Lama arrived at Wu Tai-shan, on his way to Peking, he had made up his mind to draw closer to the British.

¹A measure of Chinese penetration in the sensitive areas of Assam on India's north-eastern frontier during the years 1910-12 is provided in a memorandum culled from various reports, and prepared at the India Office in London in June 1912. For the text see pp. 35-41.

The fact that, initially, he failed in his objective was not for want of trying but because Jordan, the British Minister, was pronouncedly unfriendly, if not hostile. A Sinophile, he had, as we would notice presently, never taken kindly to the Dalai Lama whom he rated an unsavoury character.

Britain's lack of interest in the Dalai Lama during the years of his exile (1904-8) may not be difficult to explain. It may be recalled that the Tibetan ruler had been distinctly un-understanding, even unfriendly, at the time of the expedition to Lhasa. Additionally there was the halo of intrigue that surrounded the Buriat Mongol, Aguan Dorjief, who, allegedly, was close to the master of the Potala. The fact that he was a Russian subject who had uninhibited access to the high and the mighty in St Petersburg, including the Tsar himself, lent a further aura of mystery to his name. But the Buriat and Russian intrigue, real or imaginary apart, the real crux of British hostility, and later indifference, to the Dalai Lama was the series of agreements which they had concluded with the Chinese and the Russians as a result of which they had gradually washed their hands clean of Tibet. More specifically, the Adhesion Agreement of 1906, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the Trade Regulations of 1908, referred to a little later in the narrative, clearly implied a reversal, if indeed a complete repudiation of the earlier policy of Curzon. The man mainly responsible for this was John Morley, the Secretary of State for India in the new (Liberal) regime, who took over from Arthur Balfour in December 1905. And Morely, in many respects a complete antithesis of Curzon and Curzonism, often-times bent over backwards to ensure a clean break with all that the great pro-consul had stood for.

IV

In the context of Tibet and relations with China, three major developments for which Morely was directly responsible may be noted. The first relates to the negotiations leading to the Adhesion Agreement of 1906.¹ It may be recalled that before Curzon laid down

¹The 27 April, 1906 'Convention between Great Britain and China concerning Tibet', *inter alia* 'confirmed', vide Article I, the Lhasa convention which Younghusband had concluded. In the 'Notes' exchanged on the occasion, Peking undertook 'not to employ anyone not a Chinese subject and not of Chinese nationality' in Tibet, in any capacity. For the text of the convention, and the notes, see pp. 1-4.

the reins of office, talks with Tang Shao-yi in Calcutta had reached a virtual dead-end and, sadly disillusioned, the Indian Governor-General recorded his considered view that further concessions to the Chinese were impossible, an assessment in which, not long after, Minto too fully concurred. Understandably, the latter's own experience had been none too happy. The subsequent resumption of negotiations in Peking with its resultant watering down of the Indian position, as the text would clearly bear out, may be attributed directly to Whitehall. Nor is there any doubt whatsoever that Calcutta was distinctly unhappy about being completely unrepresented, and indeed ignored, in a matter which was of direct, intimate, concern to it.

Another subject on which Morley took a stand and with which the Indian Government was not always in agreement, related to the protracted negotiations with Russia leading to the conclusion of the Convention of 1907. While it may be conceded that the overall decision to sort out varied points of friction with the Tsar's government rested—and in the context of Britain's imperial role perhaps legitimately so—with Whitehall subjects such as Tibet or Afghanistan and Persia, for that matter, concerned the Indian authorities directly, and in an important manner. Thus, in retrospect, the decision to equate Russia with Britain in regard to the right of sending an Agent to Lhasa was to prove a major stumbling block at the time of the tripartite Simla Conference. Still another issue on which Morley proved mulishly stubborn was his hands-off policy in regard to the despatch of scientific missions to Tibet.¹ The fact that China was exempt from this embargo, self-imposed by the British and only reluctantly agreed to by the Russians, was a fact the Liberal Secretary of State seemed to ignore.

An interesting revelation made in the course of negotiating the Russian convention was the well-nigh impossible task of defining the physical limits of Tibet. Nor did Peking prove of much help in sorting it out. Actually when pressed hard on the subject, it referred

¹While ratifying the Lhasa Convention on 11 November, 1904, Lord Ampthill, the then Governor-General, had appended a 'declaration' materially 'modifying' its terms in two important respects viz. the mode of payment of the indemnity and the visits to Lhasa of the Trade Agents posted at Gyantse. Later what Curzon called a sell-out was incorporated in the 'Agreement' concerning 'Tibet' and the 'Notes' exchanged on that occasion which were to form a part of the larger Anglo-Russian Convention of 31 August, 1907. For the text see pp. 4-8.

to the maps of the eighteenth century which, in turn, were not ready to hand. Needless to say these were to prove elusive, far from accurate and later, for a time, stalled all progress at the tripartite Simla confabulations (1913-14).

Negotiating the Trade Regulations of 1908¹ provided another long drawn-out battle of wits between Chang Ying-tang, the Chinese Special Commissioner in Lhasa, and his British counterparts, Louis Dane and later Eric Wilton; the Tibetan representative, Tsarong Shape, acted throughout as a faithful camp-follower (of Chang). As in the case of the Adhesion Agreement, here too the Chinese proved stubborn, unyielding, intractable; the British, fighting a rearguard action, yielded ground by bits, and yet all along the way. Thus the activities of their Trade Agents were severely restricted, and the area of the marts, at Gyantse and Yatung, confined to well-defined limits; British escorts, stationed at the marts, were to be limited in number and gradually replaced when the Chinese provided their own men; the telegraph lines were to be sold out to China as also the rest-houses built along the road to Lhasa. Another 'humiliating' concession was that British agents were to be gradually replaced by the 'natives'.

The real difficulty about the Trade Regulations was not only that the Indian authorities regarded them as compromising in character, but that the Amban and his officials who now ruled the roost in Lhasa, and beyond, consistently violated them, both in letter and in spirit. What was worse was that when complaints against such breaches were lodged with the authorities in Peking, the latter denied them vociferously. The most interesting of the devices used was the subterfuge of the Amban's directives with two divergent versions—one, for implementation, in Tibet; the other, for consumption, and vindication, by the Waichiaopu, in Peking.

A consistent, if indeed wearisome, theme that dominated the Amban's administration was its pronouncedly anti-British bias. This was the main burden of numerous articles published, and widely circulated in Tibet, wherein the British were depicted as outside imperialist ogres whose principal aim was to seize Tibet's

¹Equally significant were the new Trade Regulations concluded at Calcutta on 20 April, 1908. The activities of the Trade Agents, as of the Agencies, were now severely restricted, which the British later found to be galling. For the text, see pp. 8-14.

riches, and usurp its freedom. While they were depicted as wily and clever, the Tibetans, by contrast, were made out to be easily gullible. For the latter could never comprehend how tricky the 'white Sahibs' were.

As a backdrop to Chinese administration in Tibet and the activities of Chang Ying-tang, and later of Amban Lien Yu, it is necessary to remember that Tibet's spiritual and lay ruler, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, had been away from his land and his people since the fateful August 1904 when Younghusband arrived in Lhasa. Earlier in the narrative a brief reference has been made to his 'travels' and the fact that, towards the middle of 1908, he was on his way to the Chinese capital both because he had urgent summons from the Manchu court as also perhaps because of his conviction that such a visit would be useful in his own interests. His reception there by the puppet Emperor Kuang Hsu and the real ruler, the inordinately ambitious and powerful 'Old Buddha', the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi, left a lot to be desired. There was an unseemly wrangle over the ceremonies which he was to perform. Finally, genuflections of a sort were substituted for the traditional 'kowitz', even though the Lama had to go through the motions ordained in the latter on the occasion of the Dowager's birthday. What was more, the controversy attending upon his new titles, 'The Sincerely Obedient, Reincarnation-helping, Self-existent Buddha of the West', with its appendage of a financial subvention, created a lot of bad blood. Understandably, the Dalai felt downgraded, demoted; equally, the Empress and her advisors insisted that the title was a necessary prerequisite to the Manchu court's acceptance and rehabilitation of the deposed reincarnation of Chenrezi. What further hurt the Lama was Peking's new decree laying down that he could memorialize the Throne only through the intermediary of its Amban at Lhasa. He protested, verbally and in writing, but the Board of Dependencies over-ruled his protests and the court made it evident beyond words that it was not prepared to modify the stand it had taken.

While the Dalai Lama tarried on in Peking, came the sudden death of the Emperor followed, a day later, by that of the Dowager herself. Could it be, not a few wondered, that the wrath of Heaven, invoked by the outraged Lama, fell on the house of Ch'ing?

The Tibetan Pontiff's return home was uneventful, apart from the fact that at Chengtu, his new, unwanted, if also un-solicited,

title was officially conferred upon him. That apart, a dark spectre hung uneasily over his weary head. As he progressed home through Kham, reports reached him, and from all directions, that Chao's campaigns in the March country were in full swing; that the gompas had been shamelessly desecrated, even razed to the ground; that the land had been ruthlessly conquered. What was still more disturbing was the spate of rumours that Chao had despatched a large number of well-armed, well-trained troops to the Tibetan capital where he himself had been appointed an additional Amban. The Lama, furious at Peking's new titles, must have felt that insult was being added to injury, that all that he held dear: his land, his people, above all his own life, were now at stake. Symptomatic of his new thinking was the appeal which he now addressed, while still on his way to Lhasa, to 'Great Britain and all the powers'. It is evident that he had been more than fully aroused to the dangers which he now faced at the hands of the suzerain power and that instead of regarding the British as his enemies veered round to the conclusion that they might help to sustain him in his endeavours.

The Dalai Lama had found the situation to be bad enough while passing through East Tibet; in Lhasa, he found it almost impossible. Not many days had elapsed after his return when Chao's storm-troopers, under the command of the young, and formidable, Chung Ying, marched in, unsolicited, uninvited. The new arrivals appear to have received the most explicit instructions to surround the houses of his Shapas; more, the Lama discovered his own palace virtually besieged? His flight, for which there were clear precedents in the conduct, among others, of his own suzerain, thus became inevitable—unless, of course, he could reconcile himself to play the second fiddle in the prison-house of the Potala!

The interesting part of the Lama's behaviour is not the fact of his flight—he had done it earlier too, in 1904—as the direction it now took. And this again reflects the remarkable metamorphoses that his thinking had undergone in the interval of his political wilderness. As may be guessed, he now took a southerly direction, heading towards India, with Chung Ying's men hot on his heels. There was now a price tag on his head and he barely escaped with it intact.

The Dalai Lama's deposition, a second time in less than half a dozen years, and the charges now levelled against him by the 'diabolical Len Amban' made him answer back in an equally forceful language. Was he, in fact, 'extravagant', 'capricious' and 'oppres-

sive'? Had he 'obstructed' the march of Chinese troops from Szechuan, or left his people in the lurch? The harsh truth, he now vehemently protested, was starkly different for

it has been the Chinese themselves who made it impossible for us to live in Tibet, and again it has been the Chinese themselves who thwarted our designs to go to the Chinese Government to represent our case.¹

The thirteenth Dalai Lama's two years in India were not memorable—he had his round of places of Buddhist pilgrimage while the usual crowds appeared for the 'darshan' of the God-king. His humdrum routine—and the Raj, at its noon-day splendour, was sorely exercised over an unproductive item of expenditure on an unwanted guest—however was interspersed by two developments of some significance. The first was a stern British refusal to give him any encouragement whatever in his dispute with China. Long and laborious were the Lama's complaints against Amban Len's clear violation of the letter and spirit of his masters' solemn undertakings. His land was being robbed, his religion defiled, his people enslaved. And here he was, the lay and spiritual ruler of his vast domains, turned into a hapless refugee. The Dalai even appealed to the lowly in human frailties, covetousness, proffering his land as a gift, on a gold platter. Would the British, he humbly baseeched, take it under their wings—as a protectorate!—and conclude with it a treaty on the same terms, 'as with Bhutan'? Nearly a quarter century later, in circumstances that bore a striking parallel, the Dalai Lama threw very much the same bait—proffering 'secret treaties'. Despite the Raj, and its necessary concomitant of imperialist aggrandizement, the British refused to be tempted in one case, as in the other. Not unlike its imperious-visaged twin-sister, imperialism too has its laws of diminishing returns; the Lama's offers were politely turned down!

To revert to 1910, not many weeks had elapsed after the Dalai Lama's escape when Morley asked Minto to intimate to him, and in clear, unambiguous terms, that as between him and his suzerain, the British had no intent to intervene. It followed that the Lama's stay in India was to be that of a temporary guest, shorn of all political overtones. Nor did the British, as has been noticed, evince the

¹For a detailed expose of the Chinese charges and their rebuttal by the Dalai Lama see Bell to India, June 1-2, 1910. The text is at pp. 18-26.

slightest interest in extending their sway over his dominions. To put it mildly, in the circumstances, the Lama felt himself to be at a loose end.

Another keen disappointment for the Tibetan pontiff was the rebuff administered to him by the Tzar's government. Starkly blind to the sea-change that had come over the political landscape as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the Lama secretly, and behind the back of the British, appealed to St Petersburg for aid. The Russian reply, delivered through the then British Political Officer, Bell, was couched in beautifully vague generalities; in the result, it was singularly non-committal on the crucial question of rendering assistance to his cause.

A change in the Lama's fortunes came with the October (1911) Revolution in China which at the same time helped to ease tensions in East Tibet, and indeed along the entire stretch of India's north-eastern frontier. Starting from a stray bomb outrage at Wuchang it had, before long, engulfed the whole country in its far-reaching tentacles. The repercussions on the mainland were significant enough, for, before many months had elapsed, the nearly 300-year old Manchu rule had been uprooted, yielding place to a ramshackle Republic. Presently, Yuan Shih-kai, who had occupied important offices in Ch'ing China since his political apprenticeship in Korea in 1885, assumed the Dragon Throne.

Not so much on the mainland however, as in the Outer Dependencies, the October Revolution had its most powerful impact. And as the documentation clearly underlines, there is a striking parallel here between developments in Tibet and Outer Mongolia. In December 1911, the Urga Hutukthu, his position buttressed by prominent families of the Mongol nobility, proclaimed his 'independence'. And yet as may have been evident even to the uninitiated, it were the Russian bayonets that more than anything else helped the Mongols break away from Peking's dread hold. The helping hand was that of the great White Tsar whose vested interests in a neighbouring domain appeared to be seriously threatened by the new regime in Peking. Hence the Russians' ill-disguised, almost frontal, intervention. The Mongols were conscious of their benefactors; the Chinese no less aware of what they had to contend with.

In sharp contrast to Mongolia, in Tibet, the lines were far from clearly drawn. The October Revolution released a powerful force—

the pent-up discontent of the Tibetans led by the Dalai Lama's agents who had, over the years, fostered it clandestinely. The vehemence of the storm was the greater and the resultant upheaval the more violent because, above all, in Tibetan eyes at any rate, Chinese rule had been oppressive. Another factor was the remarkable loosening of discipline in the ranks of Chinese troops who were soon indistinguishable from a mere rabble. Nor were their officials any better behaved. Thus there was a running battle between Amban Lien Yu, who was deposed and downgraded, and Chung Ying, the young and inordinately ambitious commander of the troops whom Chao had sent to Lhasa to dress down the Dalai Lama.

Britain's sympathy for Tibet's cause was confined to the few officials who became part of the Lama's entourage during his two years, 1910-12, of exile in India. Prominent among them was the then Political Officer in Sikkim, Charles Alfred Bell, and the Indian police official, of Sikkimese extraction, Laden La. In the Foreign Department the Tibetan pontiff was treated with indifference; those in finance viewed him as an expensive guest. Whitehall, for its part, had made no bones about its refusal to give him any countenance whatever—at one stage, it even contemplated shipping him back to Peking!

With the October (1911) Revolution, however, a change came over the Dalai Lama's fortunes and, to a marked degree, in the attitude of his unwilling British hosts. Not unnaturally, the latter saw in the suddenly transformed situation a great opportunity to redeem their own, and the Lama's, position. The transformation is reflected faithfully in the farewell message which Lord Hardinge, the then Governor-General, sent to the Tibetan ruler on the eve of the latter's departure. Herein British interest in him and his land shows itself in such sharp contrast to its studied hostility two years earlier when the Lama's fortunes were at a low ebb.

V

In delineating the principal strands leading to the tripartite Simla Conference, which marks the culminating point of the first volume of this study, three factors need to be carefully scrutinized. The first relates to the completely shaken Chinese position in Tibet on the morrow of the October (1911) Revolution. Amban Lien Yu had been deposed by Chung Ying and his cohorts who now besieged him in his *yamen*. This apart, the ill-disciplined Chinese soldiery

had gone on the rampage arousing the town's populace to a fever pitch that found expression in a spontaneous outburst of mob risings aimed at hunting down its (Chinese) tormentors. Lhasa thus found itself in the grip of a dual rebellion. Nor was that all. Chinese troops in Pome and Pemako, on Assam's borders, reacted to the news of the Rebellion in much the same manner as their counterparts elsewhere. They too revolted, went on a spree of loot and arson, and slowly wended their way, across the land, to join their compatriots in Lhasa. Their uneven progress was marked by impulsive and spontaneous outbursts of violence and anger on the part of the Tibetan populace. Similar scenes had been witnessed in Gyantse and Yatung.

It would thus be obvious that, in 1912-13, one of the more immediate problems with which both the Dalai Lama and the British in India had to contend was the pacification of Tibet which, among other things, depended upon the peaceful evacuation of the rebellious Chinese soldiery and its unruly commanders. Never popular, they now became the targets of the cumulative hatred and hostility, of the vast mass of Tibetans who, through the years, had resented their intercession in day-to-day affairs. It followed that there would be an acute danger of attacks on the persons and property of these Chinese stragglers. Besides, there was the problem of the arms they carried. To add to all this there was Chung Ying's demand that the Lhasa authorities should allow his men to repair home via Kham, a hotbed of intrigue and acute disturbances that followed the murder of Chao Erh-feng in the revolutionary outbreaks that had greeted the proclamation of the Republic.

All through the summer (1912) spasmodic negotiations took place in Lhasa to hammer out a truce of sorts for the evacuation of Chung Ying's men, and of the ex-Amban Lien Yu. How urgent and delicate these were may be gauged from the fact that, at an early stage, the Indian authorities decided to despatch the Sikkimese police official, Laden La, to bring about their successful consummation. Later when, under pressure from Whitehall which feared the worst, his mission was countermanded, the British exerted a powerful influence over the Nepalese to lend their good offices to mediate. Ultimately it was through them that a final settlement was wrought, fitfully, in stages.

It is not necessary to recount here the course these tortuous negotiations took, nor the terms of agreements which solemnly

concluded one day were as shamefacedly broken the next. One point, however, needs considerable stressing, namely that as between the principal negotiators, the Tibetans and the Chinese, there was, and understandably, a remarkable lack of trust. The Chinese soldiers were certain that their Tibetan captors would use their (Chinese) own weapons against them and, despite promises of safe conduct, murder them on the way. For their part, the Tibetans could never persuade themselves that the Chinese would lay down their arms, or indeed leave Tibet, whatever, to the contrary, they might profess or promise. It would thus be obvious that here was a crisis of confidence, a seemingly unbridgeable credibility gap; in current parlance, a complete breakdown of communications. Hence, in the final count, the mediation of the Nepalese and the use of British good offices, in the person of Colonel Willoughby, their Military Attache in Peking, to help Chinese soldiers and civilians across the Chumbi valley.

Another aspect of the problem which necessitated the convening of the Tripartite Conference related to disturbances in East Tibet which followed the murder of Chao Erh-feng. One of the problems here was that a large part of the work done by the Warden collapsed the moment he disappeared from the scene while the lamas who had hated him, and yet bided their time during the years he held sway, now rose in open rebellion. Hsiang-treng, the Tibetan monastery in Kham, athwart of the southern road to Lhasa, which had halted Chao's progress for the best part of a year, rose in rebellion again. What was more, it soon emerged as a stronghold of Tibetan revolt, and resistance, and thanks to its strategic location, seriously disrupted communications.

It would follow that revolt in Tibet was only one facet of a complicated mosaic of events that now presented itself. The birthpangs of the Republic in Szechuan were witness to years of violence and the strong man who emerged from the maelstrom in the initial stages was Yin Chang-heng, a young and impetuous soldier who prided himself on having butchered Chao to death with his own hands. Yin's private professions were loud, his public proclamations louder still. He broadcast his resolve to recover what had been lost and to march on to Lhasa in order not only to teach the recalcitrant Dalai Lama a lesson and relieve the hard-pressed Chinese garrison but, most important of all, to reclaim Chao's patrimony for the great Motherland. It were these ambitious plans of Yin and his com-

manders which frightened the Dalai Lama out of his wits. If Yin succeeded, he must have argued, may he not have to resume his 'travels' and perhaps say good-bye to his land for all time?

What frightened the Lama even more was the fact that by the fall of 1913, Yin had partially succeeded in stemming the tide of rebellion in large parts of East Tibet. It is true that this involved ruthless suppression—at Chamdo, for instance, General Peng had razed the huge gumpa there to the ground. This was by no means exceptional; much the same story had repeated itself in many other places. What was more, with a shaky regime in Peking, and Chinese prestige at a particularly low ebb, resistance could both be stormy, as well as sustained. It was this fear of a ding-dong battle and the danger that it might drag the whole of Tibet into its train that shook the Dalai Lama, as it did the British. It followed that an effort must be made to bring about a settlement that might avoid the dire consequences of a protracted struggle.

Thus it was that the plight of the rebellious Chinese soldiery in Lhasa, added to the fear of a long drawn-out war of attrition in Kham, posed serious problems that clamoured for urgent solution. One closely affected China, the other deeply touched Tibet. There was another aspect which concerned India's British rulers in an important manner, namely the security of the country's land frontiers. Over the years since Younghusband's return from Lhasa, the tranquillity of this frontier, as the documents meticulously chronicle, had been gravely disturbed. China's march-back into Tibet, coupled with Chao Erh-feng's well-nigh realized dream of making Chinese control effective in districts which bordered India, made the British rulers sensitive. An important landmark in this respect was the murder of Williamson, and the Abor Expedition that followed in its wake. Both were symptomatic of a great change that had come about in the situation.

In regard to the north-east frontier, as in some other fields, Minto had to a large extent anticipated Hardinge. Actually, the latter's efforts to bend over backwards to reverse the new orientation which his predecessor had sought to give to previous policy seemed, in retrospect, a brave, albeit vain, endeavour. For the new Viceroy soon realized that the forces which had brought about the change were far too powerful to be stayed. What O'Callaghan discovered about Chinese penetration into the Mishmi country was soon borne out, in every detail, by Dundas. What was more, at the Whitehall

end Chinese activity in the Mishmi country became the subject of a memorandum¹ which appears to have made a deep and powerful impact. Here it would seem, apart from other factors, the departure of Morley and the induction into office of Crewe made for a more realistic appreciation of the dangers. Morley, whom Churchill called a martinet in the India Office, had developed strong views and prejudices, which over the years he tenaciously hugged and indeed refused to modify. The result was that very often he was out of step with the harsh realities of life.

India's chief interest in the situation was the preservation of peace along its borders and this, thanks to its own unhappy experiences, it had concluded, could best be ensured by a regime in Lhasa that was free from Chinese control, or hegemony. The brief, if tumultuous, reigns of Chang Ying-tang and later of Amban Lien Yu had clearly demonstrated this. It followed that British India's vested interest in a settlement which would ensure that the Lhasa regime enjoyed a real, and not an imaginary, measure of independence and that Peking did not subvert its distinct identity was an important factor that finally weighed the scales in favour of a tripartite conference.

VI

The hazy beginnings of events that finally led to the Simla Conference of 1913-14 may be traced to the August 1912 Memorandum presented to the Foreign Office in Peking by the then British Minister, Sir John Jordan.² The sequence that preceded brings out two points which bear considerable emphasis. One that the urgency for presenting it was largely inspired by what looked like an impending invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops. Here it was not only the imperious Yin Chang-heng who had cried loud, and threateningly, to snuff out all Tibetan opposition and march relentlessly to Lhasa; the Wai-chiao-pu's Vice-Minister had made much the same claim. A relief expedition, the latter had underlined, was an urgent necessity and even though, under strong diplomatic pressure, President Yuan Shih-kai repudiated his (Vice) Minister, Whitehall had felt far from re-assured. It is significant that it was at Sir Edward Grey's

¹For the text, 'Chinese activity on the Mishmi border, 1910-12,' India Office (London) Memorandum, 9 September, 1912 see pp. 35-41).

²For the text of Sir John Jordan's Memorandum to the Waichiaopu, 17 August, 1912, see pp. 66-67.

specific insistence that the August Memorandum came to be presented.

The contents of the Memorandum are not important except insofar as they underline Britain's anxiety to restore a position which, it felt, should exist in terms of the treaties to which China had pledged its word of honour. Its true significance lay elsewhere, in that (in the absence of that position being restored) it spelt out the sanctions—making diplomatic recognition of the new Republic conditional and closing to China, and the Chinese, the route to Lhasa, across the Indian frontier. Here it may be noted that diplomatic recognition, then as now, is the attribute of a sovereign state; nor were the British alone, nor yet unique, in using this instrument as a tool for exerting pressure. The more important thing, and one which really hurt, was the refusal to allow the use of the Indian route for ingress and egress of Chinese personnel. While its importance had never been in dispute, insofar as passage through Eastern Tibet and Kham had now become virtually impossible (after Chao and his system had collapsed over his head) the route through Chumbi became infinitely more valuable. No wonder the Chinese were deeply affected by the decision to close it. Equally, their determination to get it opened played no small a part in making them later to yield ground.

Jordan's role in bringing about the tripartite conference deserves special mention. It is necessary to underline the fact that more than his masters at home and, it must be conceded, the highest functionaries of the Government of India, he saw that Great Britain's participation was a *sine qua non* for any successful negotiations on the Tibetan question. All through, it may be recalled, the British government in London was averse to any participation for fear this would entail responsibilities which it had fain avoid: a Liberal regime's traditionally conservative attitude towards accepting any imperial commitments. If Britain, Whitehall argued, 'witnessed' an agreement concluded between the Tibetans and the Chinese, might it not do the trick? It is significant too that the government of Lord Hardinge toed much the same line, albeit with a slight, marginal difference—to the extent it pleaded that the venue for Sino-Tibetan parleys should be outside Tibet. It is thus not without nothing that the choice of Darjeeling was discussed. To be sure, in the archival records of the latter half of 1912, and the early part of 1913, that town figures prominently as a place where the Dalai Lama's represen-

tatives were scheduled to confer with that of Republican China's!

Apart from what has been stated, the fact that Whitehall stuck out its neck for a bipartite conference is evident from the earlier drafts of the Convention that are extant. Here, more than anywhere else, it is evident that the British wanted to stand out, and aloof. India's emendations again largely related to getting around, if not behind, the self-denying clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Thus, in the initial stages, an Agent at Lhasa was viewed as an indispensable *sine qua non*; so were new, and revised trade regulations. But beyond that the Indian authorities had, as yet, refused to see.

It would thus appear that Jordan alone was alive to the difficulties inherent in any attempt to sort out the question of Tibet, or of the frontier, without a direct British participation in the parleys. On the one hand, he had argued, it was clear that bilateral talks, assuming these could be arranged, might prove interminable; worse, no conclusions whatever may be reached. St Petersburg's objections to modifying the Anglo-Russian Convention, Jordan emphasized, could be easily met by pointing to Britain's 'special interests' in Tibet. As to shouldering additional responsibilities, of which Whitehall was so scared, might these not be less onerous if the British participated in the parleys, than if they did not? Some measure of responsibility, it was evident, was inherent in the situation that existed; the more or less of it, would depend upon the manner in which the British played their cards.

Given the premise that a Tibetan administration that was independent of Chinese control would be peaceful—and the British equated it to a quiet, undisturbed, frontier in the tribal areas of Assam—the logic of Jordan's arguments was irresistible. India was an early convert, nor, for that matter, did Whitehall lag far behind. The best part of 1913 was spent, therefore, in giving shape and form to the convening of a tripartite meeting. Here, from the British standpoint, important questions were the venue and the choice—and status—of the delegates. As to the first, Tibet was ruled out for fear lest inside its territory, the Chinese should pressurize and browbeat the government and the people. Nor did Peking suit, for the Indian authorities had been none too happy about the 1906 Adhesion Agreement concluded there. Jordan for his part was none too keen either, nor the Chinese for that matter. Inevitably the choice fell on Simla, India's summer headquarters, although

Peking was far from enthusiastic. Curiously there was not much of argument in regard to the delegates: Jordan rejected Chang Ying-tang's nomination and suggested Ivan Chen's instead—a choice accepted by Peking, without any known protest.

The first real difficulty cropped up when the question of status of the delegates came under review. Chastened, and indeed forewarned by their experience of 1907-8, the British were keen that all the three representatives should be equal, and enjoy a plenipotentiary status. The Chinese, aware that in 1907-8 the British had, despite protests, accepted Tsarong Shape as a subordinate and indeed an under-study of Chang Ying-tang fought a long drawn-out, rearguard action to have the earlier position accepted. Jordan, and later his temporary replacement Alston, fought hard, and successfully, to have the plenipotentiary status of all the three¹ recognized on all hands.

Nor was this the end of China's obstructionist tactics. Chen represented to Alston that he was not ready to leave. Nor was he keen either, having been inducted much against his will. That he prevaricated is not surprising; what is the fact that in all this Peking supported him to the hilt. After dates had been staggered more than once, to suit Chinese convenience, Alston's firm stand that the Conference would begin with Chen if possible, but without him if necessary, did no doubt play its part in quickening the latter's pace. At long last, he did arrive in Simla, on the very eve of its commencement.

Meanwhile, towards the end of August, when all seemed settled, Peking put in another, unexpected, spoke in the wheel. This was its assertion, allegedly based on Jordan's earlier assurances, that the main purpose of the Conference was to restore to China the position it had lost after the departure of its troops, and of its Amban, and that the British stood bound to help restore the *status quo ante*. Alston felt rattled, but did not go beyond repudiating

¹For the text of the Presidential mandate appointing Ivan Chen, see p. 68. For the powers of the Tibetan plenipotentiary, Sridzin Shatra Paljor Dorji, *loc cit*. On 26 November, 1913, a 'Presidential Order' was issued constituting an Administrative Council in Peking. On this Council 'several delegates' were to be appointed by the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, 'after due consideration' of the matter. Among those nominated by the President was Lu Hsing-chi, the Amban-designate to Lhasa who, thanks to a British interdict, had to function from Calcutta. For the text see pp. 69-70.

the suggestion. Or else, too much, he felt, was at stake.

Another tactic adopted by the Chinese was to endeavour to come to a separate understanding with the Tibetans at Chamdo, and thereby subvert the very basis of the tripartite exercise. In this context, the appointment of the two 'Pacificators' and their frantic efforts, through alternate coaxing and cajolery, to negotiate with the Kalon Lama, the Tibetan Commander in Kham, deserves notice. It is significant that the Pacificators, at Peking's behest, were engaged in their mission of an independent settlement with Tibet. Again, whatever their veracity, texts, apocryphal or otherwise, of an actual settlement were widely circulated and believed—and not only in East Tibet. Curiously all this happened while Yuan Shih-kai's regime in Peking was negotiating with the British Minister on the bases for convening a tripartite conference in India!

Still another string to the Chinese bow—which the Tibetans had feared most—was to create a new situation in East Tibet, by launching a major armed offensive there. Aimed at forcing Tibet's hands to toe Peking's line, this was to be so timed as to synchronize with the eve of the Conference, or even while it was being held. The British, not unaware of China's potentialities in this regard, had, just before the Conference convened at Simla, sounded a stern warning that any such attempt to mount an offensive would make the parleys infructuous and even invite Whitehall's active retaliation. Similar noises, appropriately modulated to suit the time and place, had to be made all the while the Conference was in session so as to keep Peking, and even Lhasa for that matter, from disturbing the delicate peace that subsisted.

The Chinese apart, the Dalai Lama's role in all that preceded the holding of the Conference was neither altogether straight, nor yet above board. The 'intercepted telegrams' reveal¹ that the Tibetan ruler tried hard, and to the maximum extent he could, to keep his options open. Significantly, his rejection of Lu Hsing-chi's overtures was couched in a language which would make one infer that he was not altogether averse to a direct deal. Thus, in one of his messages Lu is reasonably explicit, for he informed his political superiors that the Lama had 'never categorically stated

¹The first 'intercepted' telegram was dated 7 May, 1913; the last, extant, 19 February, 1914. They provide a useful insight into the working of the Chinese mind, more specifically that of Lu Hsing-chi. For representative excerpts see pp. 144-65.

that he does not want a Chinese officer to come to Tibet.' Besides, there had been, Lu intimated, a 'general discussion' about the advisability of sending an officer to Peking 'to settle' the Tibetan question 'by a return to the *status quo*'.

Significantly the messages which the Lama exchanged with President Yuan Shin-kai tell the same tale. Above all, there was an aura of mystery surrounding the goings-on between the Chinese Pacifators and the Kalon Lama in Kham, and one may legitimately conclude that behind this thick pall of smoke there may have been a little fire too. In extenuation, however, it may well be argued that the British had been none too steadfast in the Lama's support and, until 1912, when the situation in Tibet took a sudden turn for the better they had, to all intents and purposes, abandoned him, and his regime, to the tender mercies of Peking's none-too-scrupulous masters. With its past experience, all through the post-Younghusband years, Lhasa may therefore have been, and legitimately, a little sceptical about the extent of backing it may get from the British, or the duration it may last. Jordan's criticism, therefore, of the Lama being an intriguer and a backslapper needs to be examined against the background of the not-altogether clean record of his own country's dealings with the Tibetan ruler.

The tripartite Simla Conference set itself a seemingly limited objective, namely to sort out the 'Tibetan problem'. That expression, however, was elusive and difficult to define if only for the reason that for each of the three parties to the dispute, it had a different connotation. Thus, for the Dalai Lama, the essence of the whole question resolved itself into a minimal degree of Chinese authority combined with a goodly measure of Tibetan autonomy. The latter, as viewed from Lhasa, was synonymous with a complete absence of Chinese troops—a situation that actually existed at the time of the Conference, and had indeed been brought about by events in the months immediately preceding it. Another basic desideratum was the establishment of peace in East Tibet, both to stabilize a sufficiently chaotic state of affairs there, as also to relieve a degree of strain on what poor resources Lhasa had, or could muster, to fight against Republican China's threats of aggression. That the lamas were in revolt was a help to Lhasa, but that the situation in Kham bordered on virtual anarchy was a matter for considerable concern. It may be recalled that in the months preceding the convening of the Conference, and even while it was being held, the

Dalai Lama's government gave repeated expression to its deep disquiet about a fresh Chinese army marching, through Kham, right into their country.

In sharp contrast to Lhasa's, Peking's objective were completely at variance. Briefly, the aim was to get back to a situation that existed during the days of Amban Lien Yu, in the years immediately preceding the October (1911) revolution. In East Tibet too the Chinese wanted the clock put back, to restore the *status quo ante* as it prevailed on the eve of Chao Erh-feng's relinquishing his charge. In other words, China's intent was to have a Tibetan administration that was completely subservient to it, while its own authority was to extend the farthest territorial limits to which China's arms had marched. A pliant, solicitous, preferably an absentee Dalai Lama; a powerful Amban, or his Republican counterpart, ruling the roost in Lhasa; an unadulterated Chinese administration restored to within a hundred miles of the Tibetan capital; these, in sum, were Peking's major goals at Simla.

Apart from Tibet and China, the third supplicant to the Conference was British India. With their first-hand experience of Chinese thrusts, real or imaginary, across the eastern frontier during the years 1909-12, the Indian authorities were keen above all to lay down a frontier that was beyond all cavil or dispute.¹ Nor was the objective here to purloin either Chinese, or Tibetan, domain. As the record bears out, Delhi was anxious to make the new contours of its political boundary widely broadcast and, in any case, made known to the Chinese. Thus in his 'Confidential Note' the Chief of the General Staff underlined *inter alia* that

no time [was] to be lost in declaring to the Chinese in unmistakable terms the line the frontier is to follow, in making our occupation of that line effective insofar as placing ourselves in positions whence we can watch developments and prevent further encroachments. . . in improving communications on our side.²

The security of the frontier, however, could not be ensured—and the British had learnt their lesson through bitter, harsh experience

¹This is amply brought out in the 'Memorandum by the General Staff Branch' on the points which should engage the attention of survey parties working in the tribal territory on the Assam-Tibet border, in 1911-12. For the full text see pp. 41-45.

²The 'Confidential Note' by Chief of the General Staff, dated 1 June, 1912, takes the frontier section by section and attempts 'a rough definition' in consonance with all the 'geographical and political information that had been culled from the various surveys'. For the full text see pp. 45-60.

—unless Lhasa was relatively free from Peking's firm grip. In other words, the British argued, a measure of Tibetan autonomy was a necessary concomitant to India's frontiers being peaceful.

From a closer scrutiny of their respective positions, it would be apparent that, as between the Tibetan objectives and the Chinese, there virtually was no meeting-ground. The British, nonetheless, found themselves closer to the Tibetans and, to that extent, a shade or two farther removed from Peking.

VII

The proceedings of the opening weeks of the Conference, in October-November, 1913, reveal that one of its first items of business, after the preliminaries were out of the way, was the presentation of Tibet's 'claims' by Lonchen Shatra.¹ And these embraced not only the widest extent of Tibet, in terms of its physical limits, but the farthest and most comprehensive demands which could be pressed politically. No wonder, Ivan Chen's retort was immediate, if abrupt; what is more, the list of Chinese 'claims',² which came as a counter-thrust, were based on much the same technique. Peking demanded a restoration of the *status quo ante* 1912; the Dalai Lama must be cut to size; above all, the Amban with his escort must reappear in Lhasa, signifying that Tibet once again was to be subservient to the Chinese fiat.

From the beginning, and long before the delegates assembled at Simla, the British, mentally and otherwise, had pitched themselves into the role of the honest broker. If McMahan had had his way, he would have, after the early sparring between the Tibetan and Chinese delegates, produced his version of a compromise formula. Unfortunately, his initiative was completely sapped by his political mentors in Whitehall where no agreement could be wrought between the Foreign and the India Office in regard to the requisite modifications of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Two of these seemed imperative for progress at Simla: one, relating to the stationing of a British Agent at Lhasa, which the Convention had disallowed; the other, in regard to the self-denying clause whereby the two parties had undertaken 'neither to seek nor to obtain' industrial or mineral

¹Extracts from the Lonchen's 'Statement', made on 10 October, 1913, are on pp. 71-2.

²The Chinese 'counter-proposals' to the Tibetan statement were made on 30 October (1913). For extracts see pp. 72-4.

concessions. Unless Russia agreed to modify the Convention on both these counts, it would be difficult to pull Tibet out of its morass of sterilization. And that without doubt was the principal objective of the tripartite exercise, as the British viewed it.

The Indian standpoint, which found considerable support in London, was that, subject to the British guaranteeing Tibet's integrity, Russia might be persuaded to renounce its 1907 gains in that country, in lieu of what it had acquired, *ex parte*, in Mongolia.¹ At an earlier stage, conscious that even the holding of parleys with the Tibetans was contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of the Convention of 1907, Whitehall had undertaken to keep St Petersburg fully posted with the progress of negotiations in Simla. This was a course of action to which McMahon was resolutely opposed fearing lest any premature disclosures in St Petersburg, notorious for its indiscretions, should seriously jeopardise the success of his own efforts. Whitehall concurred. The result was that the actual communication to Russia was deferred until after the first Simla Convention had been initialled.

Britain's long-sustained effort to make the Russians yield ground in Tibet, in return for what they had gained at Urga, was presently frustrated. The Russian Foreign Minister insisted that the question of Mongolia had no relevance in the context of Tibet, that to make him accept British demands, it was necessary to offer some *quid pro quo*. It is indeed revealing that as early as 1912, in the course of his talks in London, Sazonov had asked for 'material assistance' in smoothing things for his country in Afghanistan.

Through the years that elapsed, the Russian Minister stuck tenaciously to this position. His later bout of intensive negotiations with Buchanan, during May-June, 1914, brings out fairly vividly two aspects of the question.² One, that St Petersburg would not yield on the proposition that it was entitled to compensation for what, it felt, was tantamount to the establishment, through the terms of the initialled Convention of April 1914, of a British protectorate over Tibet. This was particularly so, Sazonov argued, in regard to the clause which stipulated that in the event of a difference of interpretation (of the terms of the Convention) between

¹For the text of the Russo-Chinese Declaration and exchange of notes regarding (Outer) Mongolia, dated 5 November, 1913, see pp. 63-5.

²For the British position see communication to Russia regarding India-Tibet boundary in Grey to Buchanan, 4 May, 1914, pp. 91-2.

the two principal protagonists—the Tibetans and the Chinese—the British would be called upon to act as mediators.

The second point on which Sazonov refused to give way was that, in return for his agreeing to the initialled Convention, the British must allow the Russians untrammelled right to concessions in northern Afghanistan. It is interesting, and indeed revealing, that with his maze of secret and public undertakings, the Russian Minister aimed directly and indirectly at dividing Afghanistan, even as Persia had been in 1907, into rival spheres of influence. The British lack of enthusiasm in propitiating his insatiable thirst for these compacts arose, if partly, from the conviction that the division would annoy the Amir beyond hope of reconciliation. There was the additional argument that the Indian authorities were strongly opposed to a solution which was bound to give rise to a number of more difficult, if intractable, problems.

But above all, the real difficulty about a settlement with Russia was the conviction that it would be useless to pay any price for something that was well-nigh unattainable, viz. China's unqualified acceptance of the compromise wrought at Simla. And here, as may be evident from the very beginning, the principal, indeed the only stumbling block to a settlement was the question of the China-Tibet boundary. The concept of Inner/Outer Tibet, which McMahan had put forth, and which Teichman later viewed as 'a poor copy' borrowed from Russia's earlier action in Mongolia, was designed to tide over this predicament. The British Plenipotentiary, powerfully sold on the idea of buffers, was keen not only to insulate Tibet from Mongolia but also to interpose the whole of Inner Tibet between the rival territorial domains of Lhasa—and Peking.

There was a lot in the age-old story of China and Tibet that would lend countenance to the solution proffered by McMahan. The 'Inner' Tibet of the Simla map had been, for hundreds of years, a no man's land where no writ, be it Chinese or Tibetan, had prevailed. Ethnologically too large parts of it were permeated by the Tibetan people and their culture—principally, in terms of the language spoken, the mode of dress, of the religion its people professed. And yet there was no gainsaying the fact that, at times, politically at any rate, parts of it had been under Peking's sway. Other things apart, the Chinese, hyper-sensitive on the imponderables called 'face', took serious umbrage at the terminology, even though it had been made clear by McMahan's deputy Rose at

Simla and reiterated, with emphasis, both in London and Peking, that here was an area wherein China could do what it wanted to. Later when it did finally accept the concept, after a great deal of coaxing and cajolery, Peking stuck out its neck on defining the boundaries. Here too the hang-over of the past, the memory of Chao Erh-feng and his exploits in the March country, the nominal Chinese administration which the Warden had established,¹ proved far too powerful when set against the more pragmatic, if practical considerations of a solution that seemed reasonable, and therefore was bound to be a compromise.

Two facts about the Simla Conference stand out. One, that despite two significant territorial concessions made by the British, at the expense of the Tibetans, and which pared to the bone the buffer which they had sought to erect, the Chinese proved singularly unresponsive. The latter had, it is true, made much of their 'five major concessions' — to meet, as they repeatedly underlined, the British more than half-way. And yet, professions to the contrary notwithstanding, the 'concessions' so-called did not add up to much. With ill-grace, Peking did, after a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing, accept the idea of a buffer and was willing that, in certain parts of what was McMahon's 'Outer' Tibet, no additional Chinese troops or personnel be inducted. But the hiatus that yawned between what the Tibetans demanded (and the British accepted as a reasonable compromise), and the Chinese were willing to concede, remained wide, and deep, and impossible to bridge.

Another aspect of the question needs mention too. And this relates to what later came to be known as the McMahon boundary, or line. Negotiations concerning it were bilateral, as well they might in a situation where Tibet was completely master of its own house. It is true that Ivan Chen was not directly involved but to suggest that he was completely in the dark as to what transpired would be to fly in the face of known facts. Thus he, and his principals in Peking, had slept for weeks over the map attached to the Convention which showed the McMahon boundary, even though the sketch was on a reduced scale. If the Chinese delegate had wanted to question either the actual delineation of the boundary, or its

¹ For what Chao Erh-feng achieved and his successor Fu Sung-mu aimed at, in terms of creating a new province of Hsi-kang, or Western Kham, see Louis King's despatches, pp. 1816. and Fu Sung-mu's 'History of the Creation of Hsi-kang', pp. 187-93.

legality, there certainly was no dearth of opportunities for so doing. There is an additional factor that needs to be borne in mind. In May, Buchanan, then British Minister in St Petersburg, had handed over to the Russian government the text of the Convention, as initialled, along with the maps, *including* that of the India-Tibet boundary. As to the latter, Grey pointedly told Buchanan that while he did not anticipate the Russians raising any objections, should they do so

Your Excellency should explain that an accurate definition of the frontier has only become possible during the last few months. . . that the line chosen follows the main geographical features approximating to the traditional border between Tibet and the semi-independent tribes under the control of the Government of India, and that as far as possible it divides exactly the territory occupied by people of Tibetan origin from . . . the other tribes within the British sphere of influence.¹

It may be recalled that the Russian penchant for leaking out information was well known. Since the (India-Tibet) boundary settlement was *bilateral* in nature, and the Chinese were not *officially* cognizant of it, it stands to reason that the Russians would have told the Chinese about it, presuming that the latter did not already know.

It is commonplace and even trite to repeat that the Simla Conference proved abortive. In a sense it did, but only to the extent that Peking did not append its signatures. Its true significance, however, is often missed. For more than anything else it demonstrated that the Chinese case in regard to Tibet was anything but convincing. Peking's data, its documentary evidence, even its presentation—at times it leaned heavily on what a British Minister or Consul had affirmed in conversation, or written in a travelogue—was in such striking contrast to the overwhelming testimony, meticulously documented, and ably presented, by Tibet's plenipotentiary. It is interesting to recall that nearly half a century later Peking, now far better organized and under a strong and powerful regime, did no whit better. Or did it—at the meetings of Indian and Chinese officials, during 1960, to sort out their respective cases in regard to their now common frontier?

There is another aspect of the Simla negotiations which needs

¹For excerpts to the communication to the Russians and Grey's specific instructions see pp. 91-2.

to be heavily underlined and it relates to the fact that even though the Conference had to be terminated, the Chinese time and again insisted, in the years immediately following at any rate, that negotiations be resumed— 'at the earliest'. This may, if partly, be explained by the fact that Peking did not want to be saddled with the responsibility for causing a breakdown. There may also have been the thought that a solution was imperative and could be best ensured by persisting in the process until British/Tibetan resistance was completely worn out.

That the British view of the Simla conference at the time was different from what it came to be later may be gleaned from the pages of Sir Henry McMahon's 'Final Memorandum'.¹ The optimistic tone of its composition rested on the firm belief, widely shared then in Delhi as in Whitehall, that Chinese acceptance would be forthcoming presently—before many days or weeks, elapsed. Sir Henry was also confident that the steps which he had enumerated, including the establishment of British administration south of the Line he had laid on the map, would be implemented. It surely was not his fault that neither the first contingency, nor yet the second, did finally come to pass. What was significant in one case, as in the other, was McMahon's own removal from the Indian scene; nor was he ever destined to return to these shores.

¹The 'Final Memorandum' was drawn up, and signed on 8 July, 1914, the day Sir Henry left Simla on his way home. For excerpts see pp. 175-80.

The proceedings of the Conference, in Sir Henry's own words, were summed up in four earlier memoranda covering the periods 6 October—20 November, 1913; 21 November—24 December, 1913; 25 December, 1913—30 April, 1914; and 1 May, 1914—8 July, 1914. For excerpts see pp. 166-75.

I

1. *Convention between Great Britain and China concerning Tibet, 27 April, 1906*¹

Whereas His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of or carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17th 1890 and Regulations of December 5th 1893 placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7th 1904 on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on November 11th 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland:

Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

and His Majesty the Emperor of China:

His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi (*sic*), His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs;

who having communicated to each other their respective full powers

¹BD IV, pp. 325-6.

See also J.V.A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919*, Vol. 1, *Manchu Period* (1894-1911), New York, 1921, pp. 576-7; G.E.P. Hertslet, *Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and China; and between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, etc.*, 2 vols., London, 1908, Vol. I, pp. 202-8.

and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:

Article I

The Convention concluded on September 7th 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modifications stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

Article II

The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan Territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

Article III

The concessions which are mentioned in Article 9(d)^a of the Convention concluded on September 7th 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any State or to the subject of any State other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article 2^b of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

Article IV

The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

Article V

The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article VI

This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both count-

ries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang-hsu.

(L.S.) ERNEST SATOW

(Signature and Seal of the Chinese
Plenipotentiary)

ANNEXE

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet signed at Lhasa on the 7th September 1904.

Declaration signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of the British Government and appended to the ratified Convention of the 7th September 1904.

Notes exchanged

Mr Tong Shoa-yi to Sir E. Satow

April 27, 1906

Your Excellency,

With reference to the Convention which was signed today by Your Excellency and myself on behalf of our respective Governments I have the honour to declare formally that the Government of China undertakes not to employ any one, not a Chinese subject and not of Chinese nationality,^a in any capacity whatsoever in Tibet.

I avail, & c.
TONG SHOA-YI

Sir E. Satow to Mr Tong Shoa-yi

Peking, April 27, 1906

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of this day's date in which you declare formally, with reference

to the Convention relating to Tibet which was signed to-day by Your Excellency and myself on behalf of our respective Governments, that the Government of China undertakes not to employ any one, not a Chinese subject and not of Chinese nationality, in any capacity whatsoever in Tibet.

I avail, & c.
ERNEST SATOW

Sir E. Satow to Mr Tong Shoa-yi
Private

Peking, April 27, 1906

Dear Mr Tong,

As regards the undertaking given by the Chinese Government in your Note of to-day not to employ any one not a Chinese subject or of Chinese nationality in any capacity in Tibet, I am authorized to state that no objection will be raised by His Majesty's Government to the employment by China of foreigners for a period of 12 months from to-day, being the date of signature of our Convention, in order to give time for the organization of the Customs in Tibet. But after April 27th 1907 the undertaking in your Note will of course come into force and be faithfully carried out.

Yours, & c.
ERNEST SATOW

2. *Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Signed at St. Petersburg, 31 August, 1907¹*

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia

¹MacMurray, *China Treaties*, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 674-8.

in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Isvolski, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

Agreement concerning Tibet

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Agreement:

Article I

The two High Contracting Parties agree to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Article II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between the British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, so far as they are con-

cerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Agreement.

Article III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines,^a or other rights in Tibet.

Article V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annexe to the Agreement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Tibet

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of the three annual instalments of the indemnity of 2,500,000 rupees,^b provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto, their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August, 1907.

(L.S.) A. NICOLSON
(L.S.) ISVOLSKI

I. *Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolski*Saint-Petersbourg
le 18 (31) Août, 1907

M. le Ministre,

Me référant à l'arrangement au sujet du Thibet signé aujourd'hui, j'ai l'honneur de faire à Votre Excellence la Déclaration suivante:

Le Gouvernement Britannique juge utile, pour autant qu'il dépendra de lui, de ne pas admettre, sauf accord préalable avec le Gouvernement Russe, pour une durée de trois ans à partir de la date de la présente communication, l'entrée au Thibet d'une mission scientifique quelconque, à condition toutefois qu'une assurance pareille soit donnée de la part du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

Le Gouvernement Britannique se propose, en outre, de s'adresser au Gouvernement Chinois afin de faire agréer à ce dernier une que la même démarche sera faite par le Gouvernement Russe.

A l'expiration du terme de trois ans précite, le Gouvernement Britannique avisera d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement Russe à l'opportunité, s'il y a lieu, de mesures ultérieures à prendre concernant les expéditions scientifiques au Thibet.

Je saisis, & c.
(Signé) A NICOLSON

II. *M. Isvolski to Sir A. Nicolson*Saint-Petersbourg
le 18 (31) Août, 1907

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

En réponse à la note de Votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à mon tour que le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie juge utile, pour autant qu'il dépendra de lui, de ne pas admettre-sauf accord préalable avec le Gouvernement Britannique-pour une durée de trois ans à partir de la date de la présente communication, l'entrée au Thibet d'une mission scientifique quelconque.

De même que le Gouvernement Britannique, le Gouvernement Impérial se propose de s'adresser au Gouvernement Chinois afin de faire agréer à ce dernier une obligation analogue pour une période correspondante.

Il reste entendre qu'à l'expiration du terme de trois ans les deux Gouvernements aviseront d'un commun accord à l'opportunité, s'il y a lieu, de mesures ultérieures à prendre concernant les expéditions scientifiques au Thibet.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

ISVOLSKI^o

3. Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet amending Trade Regulations in Tibet. Signed at Calcutta, 20 April, 1908¹

Preamble

Whereas by Article I of the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906, that is the 4th day of the 4th moon of the 32nd year of Kwang Hsu, it was provided that both the High Contracting Parties should engage to take at all times such steps as might be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, the text of which in English and Chinese was attached as an Annexe to the above-named Convention;

And whereas it was stipulated in Article III of the said Lhasa Convention that the question of the amendment of the Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893, should be reserved for separate consideration, and whereas the amendment of these Regulations is now necessary;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: Mr E. C. Wilton, C.M.G.;

His Majesty the Emperor of China: His Majesty's Special Commissioner Chang Yin Tang;

And the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorized representative to act under the directions of Chang

¹British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-8, Vol. CI, pp. 170-5.

Tachen and take part in the negotiations, the Tsarong Shape, Wang Chuk Gyalpo.

And whereas Mr E. C. Wilton and Chang Tachen have communicated to each other their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form and have found the authorization of the Tibetan Delegate to be also in good and true form, the following amended Regulations have been agreed upon:

1. The Regulations of 1893 shall remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with these Regulations.

2. The following places shall form, and be included within, the boundaries of the Gyantse mart:

(a) The line begins at Chumig Dangsang (Chhu-Mig-Dangs-Sangs) north-east of the Gyantse Fort, and thence it runs in a curved line, passing behind the Pekor Chode (Dpal-Hkhor-Choos-Sde), down to Chag-Dong-Gang (Phyag-Gdong-Sgang); thence passing straight over the Nyan Chu, it reaches the Zamsa (Zam-Srag).

(b) From the Zamsa the line continues to run, in a south-easterly direction, round to Lachi-To (Gla-Dkyii-Stod), embracing all the forms on its way, viz., the Lahong, the Hogtso (Hog-Mtsho), the Tong-Chung-Shi (Grong-Chhung-Gshis), and the Rangang (Rab-Sgang), & c.

(c) From Lachi-To the line runs to the Yutog (Gyu-Thog), and thence runs straight, passing through the whole area of Gamkar-Shi (Ragal-Mkhar-Gshis), to Chumig Dangsang.

As difficulty is experienced in obtaining suitable houses and godowns at some of the marts, it is agreed that British subjects may also lease land for the building of houses and godowns at the marts, the locality for such building sites to be marked out specially at each mart by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities in consultation with the British Trade Agent. The British Trade Agents and British subjects shall not build houses and godowns except in such localities, and this arrangement shall not be held to prejudice in any way the administration of the Chinese and Tibetan local authorities over such localities, or the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside such localities for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods.

British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Municipal Office at the mart for a

permit to lease. The amount of rent, or the period or conditions of the lease, shall then be settled in a friendly way by the lessee and the owner themselves. In the event of a disagreement between the owner and lessee as to the amount of rent or the period of condition of the lease, the case will be settled by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities, in consultation with the British Trade Agent. After the lease is settled, the sites shall be verified by the Chinese and Tibetan Officers of the Municipal Office conjointly with the British Trade Agent. No building is to be commenced by the lessee on a site before the Municipal Office has issued him a permit to build, but it is agreed that there shall be no vexatious delays in the issue of such permit.

3. The administration of the trade marts shall remain with the Tibetan Officers, under the Chinese Officers' supervision and directions.

The Trade Agents at the marts and the Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Trade Agents and the Local Authorities shall be referred for settlement to the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa. The purport of a reference by the Government of India will be communicated to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa. Questions which cannot be decided by agreement between the Government of India and the Tibetan High Authorities at Lhasa shall, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Peking Convention of 1906, be referred for settlement to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

4. In the event of disputes arising at the marts between British subjects and persons of Chinese and Tibetan nationalities, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conferences between the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities of the Judicial Courts at the mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any such mixed cases, the Officer or Officers of the defendant's nationality shall preside at the trial, the Officer or Officers of the plaintiff's country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects who may commit any crime at the marts or on the routes to the marts shall be handed over by the local authorities to the British Trade Agent at the mart nearest to the scene of the offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the local authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Chinese and Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects at the marts or on the routes thereto, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities according to the law.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Should it happen that Chinese or Tibetan subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject before the British Trade Agent, the Chinese or Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative, or representatives, to watch the course of trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly, in cases in which a British subject has reason to complain of a Chinese or Tibetan subject in the Judicial Court at the mart, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court to watch the course of trial.

5. The Tibetan Authorities, in obedience to the instructions of the Peking Government, having a strong desire to reform the judicial system of Tibet, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to relinquish her rights of extra-territoriality in Tibet, whenever such rights are relinquished in China, and when she is satisfied that the state of the Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

6. After the withdrawal of the British troops, all the rest-houses, eleven in number, built by Great Britain upon the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, shall be taken over at original cost by China and rented to the Government of India at a fair rate. One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials, but the rest-houses shall otherwise be

available for occupation by British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of respectability who may proceed to and from the marts.

Great Britain is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse when the telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India.

In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.

7. In law suits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned shall grant a hearing and take steps necessary to enforce payment; but, if the debtor plead poverty and be without means, the authorities concerned shall not be held responsible for the said debts, nor shall any public or official property be distrained upon in order to satisfy these debts.

8. The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers will be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the local authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen or conceal them.

9. British officers and subjects, as well as goods, proceeding to the

trade marts, must adhere to the trade routes from the frontier of India. They shall not, without permission, proceed beyond the marts, or to Gartok from Yatung and Gyantse, or from Gartok to Yatung and Gyantse, by any route through the interior of Tibet, but natives of the Indian frontier, who have already by usage traded and resided in Tibet, elsewhere than at the marts shall be at liberty to continue their trade, in accordance with the existing practice, but when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore, amenable to the local jurisdiction.

10. In cases where officials or traders, *en route* to and from India or Tibet, are robbed of treasure or merchandise, public or private, they shall forthwith report to the Police officers, who shall take immediate measures to arrest the robbers and hand them to the local authorities. The local authorities shall bring them to instant trial, and shall also recover and restore the stolen property. But if the robbers flee to places out of the jurisdiction and influence of Tibet, and cannot be arrested, the Police and the local authorities shall not be held responsible for such losses.

11. For public safety, tanks or stores of kerosene oil or any other combustible or dangerous articles in bulk must be placed far away from inhabited places at the marts.

British or Indian merchants wishing to build such tanks or stores may not do so until, as provided in Regulation 2, they have made application for a suitable site.

12. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities from whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexatious restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.

It being the duty of the Police and local authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of British subjects at the marts, and along the routes to the marts, China engages to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts. On due fulfilment of these arrangements, Great Britain undertakes to withdraw the Trade Agents' guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. The Chinese Authorities will not prevent the British Trade Agent from holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the

Tibetan officers and people.

Tibetan subjects trading, travelling or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet.

13. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate; but if no demand for revision be made by either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

14. The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, and, in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.

15. The ratifications of the present Regulations under the hand of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire, respectively, shall be exchanged at London and Peking within six months from the date of signature.

In witness whereof the two Plenipotentiaries and the Tibetan Delegate have signed and sealed the present Regulations.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this 20th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1908, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 20th day of the 3rd moon of the 34th year of Kuang-hsu.

E. C. WILTON
British Commissioner

CHANG YIN TANG
Chinese Special Commissioner

WANG CHUK GYALPO
Tibetan Delegate.

II

1. *China as India's neighbour: 1910*¹

It is useless to underestimate the gravity of the position. Great Britain has, of course, the advantage of negotiating with a real Government which follows ordinary diplomatic observance and can be struck at in its ports and near its heart—that is to say, providing so drastic a proceeding were ever to become necessary. The irritating impertinences of the old monastic exclusionists have gone.

On the other hand, a great Empire, the future military strength of which no man can foresee, has suddenly appeared on the North-East Frontier of India. The problem of the North-West Frontier thus bids fair to be duplicated in the long run, and a double pressure placed on the defensive resources of the Indian Empire.

The men who advocated the retention of Lhasa, have proved not so far wrong, whatever their reasons for giving the advice. The evacuation of the Chumbi Valley has certainly proved a blunder. That strategic line has been lost, and a heavy price may be exacted for the mistake. China, in a word, has come to the gates of India, and the fact has to be reckoned with. It is to be hoped that the Indian Government will do what they can to retrieve the position, and use the presence of the Dalai Lama as a lever for securing from the Chinese Government some concessions in frontier rectification.

2. *Chao Erh-Feng and East Tibet: 1910, Excerpts from a private letter, 18 July, 1910.*²

The political conditions here are puzzling, and severely try the temper of patient Christians like myself. The country west of Tachienlu^a to Batang^b has been conquered, and some attempt is being made to govern it. The Tibetans are undoubtedly better off now than before, and Chinese education, civilization, and moral

¹Excerpts from the *Morning Post*, London, 28 February, 1910.

²Extract from a private letter from Batang dated 18 July, 1910 (communicated by Mr Max Muller and received at Foreign Office, 20 September, 1910). *IOR*, L/P&S/10/150.

ideas are improving the Tibetans outwardly; but it is impossible to understand what China intends to get out of the country. If His Excellency Chao was the head of a missionary board, and his officials and staff of Chinese poorly remunerated but self-denying missionaries, the efforts and results might become famous; but when one realizes that the reforms which are influencing the moral, religious, mental, and physical life of the people are emanating from Peking—conservative, utilitarian, and unsympathetic—the puzzle becomes decidedly Chinese. The country is far too high to produce cereals, and the Chinaman has little use for beef, mutton, wool, hides, milk, butter, and cheese. In fact the country only produces what he values slightly. Again, even if it did produce cereals, no one would think of sending them to the coast, especially via Tachienlu, Chungking, and Shanghai. It seems to me that the day is coming when all the products of Eastern Thibet will go down by Talifu^a and out by Burmah. And so good-bye to Tachienlu and all theories which depend for success from that centre. The situation is something like this: His Excellency Chao says, 'the region is eminently suitable for agriculture, therefore parcel out the waste uplands, between 13,000 and 16,000 feet, among good and industrious husbandmen'. But two factors are at work interfering with this fundamentally important requirement: His Excellency can neither command nature nor induce good husbandmen to leave the fertile plains of Chengtu for the bleak uplands of Asia. Hence failures which would be amusing were they not so pathetic. So much for the country conquered.

His Excellency is busily engaged, after having pacified Derge,^b in establishing the supremacy of China in the Chamdo region, as well as territory between that and Assam. So far the regions north and west of Batang are being quietly, but surely forced to tender in reality allegiance long tendered in theory. Just how it is being done is a mystery; but this conquest of Eastern Thibet is being accomplished with little or no bloodshed. The fighting force under the Warden is miserably inadequate, perhaps 4,000 men being a liberal estimate. There is no doubt before very long a great part of Thibet will be recognizing the authority of China. But two questions arise: Can China do anything with the conquered country? and is the alleged subjugation a policy on the part of the Thibetans to avert the vengeance of the one invulnerable Chinaman? 'Wait,' they say, 'Chao will go some day, and then our turn will come.' And there is pro-

bably something in such rumours, for has not China's conquest and reconquest in this land been the wearying tale of the ages? Conquer a turbulent country at great expense, hold it at great inconvenience, and at the same time get nothing from it, and what happens? The fact, however, that Thibet is such a magnificent buffer may induce China to spend her money willingly.

Up to the present Chao has never returned to Batang. He is now at Draya, one of the turbulent centres between here and Chamdo. At the same time many of his officers are operating between here and Assam (Sadiya), the object being to introduce China's authority in the valley of the Bramaputra. Just lately Dr. Shelton went to Kiang Ka, some days beyond the true Batang frontier, and Muir pushed on to Chamdo, although overtaken by Chao's agents with orders to suggest his speedy return. The consequence is that now every town off the main road is forbidden to us; indeed we are practically confined to Litang,^a Batang, and Yenching.^b Short journeys of even 20 li are denied to us unless we give all kinds of absurd guarantees, and Thibetan landlords were even commissioned to report on our actions. Needless to say I have not been doing anything to complicate the situation, but His Excellency Chao is in a towering rage. Of course if they do not arrange some thing better for us I must ask to be removed out of China again. It is simply sentimental insanity for nine adult foreigners to be confined to Batang, a village of about 1,000 people. It is interesting to note that the officials now deny that this is Szechuan. The Viceroy, in any case, never puts out proclamations beyond Techienlu. So far, however, there is no reason to believe that the much-talked-of new province, Ch'uan Hsi, has received Imperial sanction, but I do know that the status of Tachienlu, Litang, Batang, Chamdo, and other places has not been changed, as suggested by the Warden. The same is true of the suggested new nomad sub-prefectures of Sanpa, Taopa, and other places. So it seems that His Excellency Chao is very much on the same footing as the Imperial commissioners in Lhasa, and indeed the status of the country west of Tachienlu differs little now from Tibet proper.

Nobody here pays any attention to the flight of the Dalai Lama. He seems to be no longer a *sine qua non* of Tibetan politics.

3. *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's rebuttal of Chinese charges, 2 May, 1910*¹

I have the honour to submit a translation of a letter which the Dalai Lama, Ministers and National Assembly have addressed to me on the subject of Chinese action in Tibet.

PRAYETH,

The diabolical Len Amban^a sent a copy of an alleged order by telegram from the Imperial Government of China to the officers of the Tibetan Government, who were left as our representatives to carry on the State duties. A sealed copy of this order is submitted herewith.

Firstly, it charges the Dalai Lama with having been extravagant, capricious and oppressive etc., ever since his assumption of the temporal power. If these charges had been set forth in detail, and not in such a general way, it would have been easy to answer them one by one, but, as it is not easy to answer such a ridiculously false charge laid indiscriminately, I cannot do so. But with regard to the main question of the relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans which existed, as mentioned in the previous representations, ever since the time of the seventh incarnation of the Dalai Lama. The Emperor of China then sent a number of troops from China, ostensibly with the friendly purpose of maintaining the dignity of the Dalai Lama, and of preserving order. It first established the custom of maintaining some Chinese officers with a limited number of troops in Tibet, who have in the course of time, gradually taken the management of some of the State's affairs and have thus usurped authority. Beyond this, i.e., maintaining the dignity of the Dalai Lama and preserving order, they have had no hand in the general administration of the country, e.g., the collection of taxes, the trial of cases, etc. These have always been in the hands of the Tibetan Government, of which the Dalai Lama is the spiritual and temporal head, only consulting the National Assembly in important matters. But whatever His Holiness did in the general administration of the country, has been done in the most straight-forward manner, and he never did anything which was contrary to the law. At any rate the Dalai Lama rules over the whole of Tibet, and you must know

¹From Bell to India, 1-2 June, 1910, in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/150.

what little right the Chinese can have to interfere in the internal administration of the country.

Secondly, the charge is made that when the Chinese troops from Szechuan were coming up, they were obstructed in spite of every explanation given regarding their purport, and that the Chinese Len Amban was refused even the usual allowances and contributions of rations, etc., and that he was most unreasonably blamed and calumniated. About this, Tibetan Police had been employed in Lhasa; and in the other towns and trade marts, Tibetan Police were being engaged; but just when they were ready, that is, last year, the Chinese Len Amban said that he would bring up 1,000 Chinese troops to be employed as Policemen in the trade marts. Now this was very undesirable, as provisions for the maintenance of the Chinese officers and men, who lived in Tibet, had to be imported from distant places, such as Bhutan and Nepal, at great cost to the Government and trouble to the people of Tibet, owing to there being no paddy fields in Tibet. This addition would mean much more expense and trouble, and it would be impossible for the Tibetan State to supply the increased number with rice, etc. In the Treaty regarding Trade Regulations, it is mentioned clearly that the Tibetans would have the power of appointing Tibetan officers in the Trade marts. If the Chinese Police were employed the power would be usurped by them, since these would be quite beyond the control of the Tibetan officials, and this would constitute one infringement of the Treaty. The Tibetans would not understand their language, and the contributions they would levy would be very heavy and oppressive on the local people. Besides the Tibetan squads, drilled on the Chinese Frontier, would be just the same as Chinese troops themselves. Representations, prayers and memorials from the National Assembly were submitted to Len Amban for transmission to China again and again, but a deaf ear was turned to them, while, on the other hand, Len persisted in his mischievous course of introducing innovations, etc., for depriving Tibet of its liberty and the Tibetan Government of its power and functions. A Black List showing the said Len's harmful proceedings is to be submitted separately. The two Chinese officers, Dao and Tin (or Rin), have circulated several documents proclaiming their intention of annexing Tibet, and they have destroyed many branches of the State monasteries in Kham, massacring the inmates and looting the properties. A detailed list of the properties belonging to

the Tibetan Government, thus forcibly taken and occupied by the Chinese, is submitted separately, from which it may be seen what enormities they have been guilty of. When Tang^a Amban visited Lhasa he gave out, in wily speeches, that these steps for the annexation of Tibet would be taken, as he pretended, for the welfare of Tibet itself, and he introduced the first of these treacherous designs for depriving Tibet of its freedom and Government, all the while making glib excuses. He said that it was not necessary for the priesthood to observe celibacy and monkish vows, and tried to induce the majority of the monks of the three State monasteries to become soldiers. He expressed as his opinion (no doubt with a view to change the Faith) that there would not be any merit in maintaining the priesthood or in giving charity, alms or donations, or worship to the Church; and that it was mere waste and extravagance to do so. This has been the expressed views of every one of the Chinese officers, who have thus openly expressed their contempt for our religion and plainly shown their intention of doing their worst, and of trampling it under foot. There cannot be anything clearer now than their firm resolve to accomplish the above purpose. So, since we could not jump down a precipice with our eyes open, we should certainly have defended our Faith and freedom with arms in our hands. But being bound by the peculiar relationship of Priest and Layman, which exists between ourselves and the Chinese Emperor, we had recourse only to oral and written representations through the Chinese Amban showing the difficulties under which we would be put, and were even then labouring, and we repeatedly sent men and letters to the Chinese officers, Dao and Tin, proposing conciliatory terms. Besides that we apprised the Wai-Wu-Pu in Peking by telegram on seven occasions, but no reply whatever was received. It was clear that the Chinese Government had only ears for what Len Amban reported, and none for us. Chinese troops and officers marched up, and our officers, deputed to negotiate with them, did their utmost to obtain some consideration from them, but in vain. In spite of their entreaties the Ken-Chung and his followers were murdered and much property, both State and private, was destroyed indiscriminately. A list of this is separately submitted. Before these things occurred, in the Wood-Dragon year (1904), the Dalai Lama, whose relationship with the Emperor of China as Priest and Layman, was then unimpaired and expecting the consideration he had hitherto received, in good faith proceeded to Peking, where, not

seeking the aid or protection of other Kingdoms or Empires, he put his whole confidence in China alone as Karmic Law (duty as dictated by perfect good faith) seemed to direct him; which fact is, no doubt, known to all. Hitherto however, not only have they (the Chinese) totally disregarded the interest and welfare of Tibet, but leaving aside the question of withdrawing the troops or diminishing their number, they have not even so much as changed the course of their march or progress, thus betraying the implicit trust reposed in them by waging unprovoked war upon Tibet, with the intention of depriving Tibet of her freedom and her Government of its powers. Under such circumstances with the Chinese troops overawing with arms the inhabitants of Tibet, who on their side were trying by specific means to obtain that which the other party had resolved to deprive them of, and to whose entreaties the Chinese turned a deaf ear, regarding such entreaties with contempt, emboldened to further acts of rapacity and oppression, judge then whether it is to be wondered at that without any one to redress the wrongs heaped upon them, the people of Tibet, great and small, disappointed by such unprecedented acts of perfidious tyranny, refused voluntarily to contribute rations and supplies for the maintenance of the Chinese stationed in Tibet for some time prior to our coming to Lhasa. An Amban is expected to serve the cause and interest of Tibet and to give the Government sound counsel for bettering the condition of Tibet, whereas this Amban does nothing of the sort, and treats our representations and prayers with contempt, and aims at depriving Tibet of its freedom and power. As soon as we arrived however we ordered that no armed resistance should be offered and proclaimed that the supplies for the Chinese Len Amban should not be withheld and we sent several letters to the Chinese Amban, telling him that these innovations were unpopular in Tibet and that some pacific course should be adopted at once, also that a report should be submitted to the Imperial Government on receipt of that particular letter. Some sealed letters to that effect were sent to Len Amban, but these letters as well as deputations were left unheeded. Moreover as soon as a small detachment of the Chinese troops came up to Lhasa regarding every one as enemies, they ran amok firing at random amongst the multitude which struck them with astonishment and terror and filled them with resentment. Such being the state of affairs in Tibet, to have silently suffered them to do as they pleased was impossible, since it must be clear to all, that

if they were allowed to take possession of our country, it would be next to impossible to drive them out later on. Hoping still that a representation of the actual state of affairs to the Imperial Government of China might procure a favourable consideration, and not wishing to shed blood which would have been the consequence, a war that seemed inevitable was avoided. But to leave their acts unnoticed would be simply to excite the greed of those, who had already been excited by being allowed a taste of tyrannous power. They might have pursued the Tibetan officials of note with rancour and hunted them down one by one and there was no certainty as to how they might treat our own person, since they were clearly bent upon depriving Tibet of its freedom and its Government of their power, and trampling upon the Faith. These could not be abandoned to their fate. So after appointing officers to carry on the various branches of the State affairs, both Spiritual and Temporal, and having admonished them that, on matters of importance, such as, submitting to innovations by the Chinese they (the subordinates) should not presume to decide for me their superior, but refer to me for my decision, we started for India with a view to proceed to China by the sea-route, and there represent matters to the Imperial Government in person. To this effect we wrote from Phari on the 10th day of the first Tibetan month (19th February 1910) through the Chinese Tunge-ling of the Chumbi Valley to the two joint Ambans. When His Holiness arrived at Tromo, the Jinshee, the Tung-ling and the Popon, tried to persuade him to return to Lhasa if possible, or at least to remain in the Chumbi Valley and reopen negotiations between China and Tibet. Once His Holiness entertained the idea of stopping at a monastery near by, and of exchanging communications, but the fear lest Len Amban should despatch several bodies of armed Chinese troops for His Holiness's apprehension, which step might subject the people on the road to great hardships and ill-treatment just the same as that which happened at the Chaksam monastery which was pillaged and robbed of its properties, images, books, etc., because the Dalai Lama had stopped there one night, the levy of forced supplies at the stages, the looting of the different monasteries which would be inevitable, and the certainty that if we* happened to fall into their hands we would be tortured and murdered barbarously, impelled us to cross

*i.e., the Dalai Lama and Ministers, C.A.B., 2.6.10.

the frontier with a view to proceed to China as stated above. This step was rendered imperative by Len himself. But the Imperial Government has again effectively thwarted our design by listening to Len Amban's reports alone and issuing an edict to the effect that His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, the legitimate Ruler of Tibet has been deposed and degraded to the rank of a common person, and directing that orders for the search, identification, election or nomination by ballot and formal installation of a new Dalai Lama be issued. This malicious edict is simply calculated to disgrace His Holiness, and lower him in the eyes of the public. It is unreasonable and unjustifiable. For is it not the custom and the law to allow even a subject or a small dependent to prove his own innocence, to defend himself when he is accused of wrong doing and to grant him a patient and impartial hearing before he is punished? After this drastic measure however, which already clearly showed the Chinese Government to be prejudiced, we had to relinquish our project of going to represent our case there personally, for how was it possible to repose confidence in her good faith and justice, when she had already shown herself so ready to believe what one favoured party reported? Besides, the experience that we had of the British Government's dealings during the late Wood-Dragon year (1904) in which the Government signed a Treaty, which did not do any harm to the Church or the State and the fact that this Government has just and honourable laws, which are respected and enforced—these things inspired us with the hope that we would meet with better consideration here. This made us address this Government. It has been the Chinese themselves who made it impossible for us to live in Tibet, and again it has been the Chinese themselves who thwarted our designs to go to the Chinese Government to represent our case. We beg that these statements may be submitted to the fair and impartial consideration of the Chinese and the British Governments to see whether they are true or not. Recently Len Amban has falsely reported to the Imperial Government that everything is peaceful and quiet in Tibet. He reported that everyone has quietly submitted to the Proclamations issued at Lhasa and that he had not resorted to the least repressive or tyrannical measures. Meanwhile he sent a copy of the Imperial order to the Ti-Rinpoche,^a at the end of which there is this order: 'all officers below the rank of a Kalon must render their usual services as they did before, and that the Government of Tibet will be carried on according to your wishes.

We hope that you will be happy.' But acting contrary to the purport of the sealed letter, as if holding the mediating British Government in contempt, even while this Government is negotiating, they have forcibly broken open the locks of our store and treasure-rooms in the Potola Palace and those of Norbu-Ling and rifled them most thoroughly. They have ordered that the factories, which have been opened for the benefit and development of the State, be shut up and they are now closed, under his seal. They have been trying to disarm the private people and to confiscate the new guns belonging to the State. They have stationed guards on the route leading to this side, and effectually prevented letters or men coming out or going in. They have made the position of the Tibetan constabulary impossible and made them give way by force to Chinese soldiers, and thus deprived the Tibetans of all power and authority. They have quartered Chinese troops in the houses of Tibetan gentlemen of rank (officers of State), and have caused the loss of property in many cases, of which a separate list will be submitted. Len has by force compelled the Tibetan officials left at Lhasa, by threatening them with death to submit to these high-handed measures, although he knows well that servants cannot decide for their masters. It is safer to apprise them beforehand that anything done by them under such compulsion cannot be accepted later on. If the Tibetans had seriously intended turning their backs on China, could they not have destroyed the Amban and the few Chinese troops living in Tibet before the Chinese army got into Tibet? It must be clear that they could have done this very easily and that they have not done so, shows that their acts have been guided by good faith and honesty. When I, the Dalai Lama, met the late Emperor of China and the Empress-Dowager at Peking, their Majesties by word and letter assured me on oath that no innovations would be introduced in Tibet, and exhorted me to do my best to promulgate and spread the creed of the Yellow-hat or Reformed Church of Tibet. But their acts are contrary to their assurances, because the Chinese officers, Dau and Tin, with their troops have been guilty of the grossest enormities and cruelties. So unless the Imperial Government (1) punish Dao, Tin and Len severely; (2) give indemnities to compensate for the many monasteries demolished; (3) restore the lands and subjects of the lands forcibly taken and imprisoned; (4) enquire and pursue and bring every perpetrator of cruelties and mur-

ders to justice and punish them as they deserve to be according to the dictates of justice; and (5) withdraw the Chinese officers and troops, leaving Tibet to its former freedom and quite untrammelled as to its actions, so that it need not refer to China on every point; unless the Imperial Government of China will listen to our wrongs, and redress them accordingly, we can only regard their acts with resentment, because whether the chains which bind our hands be made of iron, or made of gold, it would be the same, since the pain and inconvenience they cause are great. Since they aim at destroying and supplanting the Faith, which is dearer than life itself to the Tibetans, that Faith, which is the source of all happiness to sentient beings, he or they who aim at injuring that, can only be regarded as an enemy, and anyone who will help it must be hailed as a friend. At such a time, when a big and powerful nation is trying to swallow up a smaller and weaker nation, we cannot help appealing to other powerful nations for aid and assistance, which the law of nations should make you feel bound to grant us, being impelled by regard for the duty imposed by the dignity, power and justice of your Mighty Empire. And if the grant of the necessary aid be delayed too long, all the provinces of Eastern Tibet will be occupied by Chinese troops, where troops are being steadily concentrated, and from there, marched to Lhasa, where they are preparing to build new forts. And the more time they get, the more strategic points they will gain, and having strengthened them, it will be very difficult to dislodge them later on. At present they gain daily more influence, and daily they deprive us of our power. And especially for us who have come down here, they would surely pursue us with malice and rancour, deprive us of our properties and alienate our parties, until our position may be rendered quite painful if the help that we pray for be delayed. So we pray you to grant us such aid as seems proper at once or else the opportunity thus lost by us might cripple us and injure our prospects past remedy. As for the future interest, as I mentioned ere this, we must surely form such a contract as will be pure and agreeable to both parties. And further the ties of gratitude, which will bind us towards the British Government, will make us ready to drop such points as seem undesirable to the British Government, and to accept others which are reasonable and which they may think fit to insert, if they will let us know their pleasure for the deliberation. I, the Dalai Lama of Tibet as the

central figure do affix my seal hereunto.

Dated Iron-Dog year, 23rd of the third month (2nd May, 1910).

Seal of His Highness
the Dalai Lama of Tibet

Seals of the Lonchens,
Chief Ministers of States, Tibet

Seal of the Seal of the
Shapes National Assembly

III

1. *The Abor Expedition: an outline of official policy, 25 September, 1911¹*

From : The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department

To : Major-General H. Bower, C.B., Commanding the Abor Expeditionary Force

Dated Simla, the 25th September, 1911

Sir,

In continuation of the instructions issued for your guidance by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I am directed to forward, for your information, a copy of the marginally cited despatch* outlining the policy which, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India propose to follow on the north-east frontier, and to convey to you the following instructions regarding the political aspect of the punitive expedition against the Abors which will be under your command.

2. The Governor-General in Council is pleased to vest you with full political control during the progress of military operations, and Messrs. Bentinck and Dundas have been appointed as Assistant Political Officers to accompany the expedition, and as such will give you every possible assistance in political matters. Your authority and responsibility will, however, be complete.

You should address all communications on political questions to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, repeating them to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and the Chief of the General Staff, noting in each case that this has been done.

3. The objects of the expedition are—

(1) to exact severe punishment and reparation for the murder of Mr Williamson, Dr Gregorson, and their party in March last; and by establishing our military superiority in the estimation of the tribe, to endeavour to compel the Minyongs to surrender the chief instigators and perpetrators of the massacre;

(2) to visit as many of the Minyong villages as possible, and to

¹IOR, P & EF 1910/13.

*To His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 105 (Secret/External), dated 21 September, 1911.

make the tribe clearly understand that, in future, they will be under our control, which, subject to good behaviour on their part, will for the present be of a loose political nature;

(3) to visit the Bor Abor or Padam village of Damroh, which the expedition of 1893-94 failed to reach. Provided that the Padam Abors behave themselves, the visit to their country will not be of a punitive nature. (They have already sent in word that they wish to be friends and have proposed to send in a deputation to Sadiya. Orders have been issued to Mr. Dundas, the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, to receive the deputation, if it is representative one, and to inform the Padam Abors that there is no desire to attack them, provided that they conduct themselves in a friendly manner, but that a friendly visit will be paid to Damroh);

(4) If during the course of the expedition Chinese officials or troops are met, endeavour should be made to maintain amicable relations. If, however, such officials or troops be met within the territory of tribes on this side of recognized Tibetan-Chinese limits, they should be invited to withdraw into recognized Tibetan-Chinese limits, and, if necessary, should be compelled to do so;

(5) to explore and survey* as much of the country as possible, visiting, if practicable, the Pemakoi falls and incidentally settling the question of the identity of the Tsangpo and Brahmaputra rivers; and

(6) to submit proposals for a suitable frontier line between India and Tibet in general conformity with the line indicated in paragraph 6 of the despatch enclosed. No boundary must, however, be settled on the ground without the orders of Government except in cases where the recognized limits of the Tibetan-Chinese territory are found to conform approximately to the line indicated above, and to follow such prominent physical features as are essential for a satisfactory strategic and well-defined boundary line. A memorandum by the General staff on the subject is enclosed for your guidance.

4. I am to add that instructions will be issued to the officer in charge of the Mishmi Mission, which will explore and survey to the east of the scene of your operations, to endeavour to get into touch

*A survey party will be attached to the expedition consisting of 2 British officers, 2 Surveyors, 26 Khalasis, with reserve at base of 2 Surveyors, 10 Khalasis.

with the expedition, and to connect his results with yours; and, in the event of the sanction of His Majesty's Government to the despatch of a mission to the Miri and Dafla country being received, similar instructions will be issued to the officer in charge of that mission.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
A. H. MCMAHON,
Secretary to the Government of India

2. *The Inner and Outer Lines: Lord Hardinge's policy—excerpts, 21 September, 1911*¹

4. The principal tribes, from west to east, on the other portion of the north-east frontier are the (1) Tawang, Charduar and Thebengia Bhutias; (2) Akas; (3) Daflas; (4) Miris; (5) Abors and (6) Mishmis. Accounts of our relations with these tribes will be found in Volume II of Aitchison's *Treaties*, 4th Edition; Mackenzie's 'North-East Frontier of Bengal' and Michell's 'Report on the North-East Frontier of India.' Treaties and engagements of sorts exist with the Charduar and Thebengia Bhutias, the Akas and the Abors. The Tawang, Charduar and Thebengia Bhutias, the Akas, Daflas, Miris and Abors receive annual allowances 'posa' either in cash or kind from us; the Charduar Bhutias and Akas have pledged themselves never to join any parties who are enemies of the British Government, but to oppose them in every way in their power; but none of the tribes has definitely engaged not to hold intercourse with foreigners. Our policy in regard to these tribes has hitherto been one of non-interference, except in cases of (a) outrages on British subjects; (b) violation of the 'Inner line'; and (c) danger to the interests of people dwelling inside the British border by reason of the proximity of disturbances outside; and all proposals made for the exercise of closer control of the tribes between the 'Inner* line', which represents the limit of ordinary administration,

¹India to Crewe, 21 September, 1911 in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/180.

*Shown by blue wash on the map forwarded with our secret despatch No. 112 (External), dated the 11th June 1908.

and the 'Outer* line', which represents the limits of our political control, have been opposed.

5. So long as the problems on this section of the frontier were purely of a local character, this policy left little to be desired. The existing external boundary is, however, strategically unsound, as it runs along the base of the hills and excludes the passes leading into the plains and considerable tracts of culturable country, capable of supporting large bodies of troops, and offering a secure base for operations against the rich but defenceless plains of Assam. The unusual political activity displayed by China in recent years along our border, the claims which she advanced to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, and her effective occupation of Tibet, and the despatch of a force to Rima in the immediate vicinity of the Mishmi country, introduced a disquieting factor into the case, and it became necessary to reconsider our position. It was obvious that sooner or later a natural and more secure boundary would have to be obtained, but the want of topographical and geographical knowledge of the country prevented any definite conclusions being arrived at, although sufficient was known to lead us to believe that a suitable frontier from Bhutan to the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed would probably be found in the watershed of the Brahmaputra and Irrawaddy valleys.

6. Lord Minto's Government were of the opinion,¹ subject to further information being obtained in regard to the nature and extent of the territory of the tribes and their position *vis a vis* China and Tibet, & c., that the external boundary should run, approximately, from the east of the wedge-shaped portion of Tibetan territory known as the Tawang district, which runs down to the British frontier north of Odalguri, in a north-easterly direction to latitude 29°, longitude 94°; thence along latitude 29° to longitude 96°; thence in a south-easterly direction to the Zayul Chu as far east and as near as possible to Rima, thence across the Zayul Chu valley to the Zayul Chu-Irrawaddy watershed; and then along that watershed until it joins the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed. At the same time, in view of the near approach to, and aggression of, the Chinese on the Mishmi border, they recommended, at the urgent

*Shown by pink wash on the above-mentioned map.

¹Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd October 1910.

request of the Local Government, that the Mishmis should definitely be informed that they were under British protection, and that we would support them in refusing to have any intercourse or relations with any Foreign Power. His Majesty's Government were, however, opposed* to any such communication being made to the Mishmis, and desired that this, as well as the general question of policy, should be held over for Lord Hardinge's consideration.

7. His Excellency, who personally heard the views of Sir Lancelot Hare on the subject, was not prepared to agree to an immediate extension of our responsibilities on the frontier, and Your Lordship was eventually informed† that 'we recognize that the action of the Chinese may ultimately compel us to fix a line beyond which no further advance can be permitted: but we see no necessity at present for incurring the risks and responsibilities entailed by a forward movement into the tribal territory now beyond our control: and we propose, with Your Lordship's approval, to request the Lieutenant-Governor to instruct his frontier officers that they should confine themselves, as hitherto, to cultivating friendly relations with the tribes beyond the 'Outer line' and punishing them for acts of hostility within our limits. Should it be possible to obtain further information about the country beyond the 'Outer line' without risk of complications, we should be prepared to authorize explorations for the purpose, but we would not permit any general increase of activity in this direction, nor can we recommend that any sort of promise should be given to the tribes that they may rely on our support or protection in the event of Tibetan or Chinese aggression.'

8. While the matter was under the consideration of His Majesty's Government, Mr Williamson, the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, made a tour up the Lohit river to Walong in the Mishmi country, and obtained certain further information as to the proceedings of the Chinese in the vicinity which caused the Local Government to reiterate‡ their proposal that the Mishmis should be

*Telegram from Secretary of State for India, to Viceroy, dated the 26th October 1910.

†Secret despatch to Secretary of State for India, No. 182 (External), dated the 22nd December 1910.

‡Letter from the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, No. 204 C.G., dated the 25th April 1911, and enclosures. (Enclosure No. 2).

brought definitely under our protection forthwith; and shortly afterwards, while on a friendly visit to the Abor country at the invitation of certain headmen, Mr Williamson was treacherously murdered along with Dr Gregorson and almost the whole of their followers. Both these journeys of Mr Williamson were made without the cognizance* or sanction of the Local Government, and were contrary to well-known standing orders prohibiting the crossing of the 'Outer line' without permission. The loss of this able and experienced officer is much to be regretted, and while accepting the Lieutenant-Governor's view that Mr Williamson's fault, in thus acting in contravention of orders, was that of a zealous officer anxious to obtain information which he believed would be valuable, and willing to run a certain amount of risk in getting it, we have directed† that steps should be taken to ensure the enforcement of the standing orders regarding the crossing of the frontier and relations with the frontier tribes.

9. It was impossible, in the interests of the general peace and security of the frontier, to overlook the treacherous behaviour of the Abors, and in making the necessary proposals for punitive measures against them, we recommended‡ that advantage should be taken of the expedition to survey and explore the tribal area, as far as possible, in order to obtain knowledge requisite for the determination of a suitable boundary between India and China in the locality; and that, at the same time, a friendly mission, under an escort of Military Police, should be sent into the Mishmi country with the object of preventing the Mishmis combining with the Abors and of obtaining information as to the nature and limits of the Mishmi country. As regards the question of future policy we said that 'we do not propose that the Mishmis should be given a guarantee of protection, but we would leave them, as well as the Abors, in no manner of doubt as to their being under us, or as to their having to look to us for future reward or punishment according to their conduct. We should see no objection to the erection by this party of cairns and boundary stones on what may be considered a sui-

*Letter from the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, No. 197 C.G., dated the 22nd April 1911, and enclosures. (Enclosure No. 1).

†Letter to Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, No. 850 E.B., dated the 8th May 1911. (Enclosure No. 3).

‡Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th June 1911.

table frontier line, since this would greatly strengthen our position in the event of future negotiations with China for frontier demarcation. It is not proposed to advance our administrative frontier; our future policy would be to cultivate friendly relations with the Mishmis, and, in the event of our demarcating our external limits, we should explain that we regard it as the line within which no Chinese officials should come, and that we should periodically send a small police column to visit their country.'

10. During the past few months, there have been further developments in the Chinese policy of expansion which it is impossible to ignore. For example, Mr Hertz's expedition on the Burma-China frontier had no sooner been withdrawn than the Chinese attempted* to assert their influence in the country we claim by the despatch of a party with the usual appointment orders and tokens for issue to village headmen; in April last a party of Chinese appeared† in the Aka country close to the administrative frontier of Assam; the Chinese officials at Rima have sent‡ a summons to the Mishmi tribal headmen to appear before them with a view to the annexation of the Mishmi country; and Sir John Jordan has recently reported that, in connection with the disturbances in the Poyul and Pomed country in south-eastern Tibet, the Chinese Government have approved of the despatch of a force down the Dihong river towards the Abor country, a measure which, if carried out, may possibly lead to claims to tribal territory which do not at present exist, if not to more serious complications. Circumstances have thus forced us to revert practically to the original proposal of Lord Minto's Government that endeavours should be made to secure, as soon as possible, a sound strategical boundary between China *cum* Tibet and the tribal territory from Bhutan up to and including the Mishmi country, and this should, we consider, now be the main object of our policy. As long as such tribal territory lay between us and our peacefully dormant neighbour Tibet, an undefined mutual frontier presented neither inconvenience nor danger. With the recent change in conditions, the question of a boundary well defined and at a safer distance from our administrative border has become one of imperative importance and admits of no delay, for we have on the

*Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st June, 1911.

†Letter from the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, No. 423 C.G., dated the 14th July 1911, and enclosures. (Enclosure No. 4)

‡Letter from Captain F. M. Bailey, dated the 8th August 1911. (Enclosure No. 5)

administrative border of Assam some of the wealthiest districts of British India, districts where large sums of private European capital have been invested and where the European population outnumbered that of almost any other district in India. The internal conditions moreover of our Eastern Bengal and Assam Province are not such as to permit us to contemplate without grave anxiety the close advent of a new aggressive and intriguing neighbour.

11. As to the actual frontier line to be aimed at, we know little more of the area than we did last year, and can, at the moment, only indicate approximately the course of a line which promises to suit our purposes. Such a line is the one defined in Lord Minto's telegram of the 23rd October 1910, which represents roughly the limits of tribal territory on the Assam border which we desire to keep out of Chinese control; and, subject to such modifications as may be found necessary as a result of the explorations which will be made during the ensuing cold weather, we consider that that line should be our approximate objective, up to which the existing Assam 'Outer Line' should be advanced. We do not propose to have a third or intermediate line between the existing 'Inner Line' and the new external boundary; neither do we think it necessary, for the latter to be regularly demarcated at present, but it will probably be necessary, during the course of the contemplated operations in tribal territory, to erect cairns at suitable points, such as trade routes leading into Tibet, to indicate the limits of our control, and to explain to the tribesmen the object of such marks. One such cairn will be required in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai on the Lohit river, opposite the flags erected by the Chinese from Rima to mark the limits of their territory, but the sites of other cairns can only be determined after enquiry on the spot; and, provided that the sites selected conform approximately to the position of the line defined in the above cited telegram, and correctly represent the limits of locally recognized Tibetan territory, we see no objection to the erection of such marks by officers during the course of their enquiries.

12. The question of future arrangements for controlling and safeguarding the area between the administrative boundary and the new external frontier remains to be considered. We consider that our future policy should be one of loose political control, having as its object the minimum of interference compatible with the necessity of protecting the tribesmen from unprovoked aggres-

sion, the responsibility for which we cannot avoid, and of preventing them from violating either our own or Chinese territory; and, while endeavouring to leave the tribes as much as possible to themselves, to abstain from any line of action, or inaction as the case may be, which may tend to inculcate in their minds any undue sense of independence likely to produce results of the nature obtaining under somewhat analogous conditions on the north-west frontier of India. We admit that, as a natural and inevitable consequence of the settlement of the external boundary, whether the settlement be by mutual agreement, or as in this case, for the time being at any rate, of an *ex parte* nature, it will be necessary to take effective steps to prevent the violation of the new external boundary by the Chinese after the expedition and missions have been withdrawn. The nature of the measures to be adopted, however, cannot be determined until we know more of the country. In one part they may take the form of outposts, while in another only tribal agreements and arrangements may be necessary; but in addition to such local measures as may eventually be decided upon, it is essential in our opinion that, as soon as the boundary has been roughly decided, a formal intimation should be made to China of the limits of the country under our control.

3. *Chinese activity on the Mishmi border, 1910-12*¹

1. *Events of 1910. Erection of flags at Menilkrai*

Chinese activity on the Mishmi border (extreme N.E. of Assam) first excited notice in May 1910, when information was brought to Sadiya by the Chief of Pangum (lat. 28°, long. 96° 38'), in the Miju section of the Mishmi country, to the effect that two Tibetans had come to his village with the news that 1,000* Chinese soldiers had arrived at Rima and had demanded taxes from the Tibetan Governor. The Governor refused to comply with this demand, and was

¹*IOR*, Political and Secret Memoranda, L/P&S/18/B.189.

*The number is evidently an exaggeration. Captain Bailey, who passed through Za-yul in the summer of 1911 (see paragraph 2), found 20 Chinese troops at Rima and 320 at Chikung, the headquarters of the district.

imprisoned.* The Tibetans also brought orders from the Chinese to the Pangum Chief to cut a track from Tibet to Assam broad enough for two horsemen to ride abreast. The Chief refused to obey, saying that he was a British subject, and that he declined to take orders from anyone except the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya. (Pol. 1093/10). From a statement made by a Miju named Halam to the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, in July 1910, it appeared that the Chinese had established a firm control over Rima, and had planted flags near the River Yepuk, a tributary of the upper Lohit†, but that they had not attempted to assert sovereignty beyond what might be argued to be the limits of Tibet. (Monthly Memorandum of Information received, & c., September 1910, paragraph 15).

It was further reported in October 1910, on the authority of certain Mishmis who had come into Sadiya, that the Chinese had prohibited all trade between the Miju Mishmis and Tibet.

2. *Captain Bailey's Journey‡*

Further information on the subject of Chinese intrigues with the Mishmis was furnished by Captain F. M. Bailey, who travelled from China to Assam via Rima and the Mishmi country in the summer of 1911.

Captain Bailey reported that on the 15th June 1911 he met two Mishmi headmen at Tin-ne or Tini (two days south of Rima and three miles north of the Chinese boundary flags), who stated that they were on their way to visit the Chinese official at Chikung, a Chinese military post some 35 miles N.E. of Rima. It appeared from their statement that in the previous year a Tibetan messenger had been sent by the Chinese from Za-yul** to summon the Mishmis to make their submission to China at Chikung. The Mishmis disregarded the summons, with the result that next year more peremptory orders were sent, accompanied by a threat of military action if the

*According to another account, the Tibetan Governor was not harmed in any way, but was told to leave the place as quickly as possible.

†The late Mr Williamson, who toured in the Mishmi country in January and February 1911, found the Chinese flags at Menilkrai, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the river Yepuk. They were also found, still in their places, when the Mishmi Mission under Mr Dundas reached the Yepuk in January 1912 (see paragraph 5).

‡Viceroy's telegram, 18 August 1911 (P. 1372/11). Captain Bailey's Report, 19 September 1911 (P. 1822/11).

**The district of S.E. Tibet in which Rima and Chikung are situated; it adjoins the N.E. border of the Mishmi country.

Mishmis disobeyed. It was in response to these orders that the two headmen were on their way to Chikung; but before actually going there, they were to attend a final conference of Mishmis to be held near Tin-ne. Captain Bailey advised the headmen to consult the Political Officer at Sadiya before visiting Chikung. Acting on this advice they turned back in the direction of Sadiya, but after accompanying Captain Bailey for a few days turned aside at their own villages and proceeded no further. Later on, as he advanced into the Mishmi country, Captain Bailey met more headmen on their way to Chikung, and on the 20th July was informed by two Tibetans, who visited his camp at Minzang, that they had been sent a month before with orders to bring in the Mishmi headmen to the Chinese official at Chikung within 15 days, under pain of decapitation in the event of failure. These Tibetans told Captain Bailey that they had at last persuaded some of the Mishmis to come in, but that they had exceeded the time allowed them, and expected to be punished.

There is reason to believe that the visit of the Mishmi headmen to Chikung did not actually take place, the departure of the Chinese officer on the Po-med campaign, making it necessary to postpone further action in the direction of the Mishmi frontier.

3. *Mishmi Mission: Chinese visit to Dilli valley**

In October 1911, when the British Mission under Mr Dundas was about to enter the Mishmi country, the headman of Pangum (see paragraph 1) reported that his village had been visited about a month before by Tibetan Lamas sent by the Chinese to summon the Miju headmen to Rima for a purpose to be disclosed on their arrival. The Mijus did not obey the summons, fearing that they might be required in connection with the expedition against Po-med, which the Chinese were known to be organising. (Viceroy's telegram of 10th October 1911, P. 1975/11).

The Pangum headman also brought news of a visit paid by a party of Chinese during the previous rainy season to the valley of the Dilli (or Delei) river,† in the Taroan section of the Mishmi country. (Viceroy's telegram of 12th October 1911, P. 1679/11; General Bower to Government of India No. 1008, 10th October 1911, P. 1865/11). During the progress of the Mishmi Mission Mr Dundas was able to

*Mishmi Mission Diary, November 1911, Pol 285/12.

†A tributary of the Lohit, joining that river from the north in about lat. 96° 30, long. 28°5.

corroborate this report by particulars obtained from various village headmen, which made it clear that the Chinese had entered the Mishmi country from the north via the Glei Dakhru pass and had made an attempt to assert Chinese authority in the tribal area. The most circumstantial account of the visit was that given on 30th November 1911 by Mazanon, headman of the Taroan Mishmi village of Chipa, in the Dilli valley, and was to the following effect: Seven months ago a Chinaman named Ta Loh, with an armed escort of 50 Chinese and 100 Tibetan coolies, came over the Glei Dakhru pass and halted for seven days near Chipa. Mazanon was summoned by messengers to Chinese camp but being unwell sent his son and some of his villagers to represent him. The Chinese first demanded that Chipa and other Taroan villages should open the road down the valley of the Dilli river and allow them free passage along it. To this the tribesmen replied that the road was very bad and that the Chinese should use the Lohit road, which was the road the British also used. The Chinese then gave the Chipa people a piece of paper with some writing on it which they said should be shown both to the Chinese and British; this the Taroans did not take. Next the Chinese produced a flag and ordered the tribesmen to set it up at the confluence of the Dilli and Lohit. This they also refused to do, replying that if the Chinese wished to plant flags they must do it themselves. The Chinese then produced nine loads of salt which they gave to the villagers saying that they should eat Chinese salt as well as British. Mazanon stated that his people took the salt and ate half of it, leaving the other half in the village for fear of incurring our displeasure. The Tibetan interpreters dwelt on the fact that Ta Loh was a 'big man' and urged the tribesmen to make him suitable presents. The Taroans refused, and on their refusal being interpreted to the Chinese, the latter grew angry and threatened to send for 300 more soldiers; but they left next day without carrying out their threat, and crossed the Glei Dakhru in the direction of the Po-med country.

4. *Chinese 'passports'**

Fifteen documents which had been distributed by the Chinese were afterwards recovered by Captain Hardcastle (attached to the Mishmi Mission) in the course of a tour up the Dilli valley in Decem-

*Mishmi Mission Diary, January, P. 1009/12.

ber 1911. The documents, which were written in Chinese and Tibetan, were found to be of the nature of passports, or rather warrants of protection, issued in the name of Chao Erh-feng, Warden of the Marches of Szechuan and Yunnan. Their purport was to the effect that—(individually or on behalf of a village) having tendered his submission, the said Minister (Chao) 'after due enquiry feels it incumbent on him to sanction the issue of a Warrant of Protection for his property'.* The documents were sealed and bore the Chinese date corresponding to February 1911.

Captain Hardcastle was also able to obtain further information, corroborating Mazanon's statements in all essentials, from three Tibetans who visited him in the Dilli valley. According to their account, on the arrival of the Taroan headmen in the Chinese camp, the officer—whose name appears to have been Chang or Chiang, with the title of Ta Lao-yeh (Mazanon's 'Ta Loh⁵')—began by explaining that he had not come to their country to take any revenue from the people, but that in future they must all obey the orders of the Chinese. He persuaded the tribesmen to accept Chinese passports, saying that the documents would be useful to show to any Chinese official they might meet while trading in Tibet, or to any British official who might enter the tribal country. Chang Ta Lao-yeh was evidently a military officer; he was described as wearing a black uniform with a belt, and as having spent a year at Chikung, with a garrison of 500 soldiers, when the Chinese came into the Za-yul district. The Tibetan gave the number of his escort as 20 Chinese soldiers only.

5. *Erection of flag and notification, January 1912†*

Mr Dundas reported from the Yepuk river on the 14th January 1912 that three Tibetans,‡ sent by the Chinese official at Rima, had set up two days before at a point three-quarters of a mile beyond Menilkrai, and some 75 yards north of the flags previously erected

*Captain Jeffery's rendering of the Chinese writing on the passports is given in the text. There is some discrepancy between his version and that of the Tibetan writing as translated by Captain Hardcastle on the authority of his Tibetan interpreter.

†Viceroy's telegram, 13th January 1912 (P. 114/12); Mishmi Mission Diary, January 1912 (P. 1009/12).

‡According to another account two Chinese soldiers, not three Tibetans, were the agents employed.

(see paragraph 1), (1) a flag bearing the advice of a four-clawed dragon, and (2) a board containing a notification in Chinese and Tibetan, meaning 'The Southern frontier of Za-yul on the borders of the Szechuan Province of the Chinese Empire'. The flags planted in 1910 were found still in their places.

6. *Renewed Chinese activity**

On the 15th July 1912 Mr Dundas, who had been on special duty on the North-Eastern frontier since the withdrawal of the Mishmi Mission, reported that two Miju Mishmis had come in to Sadiya a few days before to give information about a visit paid by three Chinese officials to Yepuk and Menilkrai. According to the Miju's statement, the Chinese party, one of whom appeared to be an important official, did not belong to the Rima garrison, but came from some place in China. They came along the left bank of the Lohit. On reaching the site of the British camp on the Yepuk, the Chinese took impressions of two inscriptions carved by the Sappers and Miners on a granite boulder,† examined the bi-lingual boundary notification at Menilkrai (see paragraph 5), and gave instructions for another notification, which they were sending, to be put up alongside and to be protected against the weather by a thatch covering. After walking along the new road as far as the southern end of the Manglor flat, the party returned to Rima by the way they had come. No Mishmis were present, except a party of coolies from Tin-ne and other villages whom the Chinese brought with them. It was to these latter that instructions were given regarding the new notification. No other orders were given to the tribesmen either direct or through Tibetans.

The Chinese party may probably be identified with the 'special officer', Chiang Feng-ch'i, accompanied by an English-speaking interpreter, Chao Yang-yun, and a guide, Shu Chin-liang, whose despatch to the frontier was reported in the Chengtu newspaper article enclosed in Consul-General Wilkingson's despatch of 21st

*Dundas to Assam Government (No. 337 M, 15th July 1912). Assam Government to Government of India (No. 151 P.T.) 22nd July 1912 (P. 3323 A/12)

†These inscriptions were (1) the name plate of the Company, with date; (2) a quotation from the 'Analects' of Confucius to the effect that 'it is not a pleasant thing to meet friends from a far country.'

April 1912 (P. 2547/12). (See Appendix, paragraph 8; also paragraph 3, where the same party is apparently referred to).

J.E.S.

(J. E. SHUCKBURGH)

Political and Secret Department,

India Office

9th September 1912

4. *Surveys along the Assam-Tibet Border, 1911¹*

1. A suitable military frontier should follow the principal watersheds and include on our side the tributaries of the lower Brahmaputra, the Lohit and Irrawaddy rivers. A mountain chain is from every point of view the most advantageous frontier.

2. It is realized that other questions, such as the determination of the limits of habitation of tribes, originally under Tibet on the one hand, and independent frontier tribes on the other, will largely affect the question of our frontier *vis a vis* China, but the military aspect should be prominently kept in view.

3. We are already precluded from obtaining the best military line on this part of the border; the Tsangpo alone decides this point. Besides this instance, the Chinese, by their effective occupation of Tibet, control many of the ranges and passes, and have established themselves at the head-waters of several of the rivers which flow down into Assam.

4. From east to west, the more important are:

The Lohit; the Nagong Chu, or Dibang; possibly the Yamne; the Tsangpo, or Dihang; the Nia Chu, or Kamla; the Tawang Chu, or Dangma.

The approximate line of frontier proposed by the Government of India is shown by red chain-dotted line in the accompanying sketch map. Roughly speaking, this line divides Tibet and the tribes originally under the Tibetan Government from the independent frontier

¹Memorandum by General Staff Branch on the points which should be brought to the notice of Survey parties working in the tribal territory on the Assam-Tibet border in 1911-12.

Foreign & Political Department *Notes, Secret/External*, September 1915, 76-101.

tribes, and it will be seen that all the above-mentioned rivers cut through this line.

5. Such information will, therefore, be required from the expedition, missions, and survey parties as will enable the General Staff to determine the best military line under the circumstances.

The information already possessed, and that which is required is given below:

(1) *The Lohit.* This river is formed by the combined waters of the Zayul Chu and Long Thod Chu, both rising high in the uplands of Tibet and uniting at Shikha, a few miles above Rima in Zayul.

A range of snowy mountains divides the waters of the Rong Thod Chu from those of the Lohit, and also divides the Tibetan district of Zayul from the Mishmi country.

The waters of the Zayul Chu and Lohit are divided from those flowing into the Irrawaddy by a continuous mountain range known successively throughout its length by the names Rirapphasi, Nam-kiu, and Phungan range. This range divides Zayul and the Mishmi country from Hkamti Long and Chiu tzu. Along these two ranges a suitable boundary seems indicated, but it will be necessary to find a convenient point at which the line should cross the Lohit river.

The Chinese are now in effective occupation of Zayul, and in 1909 planted flags, presumably to mark the boundary, at Manekrai or Menilkrai, a big boulder in the valley of the Lohit. This point is believed to be the ancient boundary between Tibet and India.

(2) *The Nagong Chu, or Dibang.* Both the explorers A.K. and Kinthup, and the Mishmis and Tibetans who were with Mr Needham on his journey to Rima in 1886, stated that the Nagong Chu runs westwards from its source north of the Ata Gang La, through Pomed, and falls into the Dihang, north of the Abor country. If this statement is correct, the conclusion must be that a continuous mountain chain runs from the Lohit valley to that of the Dihang, and our alignment of a frontier throughout this section will be much facilitated.

If, however, the river breaks through the range and becomes the Dibang, as our maps show (and the volume of its water appears to lead to this conclusion), it will be a difficult matter to determine the points at which the frontier line should cross these rivers, if at all, and the ranges along which it should run between them.

The valleys of the Ithun and Ithi, tributaries of the Dibang, are inhabited by the Mithun and Midu sections of the Bebejiya Mishmis,

and the Dibang valley by the Chulikatta Mishmis. The expedition of 1899, into the Mishmi country, only penetrated, with difficulty, as far as the valley of the Ithun.

North of the Mishmi country is said to be Lhoyul, whose people (the Lhobas) are a race similar to the Mishmis, but having a slightly different language.

Should the range, referred to above, not be continuous, it seems very desirable to carry the frontier along a range of mountains that may be found separating the Mishmis from the tribes to the north (or possibly even including the Lhobas if these are found to be independent of Tibet), and dividing them from the Pobas. Failing the existence of such a range, some other suitable military line should be investigated.

Any passes leading from the Mishmi country into Lhoyul, or into the valley of the Rong Thod Chu, should be reconnoitred.

(3) *The Yamne.* A similar difficulty may present itself in the case of this valley. It is inhabited by the Padam Abors as far north as Damroh. North of them are said to dwell the Milangs, and north of them again is Po-med.

It is uncertain whether the Yamne rises in Po-med, or whether a high range divides that country from that of the Milangs. Information on this point is very desirable, as also on the course of the river above Damroh.

(4) *The Tsangpo, or Dihang.* In this valley, the explorer Kintup (1882) reported that the names of villages were Tibetan as far south as Angi. The villages of the Karko Abors are said to be four or five marches from Tibet. The Karko villages are three marches from Kebang.

The whole course of this river as far as the falls, reported to be in about latitude $29^{\circ} 30' N$ should be explored; and efforts should be made to examine the country between the Tsangpo or Dihang river and the Yamne river as far up the latter river as circumstances permit.

In order to link the work of the Abor survey parties with that of those proceeding up the Kamla, an attempt should be made to follow the stream flowing into the Dihang about Dangan (a few miles south of Angi) from a westerly direction.

The Chinese are reported to have sent an expedition down the valley of the Tsangpo, below the falls, to operate against raiders in that direction, as well as in Po-med.

(5) *The Nai Chu, or Kamla.* The Nai Chu rises high up in the uplands of Tibet, about the longitude of Chetang and Tawang. The trade route between these two places crosses its headwaters. It flows, presumably, through the country of the hill Miris and Apa Tanangs into the Subansiri.

Of late years the Apa Tanangs have had no dealings with Tibet, but it is reported that formerly relations used to exist between the two. There may have been a trade route along this valley in former years, and in such case it would not be a matter of much difficulty for the Chinese to construct a road there.

It will be difficult to determine the range which the frontier should follow north of this river, and though it is desirable to adhere as closely as possible to the proposed line between Tawang and latitude 29° N., it is doubtful if the frontier could include the watershed of this valley much further to the west of that line, owing to Chinese occupation.

(6) *The Tawang Chu.* This river rises near Chona Jong, and, separated by a snowy range from the country of the Mijis, Akahs and extra Bhutan Bhutias, flows through Bhutan into the plains of Assam.

A regular trade route from Tawang (and Lhasa) crosses this snowy range, and leads to Odalguri. A route leads from Tawang also into Bhutan.

It is very desirable, from a military point of view, that the frontier should run along the above-mentioned snowy range, starting from the Bhutan border at a point on the range a few miles south of Tawang.

6. To sum up, the points requiring elucidation and attention are:

- (1) On the Lohit. Our boundary marks should be placed near Menilkrai opposite the flags erected by the Chinese. The survey parties in this neighbourhood should endeavour to link up common stations with those proceeding north from Burma along the Burmo-Chinese frontier.
- (2) On the Dibang. The limits of habitation of the Mishmis and Lhobas should be determined, as also the course of the Nagong Chu. Passes from Mishmi country into Lhoyul and the valley of the Rong Thod Chu should be reconnoitred.
- (3) The exploration of the valley of the Yamne, with a view to ascertaining whether its northern watershed is likely to form a

suitable frontier between Po-med and the independent frontier tribes.

- (4) The Dihang. The boundary marks in this valley should be so placed that the frontier line may follow a suitable mountain chain east and west from them.
- (5) The boundary marks in the Kamla valley should be placed as far west as possible, as it will be difficult to determine along which mountain range north of this river a suitable frontier can be obtained in the first instance.
- (6) The mountain range running north-east and south-west from a few miles south of Tawang requires examination, with a view to its adoption as the frontier in that region to the southern watershed of the Kamla.

5. *Confidential Note by Chief of General Staff,¹ 1 June, 1912¹*

1. Although the survey and exploration work of the past season has not been so fruitful in results as might have been hoped for, and much yet remains to be done before we shall be in a position accurately to define our frontier with China, much useful geographical and political information has been gained from which an indication can be given of the line the frontier should take.

Taking the area section by section as dealt with by the various Missions during the past season, i.e., Miri, Abor, Mishmi and Hkamti Sections, the politico-geographical information will be summarized, a rough definition made of the proposed frontier line, recommendations put forward for the completion of the work, and past errors discussed with a view to profiting in future by the experience gained.

A rough sketch map of the whole area, the latest survey sheets of the Abor and Mishmi work are attached.

2. *The Miri Section.* The Mission did not penetrate far enough to examine or survey a suitable frontier line and the information gathered is not complete nor definite, but the survey parties were able to fix a few peaks by triangulation and these, together with

¹IOR, Political and Secret Files, 1910/1918, Part 2.

points previously fixed, and evidence obtained through the tribesmen and from observation and deduction, lead to fairly positive conclusions regarding the existence of a continuous range of snowy mountains which would serve as a suitable frontier line in this section.

Starting from the east this range may be described thus:

From about Long. $94^{\circ} 25'$ to Long. 93° , Lat. $28^{\circ} 20'$, a high range varying in height from 13,000 to 16,000 feet was seen, and peaks in it fixed. It appeared to be without a break and to form a well-defined barrier. Immediately west of Long. 93° , there appeared to be a knot of high peaks from which a lofty range, in which peaks had been previously fixed, ran in a south-westerly direction towards Tawang. This range was also apparently without a break, the two thus forming a continuous mountain barrier.

Regarding the rivers draining this area, all evidence tends to show that the Subansiri and Kamla both rise south and east of the range and do not pierce it, while the evidence to the same effect is almost equally strong in the case of the Khru river. The Nia chu is said to flow north of the range into the Tsang po.

In the Miri country only two passes appear to cross the range; one towards the eastern end at the head of a tributary of the Subansiri, from all accounts not difficult and much used by the Miris to cross into Tibet for salt: the other leads from the Khru valley into Tibet, is high, difficult and little frequented. The small amount of trade carried on between the western Miris and Tibet appears to cross by a pass in Daphla country.

The first named pass is the most important connection with Tibet throughout this section, it affords the easiest and most direct line by which any effort could be made from Tibet to influence the Miris.

The Northern Miris are in no way under Tibetan influence.

The mountain barrier above-mentioned would therefore appear to be a suitable frontier line but more definite information is necessary, especially as regards the Khru river, and it is important that the pass from the Subansiri in the eastern part of the section should be reconnoitred.

The direction of the frontier line about Tawang requires careful consideration. The present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Odalguri to the southern Bhutan border, and thus a dangerous wedge of territory is thrust in between the Miri country and Bhutan. A

comparatively easy and much used trade route traverses this wedge from north to south by which the Chinese would be able to exert influence or pressure on Bhutan, while we have no approach to this salient from a flank, as we have in the case of the Chumbi salient. A rectification of the boundary here is therefore imperative, and an ideal line would appear to be one from the knot of mountains near Long. 93°, Lat. 28° 20' to the Bhutan border north of Chona Dzong in a direct east and west line with the northern frontier of Bhutan. There appears to be a convenient watershed for it to follow.

Future Exploration. The conflict with the Miris at Tali is reported to have had a great effect throughout the whole country of the Miris and neighbouring tribes. Reports of their losses, greatly exaggerated, spread rapidly over the country, causing a great impression. There is little sympathy with the Tali people over the punishment they have received, and there is a general appreciation of the fact that those who receive us well have little to fear from us. The probability is that future expeditions will have a friendly reception, and the chances of opposition have decreased instead of increased.

Recommendations. It is very desirable to obtain exact information of the pass north of Mara, and the extent of communication carried out across it, to discover whether the range observed is the main range, and to put beyond question of doubt the courses of the rivers Subansiri, Kamla, Khru and Nia chu. The months in which the best weather is enjoyed are November and December, and allowing for the best transport and supply services, and a start being made from the base at the earliest possible date after the monsoon, it is improbable that exploration and survey work could be commenced on the higher hills till about the beginning of December in the case of the Subansiri, and the middle of December in the case of the Kamla.

There is reason to believe, however, that a considerable stretch of the Subansiri river is navigable above the Subansiri-Sidan confluence, and if this is so the difficulties of supply on this line will be considerably lessened.

It is recommended that an exploring party and two survey parties with escort should proceed to Mara in the Subansiri valley, whence small parties should be sent up to the pass north of Mara, and up the main valley of the Subansiri. That a similar party be sent through the Daphla country to the upper waters of the Khru river.

To give the parties a good chance of success, early arrangements should be made in the hot weather and supplies collected at the bases (the furthest points accessible by water) by 15th October. To ensure this, arrangements should be commenced in August at the latest.

The difficulties of reaching the northern ranges by the Kamla and Subansiri routes at a season when snowfall has not rendered high altitudes inaccessible, suggests the possibility of using a route which would give access to points whence all doubts could easily be cleared up. Should political considerations admit of a party moving north by the Tawang route, this line appears to offer a solution of the difficulty. Leading, as it does, at once into high country, where the summer rainfall is light, operations might be undertaken in the hot weather. By a move eastwards from about the Se la, north of Chona Dzong, the courses of the rivers, and the existence, or otherwise, of a line of mountains north of Lat. $28^{\circ} 20'$ affording a better frontier line, would be ascertained.

3. *The Abor Section.* At about Long. $95^{\circ} 10'$, Lat. $29^{\circ} 35'$, near the Tibetan district of Pemakoi a very high peak, altitude 25,700 has been fixed—we may call this 'Pemakoi Peak'. From this peak a lofty snowy range runs in a south-westerly direction and, from, evidence obtained locally and the conclusions of survey officers, it is said to be highly improbable that any river breaks through this range, i.e., west of Pemakoi peak. It is therefore probable that this range joins that mentioned in the Miri Section and is the main range of the Himalayas. The range continues to the east of the Dihang, but its direction and peaks in it have not been observed. At the eastern base of Pemakoi peak the Dihang breaks through by a deep gorge with many windings.

North of the Yamne river a minor snowy range lies east and west at about Lat. $28^{\circ} 45'$, and this is joined to the main range to the north by a low lying range on the east bank of the Dihang. The Yamne river rises south of the minor snow range, and only small tributaries of the Dihang rise on the west of the latter, low lying range. No rivers pierce either range.

Abors state that north of Pemakoi a large rapid river runs into the Tsangpo from the north-east. This river they call the Yigrung, and say that it flows out of the Po country, and that it was this river that caused the great flood in the Dihang in 1899, and bodies of Pobas were washed down by it. The Nagong chu has also been called

the Nyagrong chu,* a name sufficiently like Yigrung to support the idea that this river does not drain into the Dibang, but becomes the Yigrung and drains into the Tsangpo.

East of Jido, the northernmost Abor village on the left bank of the Dihang, Abors state is a hill, whence they can see part of the distance up the gorge of the Dihang, and can also see to the east a large river flowing eastwards, but they have no knowledge of the eventual course the latter takes. The river must either join the Nagong chu and become the Yigrung, or, be one of the head waters of the Dibang river system, or, flow into the Rong Thod chu. The last is the most unlikely course, as it would be difficult then to account for the Dibang river having a larger discharge than the Lohit with a much larger drainage area.

We can therefore come to the conclusion that there exists either:

- (1) a continuous mountain range running east to south-east from the gorge of the Dihang, joining the Mishmi hills which form the watershed between the Rong Thod chu and the Delei, with the unknown river rising east of Jido flowing into the Dibang;
- (2) or, a continuous range from the gorge of the Dihang, formed by the low lying range east of Jido joining the minor snow range north of the Yamne, and continuing to join the Mishmi hills which form the watershed between the Rong Thod chu and the Delei, with the unknown river east of Jido flowing into the Yigrung and thence into the Tsang po.

It would appear that (1) is the more likely conclusion and that we shall probably find the mountain barrier suitable for our frontier along such a line.

Ethnological evidence also supports the choice. The Tibetans and Abors both recognize the Pemakoi range as the boundary, while Abors state that to the north-east of their country is a region of uninhabited, inhospitable mountains.

North of the Pemakoi range the people are called Menba, and in the snows to the north-west of Abor country are said to dwell a cannibal race called Mimat (the Galongs call them Nyimek). The people are Abors as far as Jido on the left bank of the Dihang, and pure Abors extend nearly as far on the right bank, the last three villages below the gorge being mixed Abor and Menba, who act as

*Tibetan Route Book.

trade intermediaries between Tibet and Aborland.

As regards passes. There is no route up the Dihang left (of) Jido, the river must be crossed to the right bank, when the route into Tibet crosses the Doshung la. There is said to be a pass at the head of the Sigon and also at the head of the Siyom river. Kinthup visited a pass on the left bank of the Dihang which he called the Zik la; this is probably at the head of the Sik river shown on the map and leads to the source of the unknown river flowing east. No pass leads northwards from the Yamne river region.

The best route to reach the northernmost limits of Abor Territory and Tibet is via Rotung, across the Dihang to Pongging, thence a short distance up the Yamne, across the Yamne-Dihang watershed to Geku, thence via Simong and the left bank of the Dihang to Jido. This route, from Pongging onwards, passes through the territory of the Panggi and Simong-Panggi Abors, sections most friendly to us. These sections are cut off from access to the plains of Assam by the Minyongs and Padams on either side, inimical to them; they are very desirous of opening trade relations with India, and welcomed the idea of a post at Rotung and a road through their country accordingly; moreover they are the sections of the Abors who have intercourse with Tibet, the Minyongs and Padams have none. The withdrawal from Rotung is therefore most unfortunate; posts at that place and at Geku would keep open the road to the north and afford an avenue by which information regarding Chinese activities in eastern Tibet could reach us.

Recommendations. Both Simong and Riga have made promises to conduct exploring parties next cold weather into the northern limits of the country.

Mr Bentick believes that small parties could now proceed through most parts of the country.

A small exploring survey party, capable of living on the country, should be sent via Pongging and Simong to Jido to visit the Doshung la.

A similar party, which might be accompanied by a patrol as far as Dosing if necessary, should proceed *via* Riga to explore the sources of the Siyom and Sigon rivers. The Boris, at the head of the Siyom, are friendly.

4. *The Mishmi Section.* The work of the mission has revealed little to solve the riddle of the Dibang. The Dri tributary of this river has been fixed as rising in the southern slopes of a high range

to the north in about Long. $95^{\circ} 52'$ Lat. $29^{\circ} 5'$. The source of the main river, which flows from the east, remains undiscovered; one branch of it probably rises north-west of the Glei Dakbru Pass; the river flowing due east from near Jido may take a southerly turn and supply the main waters.

In the Lohit valley the work of the mission has thrown into prominence certain facts which bear closely upon the choice of a frontier line.

As regards Passes—

On the left bank:

- (1) A comparatively easy route from the Lohit valley runs up the Saalti valley by an easy gradient, and crosses the Taluk la into Hkamti Long. It is considerably used by Tibetan traders.
- (2) From this route another branches off southwards and leads into the Ghalum valley.
- (3) A route leads up the Ghalum valley and crosses the Krong Jong pass into Hkamti Long.

On the right bank:

- (4) A route leads up the Torchu valley over the Dou Dakhru pass and down again to the Lohit by the Dou valley.
- (5) A route leads up the Delei valley and, crossing, the Glei Dakhru pass, leads to Dri in the Rong Thod chu valley a short distance above Rima. It traverses a thickly populated area, enjoys considerable traffic, and affords, next to the Lohit valley, the best access from Tibet into Mishmi country. It was by this route that the Chinese entered in 1911 and issued passports to the Taroan Mishmis of the Delei valley.
- (6) Further west is a less used pass, the Hadigra, connecting the same regions.
- (7) Three routes lead from the Delei valley, across passes into the Bebejiya country.

Political and Strategical. The Lohit valley is exceedingly sensitive to interference by any of the above-mentioned routes.

The Chinese are reported to be increasing their garrison and building more barracks at Rima.

The Taroan and Miju Mishmis trade freely between Assam and Tibet, acting the part of middlemen. The Chinese made a determined effort in 1911 to bring the Taroans of the Delei and Dou valley under their sway, informing the headmen there that they were to look to China for protection, in earnest of which passports were

distributed, and in the wording of these passports occurs the expression 'has tendered submission'. Furthermore, they demanded that the Taroans should plant the dragon flag at the confluence of the Delei and Lohit rivers. This is eloquent testimony to Chinese ambitions.

The Tibetans of Zayul are desirous of exchanging the Chinese for the British yoke. This fact is known to the Chinese and renders them suspicious of our intentions. The attitude of the Mishmis, on the other hand, is tinged with caution, and is non-committal, those of them who have migrated to Zayul have been well treated by the Chinese, provided with land, and their taxes remitted. They have seen our columns winding laboriously over their rugged paths at the rate of 5 or 6 miles a day, and realise that some time must elapse before an appeal for assistance could be answered. Their period of greatest danger from the Chinese is when the passes are open in May, June and July, and this is precisely the season when we are least able to help them, a roadless tract and unbridged torrents separate us from them.

The Glei Dakhru pass can be reached from Rima in 5 days, and it is 20 marches from Sadiya.

One of the first necessities therefore is the construction of a graded and bridged road up the valley of the Lohit which will be open throughout the year.

Frontier Posts. It is necessary to establish posts in the Mishmi country for the following reasons.

(1) The Mishmi mountains impose a screen behind which the progress of the policy and movements of the Chinese near our vulnerable north-east salient cannot be observed from within our administrative border, and it is imperative that we should be in a position to watch this progress. Native information, necessarily unreliable, would often arrive too late to be of value.

(2) A wrong construction will be placed, both by the Mishmis and the Chinese, upon our failure to establish posts after the withdrawal of the Mission. The fact that the mission started on its return journey just at a time when a considerable concentration of Chinese troops was taking place at Rima, will be given undue significance, and the Chinese are skilful in turning such matters to account.

(3) The Taroans of the Delei valley, who were induced to

surrender their Chinese passports to us, will find themselves in a false position if the Chinese demand an explanation, were we not in a position to support them.

(4) The difficulty of future negotiations with China will be much enhanced by an apparent renunciation of territory by us, and our failure to set up boundary marks or occupy any position will be construed to mean that we are not justified in regarding the country as under our control, and acquiesce in the Chinese demarcation.

(5) Mishmis of all clans are anxious to obtain firearms. They have been informed that they cannot expect them from India. The establishment of posts in their country will minimize the danger of their obtaining them from the Chinese.

(6) Advantage should be taken of the present friendly attitude and primitive armament of the Mishmis to consolidate our position.

Sites for Frontier Posts. Menilkari, the spot where the Chinese planted their dragon flags to mark their southernmost limits in the Lohit valley, affords no indication of a line of frontier and has been chosen by them with the evident intention of denying to us the only suitable site in the valley for a frontier post—Walong*—an ideal site, in an elevated situation, commanding the valley to the north on either bank, lending itself to the construction of defensible post and offering little difficulty in the matter of water-supply, as three streams flow through the elevated plateau on which it stands.

Frontier Line. It is imperative to deny to the Chinese access to the routes up the Saalti into Hkamti Long and up the Torchu valley into the Dou valley; the frontier line should therefore cross the Lohit valley at some point north of where these two routes leave the valley and from which it would rise by convenient spurs to the mountain chains on either side, and it should also include the Gleidakhru pass on our side. The point of crossing should therefore be a few miles north of Walong.

Walong was a Mishmi settlement at about the middle of last century and is now a spot where Tibetan herdsmen maintain cattle for Mishmi owners. Three Tibetan hamlets on the left bank of the Lohit, Kahao, Dong and Tinai, of one or two houses each, would then have to be included on our side of the border and their section

*See map showing ground in the vicinity of Walong.

would have to be arranged for. The two last mentioned are recent settlements, and have existed on sufferance. The inhabitants, of all three, who in the aggregate do not exceed 50 persons, are employed by the Mijus to assist in keeping and pasturing their cattle.

Recommendations. (1) A matter of the first importance is the construction of a road up the Lohit valley as far as Walong. This should be a cart road in the plains section (constructed by the Public Works Department) and in the hill section a good bridle path, with permanent bridges above flood level over the Tidding, Delei and Dou rivers.

For this work the employment of 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners and 2 double Companies Pioneers is recommended, the whole under an Engineer Major of experience in such work. The question of the economical strength of the party resolves itself into one of supply and transport. The above party is the minimum that could hope to complete the work in one season, and the maximum for which supplies, together with the bridging material, etc., could be forwarded. Half the strength of the above party, with a road survey party should advance from Sadiya on 15th September to commence preliminary work from the terminus of the Public Works Department cart track, in order to facilitate supply matters. The remainder of the party should leave Sadiya on 1st November, and at once commence work on the bridges.

An early decision on this point is necessary in order that the officer in charge may be appointed at once, that the details of the scheme may be worked out and the arrangements for supplies and materials made betimes. For a proper economy of time and money all supplies and materials should be delivered at rail head by 15th August.

(2) The construction of Military Police Posts at Walong, Minzang and near the mouth of the Delei river.

(3) Later on, tracks up the Delei river to the Glei Dakhru pass, and up the Ghalum river to the Krong Jong pass should be improved, and a bridge thrown across the Lohit river near Minzang.

(4) An exploring party, accompanied by a survey party, should proceed up the Delei valley to the top of the Glei Dakhru pass. Last season the Mission only penetrated as far as Tjobum in this valley, and the position of the Glei Dakhru pass does not appear to have been correctly fixed, according to tribal evidence. It is necessary to determine the configuration of the watershed proposed as a

frontier line in this region.

(5) An exploring and survey party should proceed up the Dibang valley to determine the course of the main river and configuration of the mountain ranges.

5. *The Hkamti Long Section.* Very little of the information gathered by the recent Mission to Hkamti is yet to hand, but Captain Pritchard, on his return from his journey of exploration, has been able to supply a great deal of essential matter. The results of the survey work received to date are shown approximately on the accompanying sketch map.

Captain Pritchard has furnished the following information:

Geographical. There are four known passes over the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed from Sachangbum to Lat. $27^{\circ} 25'$.

There is no natural feature up to this Latitude, other than this watershed, which would make a satisfactory frontier line.

The upper reaches of the Tamai, the Taziwang and Taron remain unknown, as do the passes over the snow-clad ranges separating them, but Captain Bailey crossed one or two of these rivers in their northernmost reaches, if not indeed at their actual sources.

Political. Excepting the incursion of Chinese and tribesmen from Tenkeng in 1911, there is not a trace of Chinese influence up the valley of the N'mai, and north of the Mekh confluence Chinese are almost unheard of. It is significant that while a few Chinese petty traders are said to come annually down the valley of the Laking, they never cross by the existing passes north of Sachangbum, nor do they use the Mekh valley route, the reason being that by the Laking route Lisus are not met with, whereas these passes, as well as the Mekh valley route lead through Lisu country. This emphasizes the importance of the Hpimaw-Laking-N'kamti route from the Chinese point of view, enabling them, as it would, to avoid Lisu country.

The Chinese are said to be subduing the Lisus on the Salween, and their main object in so doing must be presumed to be the extension of their influence further west.

We should take steps to prevent their activity furnishing us with another Hpimaw incident further north.

Up to Lat. $27^{\circ} 25'$, the people of the N'mai valley are Marus; the Naingvaws, hitherto miscalled black Marus, are merely an isolated clan of the Maru tribe; their southern boundary is the Laking valley. North of this Latitude the people are known as Nungs or Khanungs identical in reality with the Naingvaws, but there is now

no communication between them. North of the Khanungs again are the Kinungs, who are probably the Lutze described by Prince Henri d'Orleans. The Naingvaws of some of the N'mai villages pay tribute in kind to Lisus residing both east and west of the Salween, and they suffer greatly from their depredations. Several influential Naingvaws openly asked that we should definitely take over their country, but the majority were afraid to express this sentiment, though they shared it, fearing the subsequent vengeance of the Lisus.

These Lisus have been attracted from their original abode in the valley of the Salween by the gold found at the Mekh-N'mai confluence and further up the N'mai as well, and many of their villages are to be found up the valley of the Akhyang and on the left bank of the N'mai above the confluence of these two rivers. Some of this gold is exported to China through the Lisu country by the valley of the Akhyang, while some of it goes to that country by the Laking-Hpimaw route. (It is worthy of note that the Lisus dig for gold and do not merely wash for it).

Except for the almost ridiculous tribute of monkey skins and bees-wax, said to be gathered by the headman of Ze-chi (on the Mekong) among the Khanungs and Kinungs in the valley of the Taron, or similar tribute paid by these tribes to Tibetans further north, the Chinese cannot be said to have any influence, direct or indirect, in the valleys of those rivers which go to form the N'mai. This is probably the case almost up to the Latitude where Captain Bailey crossed the upper waters of these tributaries.

Frontier Line. There are therefore political, ethnological and geographical grounds to support our claim for a frontier line running from some point north of the Taluk la, along the Zayul chu-Irrawaddy watershed, to the junction of this range with the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed in the vicinity of Menkong, and thence in a southerly direction down this watershed, and so branching off along the offshoot from the main range to Pangseng chet.

On further exploration of the extreme apex of the north-east salient and the main tributaries of the N'mai, strategical and geographical considerations may come to light which may render it expedient to align our frontier along one of the inner-lying ranges separating these tributaries. Should this be the case we hold in our hands a handle for negotiation if we claim, as we should in the first instance, the main watersheds described above.

Recommendations. (1) The despatch of a couple of officers,

accompanied by a surveyor, is recommended to explore the routes leading from the Lohit into Hkamti Long, and thence to carry out the exploration of the upper reaches of the Nam Tamai, Taziwang and Taron rivers, more particularly to report on any routes leading from China into this territory south of the line traversed by Captain Bailey in 1911, and on routes over the snow clad ranges separating the above rivers. This officer to be also accompanied, if possible, by Matung Chit su, the Burman Myok, who was with Mr Bernard.

Appointment orders could be issued by these officers to all villages to which Chinese or Tibetan influence has not yet extended. This might be done by pushing Hkamti influence beyond its present limits.

(2) That the Civil Officer at Laukhaung should tour up the N'mai valley at least as far as the Akhyang confluence with a sufficient escort to permit of the detachment of an officer to visit the Lisus of the Akhyang, and another to visit the Lisus on the left bank of the N'mai south of latitude $27^{\circ} 40'$, with the object of issuing appointment orders to these Lisus, and warning them that they are under British protection and are not to enter into any relations with the Chinese.

A Public Works Department Officer might accompany to prospect on an alignment for a mule road.

The gold, reported at the N'mai-Mekh confluence, the silver mine said to be at Ritjaw, and the mineral wealth of Hkamti (Shan-'gold land'), might repay the despatch of an officer of the Geological Department to these regions.

(3) The despatch of two survey parties, to survey the country west of the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed, including the range itself, to complete the work eastwards of the surveyor who accompanied Captain Pritchard.

It is important that the Mekh and Akhyang rivers should be traced to their sources.

(4) The time appears to be propitious, owing to the success of the Hkamti Mission, for the despatch of a friendly mission into the Hukawng valley from Burma, to further British influence there and gather information regarding routes from that valley into Hkamti Long.

(5) No recommendations as to situations for frontier posts can be made until fuller information is available, but the valley of the N'mai at about Lat. $27^{\circ} 40'$ or that vicinity, appears to be indicated

for the location of a post whence the activities of the Chinese towards the North-East salient could be watched.

(6) *The proposed Frontier Line.* Subject to alteration which may be necessitated as our knowledge increases, the proposed frontier can be described as a line following the watersheds of:

The Subansiri river, with its tributaries the Kamla and the Khru, the Dihang as far as the gorge in about Long. $95^{\circ} 10'$ Lat. $29^{\circ} 40'$ and all its tributaries south of that point,

the Dibang and all its tributaries,

the Lohit and all its tributaries south of about Lat. $28^{\circ} 20'$,

thence along the Zayul chu-Irrawaddy watershed to its junction with the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed, which latter it will follow southwards to about Lat. $25^{\circ} 50'$, from which point it will follow the Nam Ti and Taping-N'mai-kha watershed to Pang-seng-chet.

This line is shown by a red chain-dotted line on the accompanying sketch map, and corresponds very closely with the line proposed in paragraph 6 of Government of India letter No. 105 of 1911.

7. *Weak points in the past season's work.* It was in the operations of the Miri Mission chiefly that weaknesses in the preliminary arrangements militated against the successful accomplishment of the task allotted, entailing extra expenditure in the endeavour to remedy them at a later stage, and it was in the supply and transport work that the main errors occurred. The following are some of the points brought to light:

The coolies were in many cases of unsuitable classes, unfit for the work and insufficient in number.

An estimate of the transport required in a difficult and unknown country can only be made out by an experienced officer who is put in possession of all existing information and the objectives of the expedition. It would be advisable to utilize the services of a skilled Supply and Transport or other military officer.

To ensure proper control over supply depots and along a line of communications and to prevent waste of supplies and of transporting power, a small staff of Non-Commissioned Officers from the Indian Army (preferably Gurkhas on this frontier) should be employed with one or more officers to command, and an organization similar to a coolie corps on a military expedition adopted.

In order that Supplies may be sent forward in the correct proportions, a British Supply Subordinate should be placed in control of supplies at the base.

The collection of supplies should be commenced at a very early date so that the expedition may start directly when weather conditions are favourable.

The Officer Commanding the escort should have command of the whole Supply and Transport Staff and control of these arrangements. This officer is responsible for the safety of the expedition and that safety is intimately bound up with the Supply and Transport question and the organization of the line of communication.

A Medical Officer should accompany an expedition of any size where opposition is a possibility.

8. Throughout this note the assumption is made that the pertinacity of the Chinese will not long permit of their acquiescence in the present state of affairs in Tibet. Although their activity on our frontier may have received a temporary check on account of the Revolution, history proves that succeeding a Revolution, as a rule, a period of national vigour and expansion follows. A renewal of activity may therefore be expected. Moreover the Republican Government has revealed its intention of making the new China a Military Power, and we have received news that the Chinese are already sending parties to align the frontier with the Republican flag on the borders of Assam.

There is therefore no time to be lost in declaring to the Chinese in unmistakable terms the line the frontier is to follow, in making our occupation of that line effective in so far as placing ourselves in positions whence we can watch developments and prevent further encroachments is concerned, and in improving communications on our side. By reason of the effect produced by the expeditions of last season—*although the effect may have been discounted to some extent, in the case of the Abors, by the withdrawal from Rotung*—the present time is a propitious one to carry on and complete the work of survey and exploration throughout these regions. It is therefore worth while to make the effort now; if we delay, the necessity for so doing may, later on, be forced on us at a greater expenditure of force and money.

9. It is obviously dangerous to attempt to delimit a frontier on incomplete geographical knowledge, and the time for demarcation may come before many years are passed. When that time comes we should endeavour to avoid the heavy pecuniary loss which has occurred in past demarcations in other parts of the world owing to inexact geographical expression in the definition of the frontier, and consequent delay and constant reference of points of dispute, by

being ready with such complete geographical information that vague definition will not occur and that technical accuracy of expression will be assured.

10. To sum up, the recommendations for next season's work are:

In the Miri Section

- (1) An exploring and Survey party with escort to proceed to Mara in the Subansiri valley and explore the pass and upper waters of the valley.
- (2) A similar party through the Daphla country to the upper waters of the Khru river.

In the Abor Section

- (3) Exploring and Survey parties to the Doshung la and to the head waters of the Siyom and Sigon rivers.

In the Mishmi Section

- (4) The employment of 2 Sapper Companies and 2 double companies of Pioneers in the construction of a bridged bridle track up the Lohit valley to Walong.
- (5) The construction of Military Police Posts at Walong, Minzang and near the mouth of the Delei river.
- (6) The exploration and survey of the Delei valley to the top of the Glei Dakhru pass.
- (7) The exploration and survey of the upper waters of the Dibang.

The Hkamti Long Section

- (8) The despatch of a couple of officers with a surveyor to explore the passes from the Lohit into Hkamti Long and the upper waters of the northern tributaries of the N'mai kha, i.e., the Nam Tamai, Taziwang and Taron.
- (9) Tour by the Civil Officer, Laukhaung up the N'mai valley to visit the Lisus in that valley and tributary valleys.
- (10) The despatch of Survey parties to complete the survey east of the N'mai and west of the Salween-Irrawaddy watershed.
- (11) The despatch of a friendly Mission into the Hukawng valley.

Dated 1st June 1912

IV

1. *Treaty between Tibet and Mongolia, said to have been signed at Urga on 11 January, 1913*¹

Whereas Mongolia and Tibet, having freed themselves from the Manchu Dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent States, and whereas the two States have always professed one and the same religion, and to the end that their ancient mutual friendships may be strengthened: on the part of the Government of the Sovereign of the Mongolian people—Nikta Biliktu Da Lama Rabdan, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Assistant Minister General and Manlai, Caatyr Bei-Tzu Damdin-surun; on the part of the Dalai Lama, ruler of Tibet—Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan-Agwan, Donir Agwan Choinzin Tschichamatso, manager of the bank and Gendun-Galsan, secretary, have agreed on the following:

Article I

The Dalai Lama Sovereign of Tibet, approves of and acknowledges the formation of an independent Mongolian State and the proclamation on the 9th day of the 11th month of the year of the Pig, of the master of the Yellow Faith Je-tsun Dampa-Lama as the Sovereign of the land.

Article II

The Sovereign of the Mongolian people Je-tsun Dampa Lama, approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Sovereign of Tibet.

Article III

Both States shall take measures after mutual consideration for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

Article IV

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall henceforth,

¹H.G.C. Perry-Ayscough and R.B. Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia*, London, 1913, pp. 10-13. Also see Bell, *Tibet*, pp. 150-1, and *F O* 371/1608, Buchanan to Grey, 17 January, 1913.

for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.

Article V

Both States, each on its own territory, shall afford mutual aid to their subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or State business.

Article VI

Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall, as formerly, carry on mutual trade in the produce of their lands—in goods, cattle, & c., and likewise open industrial institutions.

Article VII

Henceforth transactions on credit shall be allowed only with the knowledge and permission of official institutions; without such permission no claims shall be examined by Government Institutions.

Should such agreements have been entered into before the conclusion of the present treaty, and should the parties thereto be unable to settle matters amicably, while the loss suffered is great, the payment of such debts may be enforced by the said institutions, but in no case shall the debts concern the *Shabinar*^a and *Hoshun*^b.

Article VIII

Should it be necessary to supplement the articles of this treaty, the Mongolian and Tibetan Governments shall appoint special Plenipotentiaries, who shall come to an agreement according to the circumstances then existing.

Article IX

The present treaty shall come into force on the data of the signature thereof.

Plenipotentiaries of the Mongolian Government: Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Biliktu Da Lama Rabdan and Assistant Minister General and Manlai, Caatyr Bei-Tzu Damdinsurun.

Plenipotentiaries of the Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet: Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan-Agwan, Donir Agwan Choinzin Tschichamatso, manager of the bank of Tibet, and Gendun-Galsan, secretary.

According to the Mongolian chronology, on the 4th day of the

12th month of the second year of 'Him who is exalted by all'.

According to the chronology of Tibet, in the year of the Water-Mouse, on the same month and day.

2. *Russo-Chinese Declaration and exchange of notes regarding Outer Mongolia, 23 October/5 November, 1913*¹

A. DECLARATION

The Imperial Government of Russia having formulated the principles which it took as the basis of its relations with China as regards Outer Mongolia, and the Government of the Chinese Republic having stated its approval of the said principles, the two governments have agreed upon the following:

- I. Russia recognizes that Outer Mongolia is under the suzerainty of China.
- II. China recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.
- III. Recognizing the exclusive right of the Mongols of Outer Mongolia to provide, themselves, for the internal administration of Autonomous Mongolia and to settle all questions of a commercial and industrial nature relating to that country; China binds itself not to intervene in these matters and consequently will not send troops into Outer Mongolia, nor will it keep any civil or military official there, and it will abstain from colonizing in that country. It is understood, however, that a Dignitary sent by the Chinese Government may reside at Urga, accompanied by the necessary subordinates and an escort. The Chinese Government may, moreover, in case of need, keep in certain localities of Outer Mongolia, to be determined in the course of the conferences provided for in Article V of the present agreement, agents for the protection of the interests of its subjects.

Russia, on its side, binds itself not to keep troops in Outer Mongolia, with the exception of consular guards, and not to intervene in any branch of the administration of this country, and to abstain from colonizing.

¹MacMurray, *China Treaties*, II, London, pp. 1066-7.

- IV. China declares itself ready to accept the good offices of Russia for the establishment of its relations with Outer Mongolia^a, in conformity with the principles above set forth and with the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of October 21, 1912 (November 3, 1912).^b
- V. Questions pertaining to the interests of Russia and of China in Outer Mongolia and resulting from the new state of affairs in this country will be the subject of subsequent conferences.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized to this effect, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Peking in duplicate, October 23/November 5, nineteen hundred and thirteen, corresponding to the fifth day of the eleventh month of the second year of the Chinese Republic.

(Signed) SUN PAO-CHI

(Signed) B. KROUPENSKY

B. NOTES EXCHANGED

1. From the Russian Minister in Peking to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 23/November 5, 1913.

In proceeding to the signature of the Declaration under to-day's date relating to Outer Mongolia, the undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, duly authorized to this effect has the honour to declare, in the name of his government, to His Excellency Mr Sun Pao-Chi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic, the following:

1. Russia recognizes that the territory of Outer Mongolia forms a part of the territory of China.
2. As regards questions of a political and territorial nature, the Chinese Government shall come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiations in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take part.
3. The conferences provided for in Article V of the Declaration shall take place between the three interested parties, who shall designate for this purpose, a place where their delegates shall meet.

4. Autonomous Outer Mongolia shall comprise the regions which have been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, of the Tartar General of Uliassutai and of the Chinese Amban of Kobdo. Inasmuch as there are no detailed maps of Mongolia and as the boundaries of the administrative divisions of this country are uncertain, it is agreed that the exact boundaries of Outer-Mongolia, as well as the boundary between the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, shall be the subject of the subsequent conferences provided for in Article V of the Declaration.

The undersigned takes advantage of this opportunity to renew to His Excellency Mr Sun Pao-chi the assurances of his very high consideration.

(Signed) B. KROUPENSKY

2. From the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister in Peking, October 23/November 5, 1913.
(Sun Pao-chi repeated, word for word, the four numbered paragraphs, set forth in the earlier note of M Kroupensky).

V

1. *Sir John Jordan's Memorandum to the Wai-chiao-pu, Peking, 17 August, 1912*¹

In a conversation with His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai on the 23rd of June His Britannic Majesty's Minister referred to the Chinese Military Expedition which was being organized against Tibet and gave His Excellency clearly to understand that the Tibetan question could be easily settled by friendly negotiation at a later date but that the use of force at that time would seriously prejudice an amicable arrangement. His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai assured Sir John Jordan that there was no intention of incorporating Tibet in China and that the Treaties would be scrupulously observed.

On June 29 His Majesty's Minister informed Mr Lu Cheng Hsiang that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate any attempt to reduce Tibet, who had independent Treaty relations with Great Britain, to the condition of a Province of China and he warned the Chinese Government that grave complications might ensue if the Chinese expedition crossed the frontier into Tibet.

In consequence of a visit paid to him in a few days previously by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's Minister again saw His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai on the 16th instant and, in reply to his enquiry, received the most emphatic assurances that there was no intention either of ordering the expedition to cross the frontier into Tibet or of incorporating that country in the Provinces of China. These assurances have been noted and duly reported to His Majesty's Government who will doubtless welcome them as indicating China's intention scrupulously to observe Treaty engagements. At the same time His Majesty's Government consider it to be in the interest of harmonious relations that they should now state clearly their policy in regard to Tibet. His Majesty's Minister had the honour to inform His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai that a communication in this respect would shortly be submitted to the Chinese Government and he now begs, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to make the following definite statement of that policy.

(1) His Majesty's Government, while they have formally recog-

¹IOR, Political/External File 1912/69, Jordan to Grey, 17 August, 1912.

nized the 'suzerain rights' of China in Tibet, have never recognized, and are not prepared to recognize, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Tibet which should remain, as contemplated by the Treaties, in the hands of the Tibetan Authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under Article I of the Convention of April 27, 1906, to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of Treaty stipulations.

- (2) On these grounds His Majesty's Government must demur altogether to the conduct of Chinese officers in Tibet during the last two years in assuming all administrative power in the country and to the doctrine propounded in Yuan Shih-kai's Presidential Order of the 21st of April 1912 that Tibet is to be 'regarded as on an equal footing with the Provinces of China Proper', and that 'all administrative matters' connected with that country 'will come within the sphere of internal administration'.

His Majesty's Government formally decline to accept such a definition of the political status of Tibet and they must warn the Chinese Republic against any repetition by Chinese officers of the conduct to which exception has been taken.

- (3) While the right of China to station a representative, with a suitable escort, at Lhasa, with authority to advise the Tibetans as to their foreign relations, is not disputed, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of Chinese troops either at Lhasa or in Tibet generally.
- (4) His Majesty's Government must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on the foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic.
- (5) In the meantime all communication with Tibet via India must be regarded as absolutely closed to the Chinese and will only be re-opened on such conditions as His Majesty's Government may see fit to impose when an Agreement has been concluded on the lines indicated above.

This does not apply to the withdrawal of the present Chinese garrison at Lhasa, who, as Yuan Shih-kai has already been informed, are at liberty to return to China via India if they wish to do so.

Sir John Jordan has the honour to request the Wai Chiao Pu to favour him with a reply to this Memorandum.

(Signed) J. N. JORDAN

2. *Powers of the Chinese plenipotentiary,
2 August, 1913¹*

Presidential Mandate No. 465.

Chen I-fan (Ivan Chen) is hereby appointed Special Plenipotentiary for Tibetan negotiations.

Republic of China,

Second year, 8th moon, 2nd day
(2nd August 1913)

(Great Seal of the President)

Signature of YUAN SHIH-KAI
President

Sd TUAN CHI-JUI
Premier

Sd CHENG HSIANG
Foreign Minister

Inscription of the Great Seal to be used by Mr Ivan Chen is as follows:

'Seal of the Special Plenipotentiary of the Republic of
China for Tibetan negotiations'

3 *Powers of the Tibetan Plenipotentiary,
24 June, 1913¹*

(Lag-kyar)—Letter issued by the Dalai Lama, the owner of both the religious and secular powers of Tibet.

The Chinese officials and troops in Tibet broke all faith between

¹Annexure II and III, Proc. 139 in *Foreign*, October, 1914, 134-396.

the priest and the layman acting quite against all rules, fought with us, robbed people and animals and took possession of our territory. All these are against rules. As it has now been definitely settled that a Conference of the representatives of the British, Tibetan and Chinese governments will take place at Darjeeling^a to settle peace for the future, I hereby authorize Sridzin (Ruler) Shatra Paljor Dorji to decide all matters that may be beneficial to Tibet and I authorize him to seal all such documents.

Dated the 21st day of the 5th month of the Water-bull year (24th June 1913).

Seal of the Dalai Lama

4. *Presidential Order of 26 November, 1913*¹

The ultimate intention of democratic government is that the ideas of the community should be collected in one place and that genuine benefits should be scattered abroad, in order to procure advantage for the country and happiness for the people, and in the hope that the facts (of administration) may be correctly dealt with. At present the formal government has been established, and jointly with the members of the Cabinet I have decided upon the general policy of the government and the order in which successive steps shall be taken. But when a Government is being established a thousand items wait to be dealt with, and in discussing the main policies which affect the foundations (on which the government is to be reared) the great essential is that such discussions should be of the best quality and of the utmost detail.

Telegrams have been sent to the provinces instructing the (authorities) to send men to Peking to form an Administrative Council, in order to avoid lack of understanding between the Capital and the Provinces, and that all may give their assistance in overcoming the existing difficulties of China's situation. Before long the delegates of the provinces will all have assembled. Two members of the Council should be selected and appointed by the Premier,

¹Encl. in Jordan to Grey, 29 November, 1913, Proc. 197 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

one for each Ministry by each of the Ministers, two by the body of judicial officials, and several by the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan affairs after due consideration of the matter. I now appoint Li Ching-hsi, Liang Tun-yen, Fan Tseng-hsiang, Ts'ai Ao, Pao-hsi, Ma Liang, Yang Tu and Chao Wei-hsi to unite with the above (representatives) in forming an Administrative Council. It is essential that all these members should employ all their knowledge in order jointly to give assistance in the government of the country. I earnestly trust that the country's foundations may thus be laid firmly on a rock, in order that its longing for good government may be satisfied.

VI

1. *Statement of Tibetan claims: Excerpts, 10 October, 1913*¹

Firstly, it is decided that Tibet is an independent state and that the Precious Protector, the Dalai Lama, is the ruler of Tibet, in all temporal as well as in spiritual affairs. Tibet repudiates the Anglo-Chinese Convention, concluded at Peking on the 27th April 1906, corresponding to the 32nd year of the reign of Kuanghsu, as she did not send a representative for this Convention, nor did she affix her seal on it. It is, therefore, decided that it is not binding on the three Governments.

Secondly, as regards the boundary between China and Tibet it is decided to be as follows: On the north-east by the stone pillar at Miru-gang in Zilling, thence to the east along the course of the river coming from Mar-chen Pom-ra mountain until it comes to its first big bend and thence to the south-east at a place called Chorten Karpo in Jintang. . . . This part of the country has been named by the Chinese as Hsi-Kang. The above countries all form part of Tibet, being inhabited by the Tibetans and included in Tibet. It is decided that the revenue of these countries of the past years shall be returned to the Tibetans.

Thirdly, the Tibet Trade Regulations of the 5th December 1893 and those of the 27th April 1908 will be revised by the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet in mutual consultations and agreement, China having no longer any concern with the aforesaid Trade Regulations.

Fourthly, after all this trouble, great enmity has been generated between the Chinese and the Tibetans. . . . In future, no Chinese officials and troops will be allowed to stay in Tibet. Their staying there is only an expense to the Chinese, who obtain no revenue from Tibet. In order, therefore, to ensure peace between the two countries in future no Chinese Amban or other officials and no Chinese soldiers or colonists will be permitted to enter or reside in Tibet, Chinese traders shall be admitted to Tibet when so authorized by permits issued by or under the authority of the Tibetan Government.

¹Annexure IV, Proc. 139 in *Foreign*, October, 1914, 134-396.

Fifthly, . . . the People of Mongolia and China send monks to the different monasteries in Tibet and also pay vast tributes to the monasteries. The Buddhist monasteries and other religious institutions in Mongolia and China recognize the Dalai Lama as their religious head. All these facts will continue to be recognized as at present.

Sixthly, the Chinese Government will compensate the Tibet Government soon in money for all the forcible exactions of money or other property taken from the Tibet government, for the revenue of Nyarong and other districts which they kept in their possession by force, for destroying houses and property of monasteries, officials and subjects of Tibet and for the damage done to the persons or property of Nepalese or Ladakis. A list of the damage done can be produced, but more such lists are coming from Kham. The Tibetan Government is unable to bear this loss.

The above are our claims.

Dated the 11th day of the 8th month of the Water-bull year (10th October 1913).

Seal of the Lonchen

2. *Chinese counter-proposals to the statement of Tibetan claims: Excerpts, 30 October, 1913¹*

Since the commencement of intercourse between China and Tibet there have been many occasions on which the latter has received much-needed assistance and protection from the former . . .

With regard to the action which China has taken within recent years on her frontier, it is because the Chinese and local inhabitants in that quarter have been frequently treated with injustice by the Lama authorities and they have appealed to the Chinese authorities for protection. Their appeal was immediately responded to, but the Tibetans aggravated the situation by their brutal murder of Amban Fung and many Chinese officials, who were skinned to death.

From what has been related it is evident that the claims presented

¹Ivan Chen to McMahon, 30 October, 1913, Proc. 149 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

in the Tibetan statement are inadmissible, and in answer to them the following demands are made as the only basis for the negotiations of the Tibetan question:

i) It is hereby agreed by the undersigned that Tibet forms an integral part of the territory of the Republic of China, that no attempts shall be made by Tibet or by Great Britain to interrupt the continuity of this territorial integrity, and that China's rights of every description which have existed in consequence of this territorial integrity shall be respected by Tibet and recognized by Great Britain.

The Republic of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province, and Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ii) The Republic of China has the right of appointing a Resident to reside at Lhasa, who is entitled to all such privileges and rights as he has hitherto enjoyed. He is also entitled to have an escort of 2,600 Chinese soldiers, one thousand of whom shall be stationed in Lhasa while the remaining 1,600 shall be stationed at such places as the Resident thinks fit.

iii) Tibet undertakes to be guided by China in her foreign and military affairs and not to enter into negotiations with any foreign Powers except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.

This engagement, however, does not exclude direct relations between the British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities on such commercial matters as are provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of 7th September 1904 and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of 27th April 1906.

iv) Tibet agrees to grant an amnesty to all those Tibetan officials and people who have been imprisoned by the Tibetan authorities merely on account of their well-known sympathy for the Chinese and also to restore to them all the property which has been confiscated by the said authorities for the same reason.

v) Clause 5 in the statement of Tibetan claims can be discussed.

vi) The revision of the Trade Regulations of the 5th of December 1893 and of the 27th April of 1908, if found necessary, must be made by all the parties concerned and on the basis of Article III of the Adhesion Convention of the 27th April 1906.

vii) The frontier boundary between China Proper and Tibet is now roughly indicated in the accompanying map.

IVAN CHEN

October 30th, 1913

3. *Verbal statement by Lonchen Shatra, 5 March, 1914, handed to Ivan Chen on 7 March, 1914¹*

At the Conference held on the 17th February 1914, the British Plenipotentiary handed over his decision on the boundary question between China and Tibet, which aims at restoring peace to a great many sentient beings, for which I thank him. In clause 'E' of that decision the blue line distinguishes Tibet into Outer and Inner Tibet. And Batang and Litang are shown within Inner Tibet. But convincing documentary evidences showing the appointment of the local officers, both ecclesiastical and secular from the Tibet government and the collection of rents and taxes, the appointment of hereditary Debas or headmen, have been produced by me to prove our claims. . . . So unless these people be included within Outer Tibet, those people will be drawn to despair and the other states will lose heart, in the good faith of the Government. . . .

Except in the three places viz., Dartsedo, Litang and Batang in the many other places included within Inner Tibet, the Chinese have not only no control whatever of any kind anywhere, but owing to the inhabitants being exclusively Tibetans, the Chinese have not even an officer anywhere. So, unless the present settlement be of such a nature as to definitely exclude all Chinese influence within Tibetan territories, a prolific source of future trouble will be still left; ill-feelings have unfortunately been created and the past outrages of the Chinese still rankle in the hearts of the people, who believe, that they will repeat it again. Incessant raids and invasions trouble to the British government, so it is desirable to put a stop to this system of two different prices for one article of merchandise which is bound to be a source of trouble in future, but that British Plenipotentiary will in his wisdom see the permanent peace can be

¹Proc. 214, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

secured by once for all, declaring that the Chinese should have no power of interfering in Tibetan affairs.

4. *Verbal statement by Mr Ivan Chen, 7 March, 1914, handed to the Tibetan plenipotentiary, 8 March, 1914¹*

The territorial limits of Tibet in the time of the Tang dynasty cannot, therefore, be admitted as evidence of any value for her present claim to the regions of Chinghai, Batang, Litang and Tachienlu. If one were to abide by such hoary connection in deciding the limits of her territory, what could be said about the connection of the same nature which Tibet had once had, also in the time of the Tang dynasty, with the valley of the Ganges in India and what could be said about the subjugation of India by China in the time of the Yuan dynasty?

The territory between Chiamdo and Giamda was first subjugated by Kanghsi and was afterwards bestowed on a Dalai Lama by Yungcheng. Between the end of the reign of Kwanghsu and the beginning of the reign of Hsuntung, the Manchu government took it back and restored it to the province of Szechuan.

The Republic has no right to alienate any part of the territory which she has inherited from the Manchu dynasty, and she must maintain the extent of her territory the same as before.

B. In reply to Sir Henry's remark on the two spheres, one of which Sir Henry proposes to call the sphere of periodical Chinese intervention in Tibet, and the other, the sphere in which Chinese dictation was of a purely nominal nature, my Government states that since the time of Yungcheng, Batang, Litang and other places have been under the provincial administration of Szechuan. Civil and military officials have been appointed in charge of the local revenue and garrisons. These places have indeed been administered by China in the same manner as inland districts for over two hundred years. The Chinese administration there is absolute and is not much as can be designated as 'periodical intervention'.

As regards the Anterior and Ulterior Tibet?^a they have been under the direct administration of the Lhasa Amban since the deposition

¹Proc. 215 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

of the last Khan of Tibet in the 15th year of the reign of Chienlung. This is recorded in the Wai Tsang Tung Tze and in the memorial submitted to Chienlung by Field Marshal Fu Kong Ngan on the administrative reforms he had carried out in Tibet at that time.

This memorial is contained in the Szechuan Tung Tze and Wang Ching King Shu Wen Pien. Both, the civil and military administration, have since been in the hands of the Lhasa Amban and from the Anterior Tibet to the limits of Ulterior Tibet, Chinese military garrisons have been stationed at various points together with civil officials appointed from Szechuan to take charge of collecting local revenues. The whole Tibet is therefore a sphere within which China has actually exercised her authority and cannot be designated as a sphere 'within which Chinese dictation was of a purely nominal nature'.

C. As to the designations of the Inner and Outer Tibet as suggested by Sir Henry, my Government cannot agree to the suggestion, firstly because there have never been such designations known in any public record and official documents both Chinese and foreign; secondly, because their acceptance would be fraught with grave consequences to China; and thirdly, because the regions of Chinghai, Batang, Litang and such other places have nothing whatever to do with the question at issue. In the former, the Chinese administration has been long established and so it is with the latter. They cannot, therefore, be considered otherwise than Chinese territory and should not have been brought into discussion at all.

D. To Sir Henry's remark 'that other States again were the scene of Chinese military operations and temporarily lost their independence' and 'lastly the inhabitants rose and drove out the Chinese not only from the outer zone but from the whole of Tibet', my Government replies that as to the first part of his remark it seems that Sir Henry has lost sight of the actual authority China has had over the whole of Tibet since the time of the Manchu dynasty; while as to the second part of his remark my Government would venture to say that what he has stated is not exactly the fact, for the Chinese military force were not driven out but were withdrawn on the advice tendered to my Government by the British Minister, and that the Chinese military force have been ordered not to make an advance to the west after they reoccupied Enta is also due to the same reason.

The withdrawal and the non-advancement of the Chinese military

force have been made in the hope of receiving such friendly assistance from the British Government as will lead to an amicable arrangement of the Tibetan question, but what has been proposed by Sir Henry is so favourable to the Tibetans and unfavourable to China that it is not the friendly assistance which my Government have been led to expect to receive at the hands of the British Government by what is stated in the memorandum of August 17th, 1912, which was communicated to my Government by the British Minister, and by what was stated by Lord Morley in the House of Lords last July on this Tibetan question.

E. As regards the question of the autonomy of Tibet, my Government is prepared to consider it, but how far they are prepared to go will depend upon how the whole Tibetan question is going to be discussed.

My Government cannot, however, recede from the claims they made in the statement which I handed to Sir Henry at the meeting of the Conference on January 12th.

I am also instructed by my Government to state that the boundary line between the south of China and the north of Tibet, except in that part touching Hsi-kang which was taken back by the Manchu dynasty and restored to the province of Szechuan, runs as follows:

It starts from Mount La Bon Tsi, then to Mount Keria, then to Mount Tsai Tsai, then to a place called Sari, then to Lake Bilon-Dyaka...thence it runs northward to Mount Sung Yen Pa, north of Mount Tchongota.

With reference to the Tibetan statement, communicated to the Conference on the 12th January, 1914, I am instructed by my Government to make the following remarks:

1. When His late Excellency Chao Erh Feng led his army to subjugate the various independent tribes in Hsikang, the British Government had not interfered in the matter in any way, and this statement can be substantiated by a communication received from the British Minister, dated the 26th of the 9th moon of the 2nd year of Hsuan-tung (October 28th, 1910).

2. The stone pillar at Merugang, referred to in the Tibetan statement, cannot be considered as an evidence of any value for the claim of Tibet, for there is a much later stone monument for us to go by. I am referring to the monument built in front of Potala, in the 59th year of Kanghsi, soon after the successful expulsion of the Zungarians from Tibet by the Chinese on behalf of the Tibetans.

Again, in the 15th year of Chienlung the last Khan of Tibet was deposed by an Edict, and the administrative affairs concerning U and Tsang were placed into the hands of the Lhasa Amban, and it has been so ever since.

3. What is termed spiritual influence should not be confused with what is termed spiritual authority. What does the Dalai Lama exercise is only spiritual influence and not temporal authority. He exercises the former in the same way as the Pope does in the West. The sphere within which his spiritual influence is extended can under no circumstances be claimed as the extent of his temporal authority.

4. The inhabitants of Hsikang in the east of Tanta La are of different race from those in the west of it. The former call themselves Kang Bawa, while the latter, Tsang Bawa. Ethnologically they are not of the same stock as has been said in the Tibetan statement. Moreover the calendars used in Tibet and Hsikang are different from each other, and it is so in Shanyen.

Again Shen-shih-ku-tso—the 39 tribes—is called in the Tibetan language, Jyade, the meaning of which, when translated is dependency of China.

5. In accordance with the regulations, relating to the official appointments in Tibet, proclaimed in the 59th year of Chienlung, it is absolutely necessary that any document in proof of any appointment, civil or military, or of bestowal of an Imperial favour, must be signed and sealed by the Lhasa Amban, otherwise it will be of no effect.

6. What is said in the Tibetan statement about the taxes paid to the Tibetans by the various tribes in Hsikang, it is well known that what is paid to the Tibetans is not in the shape of revenue, in the ordinary sense of the word, but merely contributions to the monasteries. It is rather charity than tax.

As regards the payment for Ula, it depends on whether the Ula ordered is for the execution of official business or not and does not depend upon whether the person who orders the Ula is Chinese or Tibetan.

Hsikang being under Tuszi pays regularly to China what is traditionally known as Kungthaning.

8. The number of soldiers in Tibet is fixed by China, and they are all placed under the control of Lhasa Amban. Whatever soldiers Tibet can occasionally have from Hsikang are merely mercenaries

and nothing more.

The despatch of a Chinese military force into Hsikang under the command of His late Excellency Chao Erh Feng was made in response to the supplication made to China by the inhabitants of that place, and as Tibet is a dependency of China, we have a perfect right to settle the matter between Hsikang and Tibet.

9. In the regulations of Tungtze, sanctioned by Chienlung in the 58th year of his reign, it is provided that the number of monasteries and Lamas that are under the control of the Dalai Lama, together with the number of all the places under the control of the Kahlons and that of population and families in various villages under the control of the Hutuktus, shall hereafter be reported separately to the Lhasa Amban and a record thereof shall also be kept in his yamen.

10. For the control of all the independent tribes, Chinese officials have been continually appointed, and they are respectively called Teung-pei-hu and pei-hu-chang. They are not appointed by the Tibetans.

11. What is said in the Tibetan statement on the question of indemnities, no such question can be entertained for a moment.

5. *Verbal statement by Sir Henry McMahon, 9 March, 1914*¹

Sir Henry McMahon is of opinion that the two memoranda presented by his colleagues on March 7th tend to bring back the discussion of the Tibetan question to the point at which it stood before the conference commenced its work; he feels bound therefore to take some decisive step towards the attainment of a settlement. Before doing so, however, he is anxious to show the greatest consideration for all the arguments which have been adduced by his colleagues, and to explain his carefully considered view of the situation.

Frontier: Our red line on the map includes the country occupied by people of Tibetan race, language, customs and religion, from the earliest recorded delimitation of Tibet in A D 822 without a break until the present time. Sir Henry has given weight to old records in his statement of February 17th in order to afford both to China

¹Proc. 216 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

and to Tibet the cumulative benefits of tradition. Before presenting that statement he had made an exhaustive study of old Chinese and Tibetan documents, and no substantial evidence adduced in the latest memoranda of his colleagues is new to him.

Batang, Litang, Hsiang-cheng, etc. That distinguished Chinese frontier authority Fu Sung-mu admits that at the time of our Treaty with China in 1906 the Chinese had no right of interference in the administration of either Batang or Litang which (were) under their own Tibetan chiefs; the Chinese had commissary officers in these towns, but they exercised no administrative powers. Hsiang-cheng is even now in the hands of the Tibetans, and is presenting an effective resistance to any form of Chinese interference in spite of continued blockades. Sir Henry notes with surprise the reference to Chiangta which has occurred in several of Mr Chen's communications, including that of February 24th. There is documentary evidence that the Manchu Emperors vetoed a proposal to inaugurate an administrative district extending as far west as Chiangta, and the President assured His Majesty's Minister at an interview on June 4th, 1913, that the insertion of Chiangta in the Presidential Order of May 25th was due to a clerical error.

Inner and Outer Zones. The whole country within both zones is still, and has always been, Tibetan. At the time of our treaty with Tibet in 1904 there was no Chinese administration in either Inner or Outer Tibet—this is admitted by Fu Sung-mu. We are now willing—under certain conditions—to see the Chinese placed in the best possible position to maintain the integrity of Tibet as included within the geographical limits of China, and to consolidate a buffer state, described as the Inner Zone of Tibet, which will safeguard the internal interests of Kanshu, Turkestan, Szechuan and Yunan. Kokonor is included within the Inner zone, as all available evidence tends to show that it is composed of a number of semi-independent districts, which are historically and actually a part of Tibet. The constant aggressions of the Chinese frontier officers in Eastern Tibet has convinced Sir Henry that no permanent peace can be secured unless the zone of Chinese military influence is clearly marked by some natural barrier and, in inserting the blue line between the Inner and Outer zones, he has chosen watersheds and deserts which will afford to both sides the best and safest natural barrier against periodic acts of aggression.

Chao Erh-feng: Sir Henry cannot but deplore the frequent

references to the campaigns of Chao Erh-feng. It was in consequence of those campaigns that Tibet was thrown into a tumult, that our Indian frontiers were subjected to several years of unrest, that the Chinese Amban, his escort and people were expelled from Tibet, that Tibet was driven to declare its independence, and that the present conference was called, in order to seek some remedy for a situation which was recognized as a menace to the peace and prosperity of the three countries now in negotiation.

Military activity in Eastern Tibet: Sir Henry desires me to hand to Mr Ivan Chen the enclosed Aide Memoire from the Lonchen, containing information that the Chinese frontier officials have made attacks upon the Tibetans some nine days to the west of Riwoche. Constant aggressions on the part of these frontier officers has been evidenced by the statements both of Mr Chen and the Lonchen, and it is clear that they are acting in open disregard of the order issued to them by the Central Government, whose assurances to us therefore have been rendered of no effect. Sir Henry has exercised all his influence with his Tibetan colleagues to prevent aggressions of the Chinese; these however have now gone so far that this restraining influence is becoming increasingly difficult, and it becomes a question as to how far its exercise will continue to accord with the demands of fairness and justice. The Tibetans are hardening in their refusal to accept any representative of China, and any reinstatement of Chinese influence, either in Inner or Outer Tibet. Unless the Chinese show a sincere desire to effect a settlement at once, on lines which will be reasonable and honourable to both parties; he feels that it will be impossible to prevent reprisals on the part of the Tibetans, which will render impossible a settlement on the basis of his statement of February 17th. It has been his desire throughout to secure some agreement which will record the integrity of Tibet as a part of the integrity of China, whilst at the same time safeguarding the interests of Tibet, a country with which His Majesty's Government is in intimate treaty relations.

VII

1. *Tibetan attitude to India–Tibet boundary,* *16 April, 1914¹*

Sir H. McMahon,

As verbally reported to you on the 14th instant, the Lonchen called on me that day and told me that he had received the following instructions from the Tibetan Government by post about the proposed Convention, in reply to his report to them forwarding a copy of the Convention.

- (1) There should be no Amban at Lhasa.
- (2) If it is found absolutely necessary to have an Amban, he should have as few soldiers as possible as escort and he should come to Lhasa via India.
- (3) The Amban and his escort should pay for their supplies at market rates.
- (4) The Chinese should have no hand in the appointment of Tibetan officials, either civil or military, in Outer Tibet.
- (5) The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 should be cancelled.
- (6) The Tibetans should exercise temporal power in Inner Tibet, chiefly in the appointment of Chiefs, such as the Ba Deba and others as they have been doing since a long time.
- (7) Derge and Nyarong should be retained in Outer Tibet. On my raising the point however the Lonchen readily admitted that the possession of Chiamdo was of greater importance than the possession of either Derge or Nyarong.
- (8) The Chinese should pay the indemnity to the Tibetans as well as that to the Nepalese and the Ladakhis.

The Lonchen states that if the British Government are firm with the Chinese, the Chinese Government will give in, as it is afraid of the British Government; but if the British Government give in the least, the Chinese will think that they will gain their end by haggling. This will lead to fighting in the end, in which case the Tibetans will have to ask for the help of the British Government.

The Lonchen has received a number of unreasonable demands from the Tibetan Government recently. I have taken the opportunity

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

from time to time to advise him to recommend his Government to moderate their demands and to consider what would be their position if they were left to their own resources in the conduct of these negotiations. The recent proposals from the Chinese Government in respect of the China-Tibet frontier, which have been telegraphed to Lhasa, will no doubt serve to abate Tibetan pretensions.

C. A. BELL
16.4.1914

2. *Tibetan reaction to Chinese disavowal of Ivan Chen, 8/9 May, 1914*¹

Sir H. McMahon,

I told the Lonchen Shatra today, 8th May, that under instructions from the Chinese Government Mr Chen had expressed his unwillingness to sign the Convention. I added that you had declined to discuss the position with Mr Chen, that it was, therefore, being dealt with by the British and Chinese Governments and that I would let him know in due course what transpired.

The Lonchen expressed his surprise at the action of the Chinese Government, and added that if they disavowed the action of their Plenipotentiary now, how could they be trusted to respect the Convention even after it was formally signed and sealed? After he had initialled the Convention he had himself received instructions to press the claim for damages and also not to agree to the Convention, unless Derge and Niarong were included in Outer Tibet, but he held himself bound by the initialling and declined to reopen these questions. He had already reported the initialling of the Convention to the Tibetan Government, who would be both surprised and disgusted at any such Chinese breach of faith. They would consider the action of the Chinese as resembling the story of 'water catching fire'.

C. A. BELL
8-5-1914

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

Mr Rose to see. This should then go into our file.

A. H. McMAHON
9-5-1914

Seen

A. ROSE
9-5-1914

3. *Tibetan reaction to Chinese disavowal of Ivan Chen, 19 May, 1914*¹

Sir H. McMahon,

The Lonchen Shatra came to see me on the 14th instant in the Foreign Office. He asked me how the negotiations were progressing and added that the Chinese Government should not have disavowed the initialling of the Convention by their Plenipotentiary. All the previous treaties and agreements were discussed and signed by Plenipotentiaries who were given full powers to do so but, if the action of the Plenipotentiaries could be disavowed in this way, then those treaties and agreements could also be disavowed in a similar way, unless signed by the Governments themselves. He gave up Derge and Niarong, in spite of orders from his Government to the contrary, in order to secure the other terms of the Convention. He would not have done this, had he anticipated this action of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government seem to think that the British Government would make further concessions if now they (Chinese) were persistent in holding on. The Tibetans always heard from Eastern Tibet that the Chinese were saying that this Conference was simply a pretence to gain time, as the Chinese army was not quite ready, and that as soon as it was ready, Chinese would break off negotiations and advance on Lhasa. The present action of the Chinese Government seems to bear out this rumour.

I told the Lonchen that there was no need to be anxious. The Chinese have agreed to all the rest of the Convention, except Article 9 regarding the boundary. I added that in the meantime we could often see each other and give each other our private opinions on the

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

best methods for the future administration of Tibet. I cited to him the case of Mongolia labouring under new difficulties in the matter of the administration of their country and added that this discussion would be a good thing in itself and our meetings might also rouse Chinese suspicions and so render them more inclined to sign the Convention. The Lonchen agreed that this was probable.

I will submit later on a separate note about our conversation regarding the future administration of Tibet.

C. A. BELL
19-5-1914

4. *Note regarding the Tibet-Kokonor Boundary,*
9 May, 1914¹

Mr Rose

Sir H. McMahan

In conversation yesterday the Lonchen told me that when the Dalai Lama was returning to Lhasa from Peking, the Sining Amban sent his officials and escort as far as Jun in Tsaidam. The officials and escort returned to Sining from Jun* as they said that from Jun southwards it was Tibetan territory and the Tibetans themselves should escort him. The Tibetan Government accordingly sent soldiers to Jun to receive him and escorted him thence to Lhasa.

In 1907, when the question of the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa from the north was under discussion, Mr Chang Yin Tang, who was then Chinese Amban in Lhasa, informed the Tibetan Government that, as the cold and almost uninhabited country between Nagchuka† and Tsaidam belonged to Tibet, they should erect the shelters for the Dalai Lama's occupation.

C. A. BELL
9-5-1914

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

*About latitude 36°20, longitude 96°50.

†Latitude 31°50, longitude 92°.

Mr Rose to see. This should then go on to our file. It is satisfactory to see that our final alignment of the boundary passes actually through Dun or Jun.

A. H. McMahon
9-5-1914

Seen

A. ROSE
9-5-1914

5. *China's objections to boundary settlement*

a. Jordan to Grey, telegram, 1 May, 1914¹

My telegram No. 98. President sent a Secretary to me today with Memorandum stating that initialling of Convention by Ivan Chen was an informal act, that instructions have been sent to him to cancel it, that question of boundary was the only article not generally acceptable and that Chinese Government was anxious to reach friendly decision and considered negotiations should not be interrupted. I replied that Ivan Chen had been appointed Plenipotentiary and that in my experience signature of a document had invariably followed its initialling. Secretary, whose map incorrectly showed boundaries of both Outer and Inner Tibet as initialled at Convention, was shown boundaries as given in Viceroy of India's telegram, dated 28th April. He was favourably impressed by the fact that the latter was more advantageous to China.

Secretary stated that President of the Republic's objection to boundary as settled was the inclusion in Outer Tibet of Chiamdo and of complete portion of Kokonor territory. The latter he states extended to the Tangla range and had always been Chinese. He described it as a barren waste. This latter statement is corroborated by Explorer A. K, by Rockhill and by others.

b. Jordan to Grey, 30 April, 1914²

On the evening of Saturday, the 25th instant, Mr Wellington Ku, a Secretary of the Wai Chiao Pu, who has been acting as the Con-

¹Proc. 274, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

²Proc. 312, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

fidential Agent of the President in the Tibetan question, handed me a Memorandum, copy of which in translation I have the honour to transmit to you herewith.

Mr Wellington Ku said that, in the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs through indisposition, he had been deputed to see me and request my good offices in placing the views of the President before His Majesty's Government. The President was sincerely anxious to arrive at an amicable arrangement and deprecated the idea of breaking off the negotiations. He was ready to accept in principle all the provisions of the Draft Agreement, with the exception of the 9th, which related to the boundary question. On this point he had made successive concessions, all of which had met with no response from the British side and he felt that the time had come now when His Majesty's Government would modify the boundary stipulations of the Agreement in the interests of an amicable settlement.

I said I had no authority to intervene in the matter which was in the hands of the Plenipotentiaries at Delhi and that I was in any case not in a position to express an opinion upon an agreement, the text of which had not reached me.

The Secretary hinted in the course of the conversation that insistence upon our claims with regard to Tibet might hamper the Chinese Government in its desire to facilitate the settlement of our claims in the Yangtse valley, but I refused to believe that such a contingency was possible.

After considerable pressure I said that, although my action might be open to the construction of being irregular, I would not fail to bring the President's views to your notice by telegram.

Translation

*Memorandum handed to Sir John Jordan by Wellington Ku,
25 April, 1914¹*

In the Tibetan question the Chinese Government set high value on the British Government's assistance towards a settlement, and sent a delegate to India to take part in the negotiations. At the opening of the Conference the British delegate was anxious that the boundary question should first be discussed. In this matter the views of this

¹Encl. in Jordan to Grey, April 30, 1914, Proc. 312, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

Government were strongly opposed to those of His Majesty's Government, but the former again gave way. Finally, when the Tibetan delegate handed in a memorandum on the boundary question in which the whole of China's territory of the Szechuan Marches and Kokonor was marked out as under Tibetan autonomous government, the Chinese Government considered that this affected the sovereignty and territory of the Republic and was unable to agree. It considered that with the assistance of the British delegate a just conclusion would certainly be reached. Unexpectedly the Tibetan claim, having been presented first, became the dominant factor, so that the British delegate was unable to consider carefully the various historical documents of evidence repeatedly brought forward by China, and suddenly the idea of an Inner and Outer Tibet was brought forward, together with a map in which the boundaries of these were marked with blue and red line; according to this everything south of the Altyn Tagh and west of Tachienlu, hitherto absolutely Chinese territory, was marked as within the limits of Inner and Outer Tibet. The Chinese Government much regrets that it was impossible for it to recognize this proposition, and considers that the original intention of the British Government in offering its mediation was very different from this.

Since the opening of the Conference the Chinese Government has, in view of its desire to attain its object of a friendly agreement, made many concessions, and its special Delegate has verbally stated them in detail on many occasions. By now repeating them the genuine high regard which China sets upon her relations with other countries will become even more apparent.

1. The Chinese point of view first proposed to consider Giamda as the boundary between Szechuan and Tibet, and the Tangla range as the boundary between Kokonor and Tibet.
2. When China made her second concession it was proposed that the area east of the Salween in which administration by prefectures and districts had been established should come entirely under Chinese jurisdiction, while in the area west of the Salween and as far as Giamda the administrative system of the late Manchu dynasty should be preserved and a declaration made that no prefectures or districts should be established; the administration of Damu, Mengku and Jyade also to continue as before.
3. By her third concession China agreed to consider the Tanta

pass the boundary between Tibet and China; the old administrative system not being altered in the country between the Salween and Tanta, and no prefectures and districts being established.

4. By the fourth concession it was agreed that the Salween should form the boundary between Szechuan and Tibet; the country to the east of the Salween coming entirely under the jurisdiction of China while that to the west should come within the sphere of Tibetan rule. At the same time it was stated that Tibet should be Chinese territory, on the same footing as Outer Mongolia; Kokonor and Jyade to form part of China. But, it was declared that in Jyade, as in the past, prefectures and districts should not be established.
5. China's fifth concession was her proposal to place the territory north of the Tangla range i.e. the old area of Kokonor together with Atuntzu, Batang, and Litang, to be entirely Chinese governed, as the interior of China, as in the past; Derge, Nyarong, Chiamdo and Jyade i.e. territory east of the Salween to form a special zone, to be called Kham as heretofore. Within this zone China to be free to take such action as she sees fit to strengthen her position, but no new administrative districts to be created. The Dalai Lama to continue to enjoy such religious prerogatives as heretofore. The country west of the Salween to be placed under Tibetan autonomy.

Thus looking at the matters detailed above it cannot be said that the Chinese Government has not made any concessions in questions of government and territory which have been discussed between China and Great Britain, at which discussions the presence of Tibet has been permitted. These concessions are sufficient to show that the Chinese Government has from start to finish had the hope of reaching a friendly settlement. At the same time it is clearly evident that China has gone to the extreme limit in making concessions in order to get out of her difficulties. Nevertheless the Tibetan Delegate at the Conference has obstinately adhered to his views and refused to make any concession, with the result that no progress has been possible. The British delegate has also found it impossible to make any allowances in favour of China's difficulties in making these repeated concessions, and has given a limit of 27 days (or of the 27th instant) in which a reply must be given. At the same time he has declared that, if the Chinese Delegate does not consent, he will

withdraw the Draft Agreement. To a proceeding of this sort the Chinese Government finds it impossible to agree. It is earnestly entreated that His Majesty's Minister will bring its views to the notice of the British Government, in order that the latter may telegraphically instruct the British Delegate to bear in mind the good intention of the British Government in endeavouring to arrange a settlement and to continue to negotiate, in order that the object aimed at, a friendly conclusion, may be attained.

As regards the present Draft Agreement, apart from the boundary question dealt with in Article 9, the ideas of both parties are generally speaking in agreement as to the remaining, and it will not be a difficult matter to reach an agreement by mutual consultation.

The Wai Chiao Pu trusts to receive Sir J Jordan's reply to this memorandum.

6. *China wants negotiations in London or Peking, 10 May, 1914*¹

Translation of a telegram received from the Wai Chiao Pu

The Memorandum from the Foreign Office saying that the report:

That the British Delegate has announced the intention of terminating negotiations with the Chinese Delegate is due to some misapprehension:

Conveys to us the idea and hope that the British Government might entertain further proposals.

The Chinese Government is also desirous of peaceful negotiations with a view to settlement. But telegrams from Ivan Chen say that the British Delegate has refused further negotiations and abrogates the 2nd and 4th Articles, which would prevent further negotiations.

Whether the British Government has instructed by telegraph their Delegate to further negotiations and whether they are willing to negotiate in London or Peking. Please enquire from the Foreign Office and reply immediately.

10th May 1914

Wai Chiao Pu

¹Communicated by the Chinese Minister, 11 May, 1914, Encl. 1, Proc. 321, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

7. *Communication to Russia regarding India-Tibet Boundary*

*Grey to Buchanan, 4 May, 1914:*¹ *Excerpts*

With reference to my despatch No 197 (Confidential) of the 23rd of May 1913, relative to the Conference in India between representatives of His Majesty's, the Chinese and the Tibetan Governments, with a view to the settlement of the Tibetan question, I have to inform Your Excellency that the negotiations have now reached a stage at which it has become necessary for His Majesty's Government to acquaint the Russian Government with what has passed in accordance with the undertaking given to them by Your Excellency on 27th May 1913, and to lay before them the draft Convention which was initialled by the three Plenipotentiaries of the three Governments.

I should be glad, therefore, if Your Excellency would communicate to Monsieur Sazonoff a copy of the enclosed draft Convention, together with its accompanying maps, and also copies of the Trade Regulations and of an Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement which have been separately negotiated and initialled by the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries.

It appears to me, subject to Your Excellency's opinion, that in presenting the Convention it would be well only to offer comments on the following two points, which alone directly affect the engagements towards Russia entered into by His Majesty's Government in 1907:

- (i) The decision with respect to industrial and financial concessions in Article 6.
- (ii) The arrangement for the British Trade Agent to pay occasional visits to Lhasa in Article 8 and to add an explanation of the reasons which have led to the adoption of a division of Tibet into spheres or zones (Article 9).

It further seems possible that the Russian Government may offer criticisms or objections on the following three points:

- (1) Article 10 of the Convention.

¹Encl. in Foreign Office covering letter, dated 4 May, 1914, Proc. 333 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

(2) The India-Tibetan Boundary Agreement.

(3) The Trade Regulations.

If they do so, Your Excellency should explain with regard to the first point that past experience has shown that some dispute as to the exact meaning of the terms of any arrangement of this nature is always possible, and that it is consequently desirable that some arbitrator should be named in the Convention itself to determine such disputes, and that it seemed most convenient that His Majesty's Government, who have throughout acted as mediators in this matter between the extreme views held by the Chinese and Tibetan Governments, should undertake this task if it becomes necessary.

I may add, however, for Your Excellency's information, that should Monsieur Sazonoff raise very strong objections to this article, His Majesty's Government would be prepared, although with great reluctance, to delete it and to substitute an article making the English text of the Convention authoritative.

His Majesty's Government do not anticipate that the Russian Government will raise any objection to the Indo-Tibet boundary, but if they do so, Your Excellency should explain that an accurate definition of the frontier has only become possible during the last few months in consequence of the survey work undertaken recently in the tribal territory, that the line chosen follows the main geographical features approximating to the traditional border between Tibet and the semi-independent tribes under the control of the Government of India, and that as far as possible it divides exactly the territory occupied by people of Tibetan origin from that inhabited by the Miris, Abors, Daphlas, and the other tribes within the British sphere of influence.

VIII

1. *Informal discussions between Ivan Chen and Archibald Rose, 14-15 April, 1914¹*

Mr Chen called at the Foreign Office this morning and told me that his Government was extremely anxious to secure the postponement of tomorrow's meeting. I told him that I feared it would be difficult to arrange this at so late an hour, and asked him if he wished to give any reason for the request. He appeared convinced that his Government was anxious to arrange a settlement of the Frontier question. I read to him the Memorandum which had been communicated by the Chinese Minister in London to the Foreign Office on 11th March, and the reply from His Majesty's Government. He assured me that not only had he received no communications from his government, but that they had never given to him any instructions which would have justified him in submitting a definite objection to any part of our proposals, such as was indicated in Mr Lin Yuk-lin's reference to Kokonor, Ching Chuan, Tachienlu and Atuntze. I asked him if I might convey to you a message that he would discuss our proposed frontier in some such definite way, and if you would agree to the postponement of the meeting. He said he could not venture to make any promise, as he was entirely without instructions, but he would give you an assurance that he would telegraph to his Government on the subject in the strongest possible terms if you would consent to a postponement for even a few days. I promised to communicate your reply at half past three.

A. ROSE
14.4.1914

Mr Chen again called at the Foreign Office at half past three today. I told him that you were placed in an extremely difficult position vis-a-vis your Tibetan colleague by his application for a postponement of tomorrow's meeting at so late an hour; that you were willing however to accede to his request as a personal concession, but that you felt obliged to make your consent conditional one: that you would postpone the meeting for one week (i.e. until Wednesday, 22nd April), but that you would then ask your colleagues for

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

their final decision in regard to the map of 17th February and the draft Convention of 11th March: you would ask them to initial the documents and, should they be unable to do so, you would feel bound to withdraw them. He agreed that this proposal was reasonable, and that we could achieve nothing by the perfunctory procedure of the last few weeks. I asked him if he wished to bring forward any suggestions on behalf of his Government. He had nothing to propose, but asked me to give him some indication of our final attitude in order that he might formulate it definitely in his telegram to Peking. He promised to do his utmost to secure an unconditional reply. I indicated on the map the slight readjustments of frontier (based on the Memorandum of 11th March presented in London) which you might be willing to consider, if they really represented the wishes of his Government.

I then reminded him of his Government's stipulation that the question of the political status of Tibet should be discussed concurrently with the frontier problem, if the latter showed signs of reaching finality, and of your promise that this should be done. I told him that it was now essential that an agreement should be reached in regard to both questions concurrently. He asked me if I would discuss the draft Convention with him in a similar manner. It was growing very late, and I arranged that we should meet again for the consideration of the draft at 10 A M tomorrow.

A. ROSE
14-4-1914

Mr Chen called at the Foreign Office this morning to discuss the draft Convention. I explained to him before commencing our discussion, that I was not in a position to give him a definite promise on any point which might be raised, that you would, however, give sympathetic consideration to his representations, and that he must accept my assurance that any views I expressed today would represent the maximum which His Majesty's Government would be willing to concede. He asked me if it would be possible to reconsider any point under discussion before the meeting of 22nd March.¹ I replied in the affirmative, explaining however that I was convinced that no further concessions could be hoped for, as the draft under consideration represented the considered views of His Majesty's

¹Should read 22nd April.

Government after weighing carefully both the Chinese and Tibetan claims.

Preamble: Mr Chen objected strongly to the status of equality given to Tibet vis-a-vis China and Great Britain.

I referred Mr Chen to the despatch from His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Peking to the Wai Chiao Pu, dated 25th August 1913, and told him that the question of status could not be re-opened.

Mr Chen said that the arrangement made in Peking referred only to the course of the Conference: that the Convention would be signed only after the Conference was completed and that the recognition of equality between China and Tibet was out of the question.

I replied that the Convention would necessarily be part of the Conference, and that, until the seal of the Tibetan Plenipotentiary had actually been affixed to an agreement such as was now under consideration, the status of Tibet was that of an independent nation recognizing no allegiance to China.

Article I. Accepted.

Article II. paragraph I. Mr Chen requested the omission of the words 'but not the sovereignty'.

I promised that his views on this point should receive consideration.

He also requested the addition of a clause recognizing Tibet as a portion of Chinese territory.

I suggested the insertion of this clause in the form of a separate note (draft attached as Note 1).

The Chinese Government was anxious, he said, that the limits (political, not geographical) of suzerainty should be defined in a separate Agreement.

I reminded Mr Chen of the vagueness of this term, and the diffidence shown by all authorities on International Law in putting forward any definition of suzerainty. I was convinced that this suggestion could not be entertained.

With regard to the bracketed portion of the paragraph, we agreed that a more suitable wording would be 'including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama'.

Mr Chen was anxious for the recognition of some formal investiture of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese Government, and we agreed on the draft Notes II and III attached. With reference to Note II, I reminded him that in recent years titles had been conferred which were not considered to be consistent with the dignity

of the Dalai Lama. As far as I remembered the titles 'Sincerely obedient, Reincarnation—helping' had been added to those expressing 'Most excellent, Self-Existent Buddha of the West'. I said that we should look to the Chinese Government for a loyal adherence to the principles indicated in Note II. The insertion on this point if the Chinese required a specific assurance in regard to their right to confer titles on the Dalai Lama (will be made).

Paragraph 2. Mr Chen requested the deletion of the clause referring to the representation of Tibet in the Chinese Parliament.

I explained to him that, in view of the action of the Peking Government in gazetting Tibetan members of Tibetan Parliament immediately after assurances had been given that Tibet would not be converted into a Chinese province, I was sure that His Majesty's Government would not consent to waive this point. I would however submit for consideration the draft Note IV as a substitute for this clause.

Article III. Mr Chen requested the deletion of the first clause, as far as 'adjoining states'.

I told him that it was useless to suggest this as Chinese action in Tibet during the last 8 years had rendered it imperative that the interests of Great Britain should be clearly recognized along the North-East Frontier of India.

Mr Chen requested that the word 'colonists' in paragraph 1 should be omitted, in view of the impracticability of carrying out the proposal: he thought it would be advisable also to extend the period within which withdrawals should be made from one month to three months. I promised to support these recommendations.

Mr Chen then asked for an assurance that bona fide traders, merchants and priests would not be considered as colonists.

I told him that I felt able to reassure him on this point, but that it was scarcely necessary to insert such a provision in the Convention. In reply to his request for an assurance that we would not establish colonies of native States, I said that the same remark would apply.

Article IV. Mr Chen agreed to the following wording of this article and of Note V attached.

The foregoing article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa by the Chinese Government, but it is hereby provided that the said

escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

The Chinese Government was anxious, Mr Chen said, that a clause should be inserted in the Convention, providing that the above-mentioned high official should receive the respect and consideration due to his rank.

I assured him that the views of His Majesty's Government would certainly accord with those of his Government on this point, but that it could scarcely be inserted with dignity in a public document.

I told Mr Chen that the Tibetans were anxious for some understanding that the Chinese Representative and his escort would pay for all supplies and transport at market rates.

He replied that he believed that this had always been done since the receipt by the Central Government of a Memorial from Amban Lien on the subject.

I said that, if he would record his assurance on this point, it would be unnecessary to insert any reference to the subject in the Convention.

Mr Chen said that his Government attached great importance to the addition of a clause in this article, recognizing the right of the Amban to guide the Tibetans in their foreign policy.

I told him that the article as now drafted represented the most favourable terms which could possibly be expected from His Majesty's Government. The article recognized the traditional position of the Chinese Representative, and it was unnecessary to attempt any definition of that position.

Mr Chen brought forward very strongly the desire of his Government for the appointment of officers to watch the Chinese commercial interests in Tibet.

I informed him that our past experience of Chinese officers who had been charged with such duties had been unfortunate, that there was no chance that such a request would be considered.

Article V. Mr Chen raised objection to this Article and proposed to modify it by substituting the words 'The High Contracting Parties' for the words 'The Governments of China and Tibet'. He thought that a self-denying ordinance of this nature should be equally binding on all parties to the Agreement.

I expressed a fear that any redrafting of the Article would lead to much confusion; it recognized existing conditions, and the interests of all three contracting parties were carefully safeguarded by the concluding clause.

Article VI. Accepted.

Article VII (b). Mr Chen proposed that the words 'for Outer Tibet' should be inserted after 'New Trade Regulations' in paragraph (b).

I promised to recommend the acceptance of this proposal.

He wished to secure the insertion of a clause to the effect that the new regulations should in no way affect any commercial rights or interests which the Chinese enjoyed under the Regulations of 1893 without the previous consent of the Chinese Government.

I replied that the earlier Trade Regulations were based on a recognition of Chinese administrative control in Tibet, which had now ceased to exist, and that it would not be possible to insert any such reference.

(c) Mr Chen said that his Government could not consent to paragraph (c), as it covered a political issue which was not dependent upon any recognition of Tibetan autonomy.

I replied that we could not expect China to accept any responsibility on the Sikkim frontier now that she maintained no garrisons in Tibet. The utmost I could hope to arrange would be the deletion of this paragraph from Article 7, and its insertion as Note VI.

After much discussion Mr Chen promised to telegraph this to his Government.

Article VIII. The Chinese Government was opposed, Mr Chen said, to the discussion at Lhasa of any questions of a political, territorial or international character by the British Agent. His activities should be confined entirely to commercial matters.

I said that this article specifically limited the discussions to such questions as were covered by the Convention of 1904—a document to which the Chinese Government had expressed its adhesion: I could not even suggest any modifying clause.

Mr Chen asked if you would be willing to limit the right to proceed to Lhasa to the British Agent stationed at Gyantse; he thought it might lead to misunderstanding if the permission were extended generally to any Agent.

I promised to do my best to ensure the acceptance of this proposal. I thought we should be quite willing to limit the right to the officer who was stationed nearest to Lhasa.

He was very anxious also that the travelling escort of the Agent should be limited in number.

I recalled the incidents of 1912, when a substantial British escort

might have saved the situation for the Chinese representative. I thought it unlikely that any British official would wish to travel about with a large escort, except in case of urgent need. It would be most inadvisable however to impose a limit which would destroy the practical utility of the escort.

Article IX. Mr Chen again made the most urgent representations in regard to the frontier lines indicated on the map of 17th February. He was not in a position to bring forward any definite suggestions, but he was extremely anxious to ascertain the final attitude of His Majesty's Government.

I told him that the lines on the map represented your view of an equitable settlement. I added, however, that you had been led to believe by a communication from London that the Chinese Government attached special importance to certain places, notably to Kokonor, Chin-Chuan, Tachienlu and Atuntze; that, so far as was consistent with the maintenance of the general principles laid down on 17th February, you would endeavour to meet the Chinese in these matters of detail. I once more indicated on the map the most favourable terms to which you could possibly agree, having regard to all the interests concerned. I pointed out the advantage of the watersheds which had been utilized in defining the frontier lines, and repeated your earnest desire that these watersheds should be used as frontier limits wherever possible, as they were permanent and intelligible to the mind of the local tribesmen, while they avoided the necessity for elaborate frontier commissions.

Mr Chen said that he quite appreciated these facts; he suggested however that the policy of a watershed frontier would be more consistently followed if the line between Inner and Outer Tibet followed the mountain range on the west of the Yangtse leaving Derge and Nyarong in Inner Tibet.

I said that Derge and Nyarong were the two richest districts in the border country; that the Tibetans had brought forward very strong evidence in support of their claim to them; and that it would be extremely difficult to obtain Tibetan assent to any realignment of the frontier at this point. I told Mr Chen however that I would report to you his remarks in regard to the watershed and that I was sure his views would receive consideration.

He then asked me if there was any change of the cancellation of the two zones; his Government appeared to dislike the idea very much.

I told him that on the basis which we were now considering, such a suggestion could not be entertained for a moment.

He said that the last three lines of paragraph 2 of this Article appeared to him to indicate that the Tibetan Government would retain all administrative control in Inner as well as in Outer Tibet, and that such an arrangement could only result in the continuation of the present disturbances. He could not understand the zone theory at all, and he could only suppose that we were bent on ignoring the position which the Chinese had made and still held in the districts of Inner Tibet.

I pointed out to him that Outer Tibet was far nearer to the great cities of India and to our centres of military strength than was Inner Tibet to corresponding centres in China. We were exercising a very self-denying attitude in regard to Tibet and were justified in thinking that China should recognize the fact. At the same time I promised that I would do my best to secure the deletion of the words 'to issue appointment orders to chiefs and local officers, and to collect all customary rents and taxes'.

He asked me if this meant that China would be given a free hand for the consolidation of her position in Inner Tibet.

I replied in the affirmative, with the proviso that such consolidation did not infringe the integrity of Tibet as a geographical and political entity.

Article X. Mr Chen said that he could not consent to the inclusion of this compensation clause in any form, even as a Note.

I expressed the greatest surprise and feared that it would be impossible to conclude any agreement if the Chinese adopted so unreasonable an attitude. I told him that the claims had been most carefully assessed, that they were undoubtedly the direct result of Chinese action in Tibet, and that they would have to be met in one way or another. If China did not pay, India would be bound to compensate the traders, an arrangement which was obviously unfair. He was very firm on the point, and said that China was not in a financial position to recognize claims of this indirect nature. He refused to accept any responsibility for payment, and he was sure that His Majesty's Government would regard his refusal with understanding and not as an obstructive move.

I reluctantly consented to lay the proposal before you, but could hold out no hope of its acceptance.

Article XI. Mr Chen thought it might be advisable to make some

provision for ratification.

I explained that this was a minor point which could be settled later by mutual agreement.

Additional Article. I told Mr Chen that the Tibetan Government was anxious for the inclusion of some provision for arbitration. Mr Chen read a proposed Article and suggested slight verbal alterations; it then read as follows:

In case of differences between the Governments of China and Tibet in regard to questions arising out of this Convention, the aforesaid Governments engage to refer them to the British Government for equitable adjustment.

Mr Chen said that if Article X were deleted, he could be willing to recommend this new article to the favourable consideration of his Government. It might indeed be inserted in place of Article X.

He added that should this additional article be inserted, he thought it would be superfluous to make any provision that the English text would be authoritative.

I replied that such provision was useful, and that an expert opinion on an English text could be readily obtained in any cosmopolitan communities, whereas experts in Chinese and Tibetan were somewhat limited.

Mr Chen pointed out that the deletion of the clause would not affect this in view of the arbitration proposal.

I replied that I quite understood his point and would certainly recommend it to your consideration.

In conclusion, Mr Chen enquired whether the present embargo on the entry of accredited representatives of the Chinese Government into Tibet by way of India would be cancelled on the conclusion of an agreement such as that now under discussion.

I told him that, in the event of this Convention being signed, I was convinced that the embargo would automatically cease.

Before Mr Chen left I reminded him that, the purpose of the postponed meeting, to be held on 22nd April, was to withdraw our present proposals. I explained that the only way of avoiding this was the unconditional acceptance of the terms which had been urged so long and so patiently without any reasonable response from the Chinese Government. I would do my best to secure the acceptance of such modifications as I had promised to support at this interview, but I could hold out no promises, and it would be well for him not to count too much on their acceptance. I begged him to make the

situation absolutely clear to his Government and to leave them no loophole for misunderstanding our attitude.

Mr Chen replied that he understood that his request for the postponement of the meeting of 15th April had been agreed to only on the understanding that he would place before his Government the final nature of the present interview. He would telegraph to Peking as explicitly as possible in order to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of his Government.

I attach a list of six Notes drafted during the interview in cooperation with Mr Chen. They are mainly of an explanatory nature.

A. ROSE

15th April 1914

15.4.1914

Appendix to Interview of 15th April 1914

Draft of notes to be exchanged in connection with Convention.

- I. It is understood by the contracting parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
- II. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.
- III. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.
- IV. Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or any other similar body.
- V. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies shall not exceed seventy-five per cent of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.
- VI. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

A. ROSE

15th April 1914

15.4.1914

Dated Simla, the 16th April 1914

From: A. Rose, C.I.E., Assistant to the British Plenipotentiary

To: Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary

I am sending you copies of the notes of yesterday's interview in regard to the draft Convention. Would you kindly look through them, and let me know if you think that they convey a faithful impression of our conversation.

Dated Simla, the 16th April 1914

From: Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary

To: A. Rose, Esq., C.I.E., Assistant to the British Plenipotentiary

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today's date enclosing copies of the notes of the interview of the 15th instant and having carefully read them to inform you that they are found correct.

2. *Telegram from the Wai Chiao Pu to Ivan Chen, 20 April, 1914 and received in Simla at 11 p.m., the same day*¹

Your two telegrams received. Although the British Plenipotentiary has said that what he has proposed is the final concession he can make, yet the question under discussion is of such importance in relation to our territory and rights of sovereignty that we cannot make any more compromise in order to bring about a settlement.

The following represents the several points on which we will never give in:

1. That we can never agree to the clause that 'Tibet shall not be represented in Parliament or other similar body'.
2. That the number of the escort of the British Agent shall under the circumstances exceed that of the escort of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. (Article 4).
3. That the Chinese Amban shall have the right of appointing deputies to all the places where there are British Trade Agents (Article 4).
4. That the new Regulations to be negotiated between Great

¹Annexure II, Proc. 257—Proceedings of the 7th meeting of the Tibet Conference held at the Foreign Office, Simla, on the 22nd and 27th April, 1914—in *Foreign*, October, 1914, 134-396.

Britain and Tibet shall be submitted to the Chinese Government for its approval (Article 7).

5. That in regard to the frontier question in Article 9 of the draft Convention it cannot be said that we have not made a number of concessions, but we are further prepared to show our great regard for the wishes of the British Plenipotentiary and will state our points of contention as follows:

(a) All the places north of the Tangla range, the original limits of Chinghai, Atuntzu, etc., shall retain, all be administered by the Central Government in the same way as the inland districts.

(b) All the places east of the Salween together with Derge, Niarong, Chiamdo, Jyade, etc. shall retain the original territorial name of Kham, but shall be regarded as a special zone where the Central Government shall have the right of doing whatever they think necessary for the consolidation of their position in that country.

With the exception of those districts which China has already instituted no more new districts shall hereafter be created and the religious control which the Dalai Lama has had in the country shall remain as heretofore.

(c) All the places west of the Salween shall be placed within the limits of the autonomy of Tibet, but any question, which may arise there, of political, territorial or international nature shall be discussed between China and Great Britain while the Tibetans shall participate in the said discussions; a statement to that effect is to be inserted in the proposed appendix.

Now during the course of the negotiations, we have made a number of concessions, and if the British Plenipotentiary is not prepared to take that into his favourable consideration, we certainly cannot be held responsible for any blame, if the negotiations so unfortunately come to a premature end.

You are hereby instructed to submit the above to the British Plenipotentiary and telegraph your reply as soon as possible. The above telegram has been repeated to Minister Lew^a for communication and discussion with the British Foreign Office in London.

WAI CHIAO PU

3. *Ivan Chen to McMahon, 26 April, 1914*¹

With reference to what was passed between us at Conference on the 22nd instant which was adjourned until noon tomorrow, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a telegram I have received from the Wai Chiao Pu this morning.

I beg leave to recommend the contents of the telegram to your careful and sympathetic consideration, and at the same time to express my fervent hope that I shall receive a favourable reply from you when we meet at the Conference tomorrow noon.

Telegram from the Wai Chiao Pu, dated 25th April 1914, and received in Simla the following day, at 2-14 a.m.

Your telegrams received. Since the frontier question has been brought up, we have already made a number of concessions in order to show our readiness to do our utmost to bring about a settlement. Certainly the British Plenipotentiary cannot have failed to have a proper appreciation of our friendly disposition towards the matter. We therefore regret extremely to learn that he has imposed a time limit within which he wishes to have a definite answer from us, otherwise he would draw absolutely the draft Convention.

Considering that we have had throughout an earnest desire to find an amicable solution for the Tibetan question, we cannot bring ourselves to say that the action which your British colleague proposes to take is a right one for the attainment of the end which all the parties have in view. With the exception of Article 9 of the draft Convention, we are prepared to take the main principles embodied in the other articles, into our favourable consideration, which is, again, a further great concession from us.

As regards the frontier question, you are instructed to state to your British colleague that we have made all the concessions we can, and that he should now make further concessions in order that we may continue our friendly negotiations on the matter.

¹Annexure III, Proc. 257—Proceedings of the 7th meeting of the Tibet Conference held at the Foreign Office, Simla, on the 22nd and 27th April, 1914—in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

4. *Telegram from the Wai Chiao Pu, 28 April, 1914, and received in Simla at 6 a.m. the following day*¹

(Personally communicated by Ivan Chen on 29 April, 1914)

Your telegram received of the 27th. We learn with great astonishment that the British Plenipotentiary only consents to make a concession to us of a small portion of territory to be delimited to Chinghai and has pressed us to accept.

The Central Government disavow the action you have taken, under the pressure of circumstances, in initialling the draft Convention, and you are instructed to inform your British colleague to that effect and that your action of initialling is null and void.

If the British Plenipotentiary is willing to continue the amicable negotiation, we will continue it; we have no desire to break it off abruptly.

Please wire at once the reply of the British Plenipotentiary.

5. *Ivan Chen to McMahan, 30 April, 1914*²

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date enclosing copies of the minutes of the seventh meeting of the Conference which took place on the 27th instant.

In reply, I beg to state that, with the exception that all the circumstances attending the discussions which took place between Mr Rose and myself in the ante-room to the Conference Chamber on the 27th are only briefly touched upon in the minutes, the rest is found in order.

¹Proc. 263, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

²Proc. 273, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

6. *Chinese disavowal of Ivan Chen (memorandum handed by Wellington Ku to Sir John Jordan)*¹

Translation

On the 25th April a memorandum was presented to Sir John Jordan by the Chinese Government stating the repeated concessions made by it in regard to the Tibetan question, and it was requested that a telegram might be sent to the British Government requesting it telegraphically to instruct the British Delegate to continue friendly negotiations.

This Ministry was hoping to receive a reply when it received a telegram from the Chinese Special Delegate, Mr Ivan Chen, to the following effect:

The British delegate has stated to me that all territory north-east of the Burkhan Buddha and the Amne Machin ranges shall form part of Kokonor; and that it was agreed that the statement with regard to Tibet not sending members to China's Parliament should be changed to refer to Outer Tibet. He further informed me that the proposed draft Convention had already been initialled by himself with the Tibetan delegate; and that if I did not initial the document today then Articles 2 and 4 of the draft Convention would be deleted; the Convention would be made with Tibet and no further negotiations carried on. I mentioned to the British delegate that the initialling of a document was different from its signature, and that I could not sign the Convention without the instructions of my Government, to which the British Delegate agreed. I then initialled the Convention, as the best thing to do under the circumstances.

The Chinese Government would observe that mutual negotiations are at the moment being carried on with a view to arriving at a decision as regards the boundary question, and that Mr Chen, the Chinese Delegate, had not received the Government's instructions so that his act was an informal initialling by himself as an individual. Instructions were thus at once sent to him to cancel his initialling of the document. Mr Chen's reply was subsequently received to the effect that the British Delegate requested that the Chinese Government should directly approach the British Government in the matter, and stated that if the Convention was not signed, the initialling be-

¹Encl. in Sir John Jordan's No 187 of 2 May, 1914, Encl. 2, Proc. 337 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

came *ipso facto* null and void. Sir H. McMahon added that, as the Conference was terminated on that day, no continuation thereof was possible; and at the same time cancelled Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention.

It is observed that apart from the question of boundary all the other articles of the Convention which has now been under negotiation for months are generally speaking acceptable to both parties. The boundary, however, is an exceedingly important matter and the Government would be utterly wrong in lightly agreeing to any alteration in it or in abandoning territory. The Wai Chiao Pu feels sure that His Majesty's Minister is well aware of all the difficulties in the way of such action.

The statement by the British Delegate that the Conference is now terminated is entirely at variance with the view of the Chinese Government, inasmuch as the Tibetan Convention not having been signed, the period of negotiation still continues.

Although the British Delegate states that there is no question of a continuation of the negotiations, the Chinese Government's willingness to reach a friendly decision in the matter with the British Government is the same as before. The negotiations should, therefore, be continued, and cannot be interrupted because of the cancellation of Mr Chen's individual and informal initialling of the Convention. It is earnestly trusted that Sir John Jordan will communicate the views of this Government to the British Government and a reply is awaited.

7. *Chinese disavowal*

a. Reuter's telegrams, dated 22 May, 1914¹

London, 22 May—Message to the *Times* from Peking says that Chinese reports from India state that the Tibet Convention has (been) initialled. It is understood that complete autonomy of Tibet proper has been recognized. China is entitled to maintain a Resident at Lhasa with a suitable guard. A semi-autonomous zone will be constituted in Eastern Tibet, wherein Chinese position will be

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes, Secret/External*, 134-396.

relatively much stronger.

The correspondent adds that it is disappointing in that he has not been able to learn that provision has been made for the establishment of a British Resident at Lhasa.

London, 22 May. According to a telegram from Peking to the *Daily Telegraph* the British and Chinese delegates in Simla have initialled the draft of the Tibetan treaty. It provides, says the telegram, that Great Britain and China shall have representatives in Lhasa and gives to China undisputed sovereignty in Outer Tibet, including Kokonor.

a. *Extract from Reuter's telegram, No. 198, dated Bombay, 27 May, 1914*¹

With reference to Tibet negotiations *Reuter* learns that nothing has been signed and nothing can be signed, except under conditions which do not conflict with provisions respecting Tibet comprised in Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. These conditions must of course form object of discussions with Russian Government.

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret/External, 134-396.

IX

1 *Signing of Simla Convention, 3 July, 1914*

- a. *Crewe (Secretary of State) to Hardinge (Viceroy), telegram P., 1 July (received 2nd), 1914*¹

Conference regarding Tibet. Please refer to your telegram dated the 29th ultimo. A final meeting of the Conference should be summoned by Sir H. McMahon on the 3rd July. If Chinese Plenipotentiary then refuses to sign the Convention, negotiations should definitely be terminated by Sir Henry. He should express to Tibetan Representative great regret at failure to arrive at a settlement and should also assure Lonchen Shatra that Tibet may depend on diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government and on any assistance in the way of munitions of war which we can give them, if aggression on the part of China continues.

Will you kindly also consider what action should be taken vis-à-vis China if the negotiations break down. Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 will presumably have to be denounced. Would you recommend denunciation of Convention of 1906?

This telegram should be repeated* to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking.

- b. *Crewe to Hardinge, telegram P. 2 July (received 3rd), 1914*²

China-Tibet negotiations. My telegram of the 1st instant crossed yours of same date.

Orders hold good as to final meeting on 3rd July.

In expressing regret that signature of Convention has been prevented by the action of the Chinese Government, Sir Henry McMahon should say in Conference that settled view of His Majesty's Government as to status and boundaries of Tibet is represented by Convention as initialled.

The assurance contained in my telegram of the 1st instant should be privately given to Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

¹Proc. 341, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

*Repeated on 2 July 1914

²Proc. 344, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

Your telegram and my reply should be repeated to the Peking Legation.*

c. *Crewe to Hardinge telegram P., 3 July (received 3rd), 1914*¹

With reference to your telegram of the 2nd instant, separate signature with Tibet cannot be authorized by His Majesty's Government. Sir H. McMahon should proceed in the manner laid down in my telegrams dated, respectively, the 1st and 2nd July, if the Chinese delegate refuses to sign.

2. *Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet (1914)*²

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra

*Repeated on 3 July.

¹Proc. 345 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

²For the text, Encl. 3, Proc. 346, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396, and Aitchison, *Treaties*, XIV, 1929, pp. 35-8.

Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

Article I

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the Present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

Article II

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognizing that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

Article III

Recognizing the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

•

Article IV

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

Article V

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

Article VI

Article 3 of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article 9 (d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term 'Foreign Power' does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the commerce of China or of the most favoured nation.

Article VII

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 are hereby cancelled.
(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.¹

¹The earlier, February 17, 1914 draft of the Convention had this additional clause:

(c) The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

Article VIII

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

Article IX

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown as in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.¹

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.²

Article X

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.³

Article XI

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

¹For the map see *An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India* (New Delhi, 1960), Map 24.

For the map referred to in Article 9 of the Convention initialled by the Chinese delegate (in addition to the British and the Tibetan) on April 27, see Map 23 in *Ibid.* The map was signed, *not* initialled, by Ivan Chen.

²In the February 17 draft of the Convention, Article 9 concluded as follows: religious institutions, *to issue appointment orders to chiefs and local officers, and to collect all customary rents and taxes.*

³In the February 17 draft of the Convention, this article read as follows: The Government of China hereby agrees to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 4,28,840 due for losses incurred by Nepalese and Ladakhis in Tibet in consequence of acts done by Chinese soldiers and officials in that country.

In the April 27 draft, it read:

In case of differences between the Governments of China and Tibet in regard to questions arising out of this Convention the aforesaid Government, engage to refer them to the British Government for equitable adjustment.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial* of the Lonchen Shatra.

Seal of the
LONCHEN SHATRA

(Initialed) A.H.M.

Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

Schedule

- (1) Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March, 1890.
- (2) Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.
- (3) Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:

- (1) It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
- (2) After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.
- (3) It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.
- (4) Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

*Owing to it not being possible to write initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lonchen at this place is his signature.

- (6) The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article 3 of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.¹
- (7) The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatories to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial* of Lonchen Shatra
Seal of the
LONCHEN SHATRA

(Initialed) A.H.M.
Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

3. Declaration appended to the Simla Convention, 3 July, 1914²

We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet, hereby record the following declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as initialled to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom.

In token whereof we have signed and sealed this declaration, two copies in English and two in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Seal of the
DALAI LAMA

(Signed) A. HENRY MCMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

¹As has been noticed, in the February 17 draft this was included as part of Article VII.

*Owing to it not being possible to write initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lonchen at this place is his signature.

²For the text, Encl. 2, Proc. 346, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

Signature and seal
of the Lonchen Shatra

Seal of the British
Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Drepung
Monastery

Seal of the
Sera
Monastery

Seal of the
Gaden
Monastery

Seal of the
National
Assembly

X

1. *The McMahon Line Notes, March 1914*¹

a. *McMahon to Lonchen Shatra, 24 March, 1914*

To

Lonchen Shatra
Tibetan Plenipotentiary

In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map² (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the following conditions:

- (a) The Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
- (b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him with the further information, which you promised.

The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

Delhi

(Signed) A. H. MCMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

¹Aitchison, *Treaties*, XIV, (1929), pp. 34-5.

²For the map see *An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India*, op cit., Maps 21-2.

b. *Lonchen Shatra to McMahon, 25 March, 1914*

(Translation)

To

Sir Henry McMahon

British Plenipotentiary to the China-Tibet Conference

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent me in February last, to Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st Month of the Wood-Tiger year (25th March 1914) by Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

Seal of the
LONCHEN SHATRA

2. *Anglo-Tibet Trade Regulations, 3 July, 1914¹*

Whereas by Article 7 of the Convention concluded between the Governments of Great Britain, China and Tibet on the 3rd day of July, A.D. 1914, the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and the Tibetan Government engaged to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir A. H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I.;

¹Aitchison, *Treaties*, XIV, 1929, pp. 39-41.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje;

And whereas Sir A. H. McMahon and Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form, the following regulations have been agreed upon:

I. The area falling within a radius of three miles from the British Trade Agency site will be considered as the area of such Trade Mart.

It is agreed that British subjects may lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at such Marts. This arrangement shall not be held to prejudice the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside the Marts for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan Trade Agent. In consultation with the British Trade Agent the Tibetan Trade Agent will assign such or other suitable building sites without unnecessary delay. They shall fix the terms of leases in conformity with the existing laws and rates.

II. The administration of the Trade Marts shall remain with the Tibetan authorities, with the exception of the British Trade Agency sites and compounds of the rest-houses, which will be under the exclusive control of the British Trade Agents.

The Trade Agents at the Marts and the Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

III. In the event of disputes arising at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts between British subjects of other nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British and Tibetan Trade Agents at the nearest Mart. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts, shall be handed over by the Local Authorities to the British Trade Agent at the Mart nearest the scene of offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India,

but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the Local Authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects, shall be arrested and punished by the Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Should it happen that a Tibetan subject or subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject or subjects before the British Trade Agent, the Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative or representatives of suitable rank to attend the trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly in cases in which a British subject or subjects have reason to complain against a Tibetan subject or subjects, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative or representatives to the Tibetan Trade Agent's Court to attend the trial.

IV. The Government of India shall retain the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts. Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by these lines. The Tibetan Authorities shall be responsible for the protection of the telegraph lines from the Marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering with them in any way or with the officials engaged in the inspection and maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished.

V. The British Trade Agents at the various Trade Marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the Local Authorities, whose districts they traverse, and shall be accorded the same protection and facilities as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Government.

No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights, to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the Local Authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employers to screen them.

VI. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private company, institution, or

individual in Tibet. It is of course understood that companies or individuals, who have already received such monopolies from the Tibetan Government previous to the conclusion of this agreement, shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

VII. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexations, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever. The Tibetan Authorities will not hinder the British Trade Agents or other British subjects from holding personal intercourse or correspondence with the inhabitants of the country.

It being the duty of the police and Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts, Tibet engages to arrange effective Police measures at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts.

VIII. Import and export of the following articles:

arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs

may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only as their Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IX. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

X. The English and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, but in the event of their being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

XI. The present Regulations shall come into force from the date of signature.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine

hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Seal of the
Dalai Lama

Signature of the
Lonchen Shatra

(Signed) A. HENRY McMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Drebung
Monastery

Seal of the
Sera
Monastery

Seal of the
Ganden
Monastery

Seal of the
National
Assembly

XI

1. *Ivan Chen: Was he coerced?*

*Note communicated to Chinese ministers:
excerpts, 1 May, 1914¹*

His Majesty's Government have received the communication made by the Chinese Minister on the 29th ultimo containing the substance of telegraphic messages received in Peking from the Chinese delegate to the Conference in India on the affairs of Tibet.

The communication suggests that Mr Ivan Chen was coerced into giving his assent to the draft agreement initialled by the delegates on the 27th April. His Majesty's Government cannot refrain from expressing surprise at such a suggestion being put forward by the Chinese Government. The British Delegate has, however, been consulted in the matter, and has reported that not only is the suggestion entirely unfounded, but that it was not even made by Mr Ivan Chen.

His Majesty's Government learn that the final instructions to the Chinese Plenipotentiary, as communicated officially to Sir H. McMahon on the 27th April, accepted the main principles of the draft agreement with the exception of Article 9, as to which the Chinese Government asked for a boundary concession without, however, specifying any indication of their nature. Sir H. McMahon, therefore, in order to meet their objection, made a further considerable concession of the boundary line, placing Kokonor within China proper territory.

The Chinese Government do not appear to appreciate the importance of this alteration of the frontier, but His Majesty's Government are satisfied that every point in her favour that could properly be conceded without injustice to Tibet has been allowed to China during the course of the negotiations.

Foreign Office, 1st May 1914

¹Proc 356 (Received on the 8th June with Political Secretary's letter No 21, dated the 22nd May 1914) in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

2. *China will never accept any settlement.*

India Office to Foreign Office, 3 June, 1914¹

In continuation of previous correspondence regarding the Tibet negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy on the subject.

It appears to the Marquess of Crewe to be necessary to await the result of the representations to the Chinese Government proposed in my letter of the 28th May 1914, N P—2065, before taking any action on the lines suggested in the latter part of the Viceroy's telegram.

His Lordship does not overlook the objections expressed by His Majesty's Minister at Peking, on general diplomatic grounds, to pressing the Tibetan Convention in its present form on the acceptance of China. But he would point out that no settlement of the Tibetan question, compatible with the interests of His Majesty's Government and the just claims of Tibet, is likely to prove otherwise than unacceptable to the *amour propre* of the Chinese. In these circumstances, Sir J. Jordan's apprehensions may, in his opinion, be to a large extent discounted, as inherent in any satisfactory solution of the present difficulty. How far these apprehensions are likely to be realized, is a question which Sir E. Grey is better able to judge than is the Secretary of State for India. But in view of the fact that, after four years of grave disturbance in Tibet, a settlement is at last within sight, and having regard to the objections to which all alternate courses are open, His Lordship, on his part, would urge that the communication suggested in my letter cited above should be made without further delay both to Chinese Minister in London and to the Wai Chiao Pu at Peking.

With regard to the final paragraph of the Viceroy's telegram, the Government of India are being consulted as to the nature of the 'active assistance' which it would be practicable to render to the Tibetan Government, should it ever be decided to do so, in repelling Chinese invasion and in 'establishing and maintaining Tibetan independence'.

¹Proc 361 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

3. *Reaching Finality in negotiations.*

Memorandum from the Foreign Office, 5 June, 1914¹

After the fullest consideration of the arguments advanced in the Chinese Minister's notes of the 1st, 11th and 21st ultimo, and of the Tibetan situation generally, and after a recent exchange of views with the Governments of Russia and Tibet, His Majesty's Government have decided that the terms of the Convention as initialled at Simla form the only possible settlement on a tripartite basis. They propose to modify Article X in the manner indicated in the annexure to this communication, in order to remove from the Convention any suggestion of British tutelage; but they can make no further alteration in text or in the maps, which were drawn up by the British Plenipotentiary after the most careful consideration of the evidence produced by his Chinese no less than by his Tibetan colleague. His Majesty's Government and the Tibetan Government regard the Convention as concluded by the act of initialling and unless the Chinese Plenipotentiary is prepared to sign the Tripartite Treaty, the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries, will now do so independently; in that case, however, the text will necessarily be modified to meet the requirements of a dual arrangement such as has been foreshadowed in the course of conversations which have taken place during the last few weeks since the Chinese Government disavowed the action of their Plenipotentiary. The Tibetan Plenipotentiary is unable to remain any longer in India and is expected to leave in a few days. Should China persist in her dissentient attitude and decline to sign a document concluding the Conference, she will naturally be debarred from the privileges contemplated by the Tripartite Convention.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking has been instructed to address a similar communication to the Chinese Government.

Foreign Office, 5th June 1914

¹Proc 361 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396 (Encl in *FO* covering letter, dated 8 June, 1914).

4. *China's rejection of the Tripartite Convention Jordan to Grey, 16 June, 1914¹*

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 115 and 117, of 11th and 13th instant respectively, I have the honour to forward translation of the memorandum handed to me by Mr Sun Pao-chi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 13th instant, together with copy of a map showing the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet as proposed by Sir Henry McMahon (red and blue), as now proposed by the Chinese Government (green and brown), and the boundary line between Inner and Outer Tibet as first put by the Chinese at Conference (yellow). A short memorandum on the Kokonor and the Chang Tang, with sketch map, prepared by the Military Attache, Major Robertson, is also enclosed.

Mr Sun opened the interview by stating that he was commanded by the President, who had consistently opposed an aggressive policy in Tibet, to say that it was impossible for China to proceed beyond the proposals embodied in the Chinese Memorandum. If the demand that China should yield her sovereignty over regions not only occupied by her soldiers but administered by Chinese magistrates were persisted in, the Chinese Government would refuse to sign the Tripartite Convention. Kokonor, he maintained, had always been an integral part of China, but he was prepared to agree to include the south-west portion in Inner Tibet; in regard to Derge, Niarong, etc., embraced in the Kham zone, China would engage to create no new military posts there.

I said that I had no authority to deal with the question raised in the memorandum. The boundary now demanded for Outer Tibet by China had been put forward before, and the Chinese Government after six months negotiations in India were seeking to open the whole question again; it was too late to do so however, as the Tibetan delegate was returning to Lhasa soon, and the Convention, initialled by the three Plenipotentiaries at Simla, on 27th April, would be signed by the British and Tibetan Representatives independently if the Chinese Representative were not authorized to participate. I might have been prepared to submit to His Majesty's Government some slight rectification of the frontier line, in Kokonor for instance—although even in that case I would have been exceeding

¹Encl 1, Proc 373, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

my instructions—but such radical proposals as the present would certainly be quite unacceptable.

Mr Sun remarked that China was again making large concessions by these proposals, and pressed me to telegraph their substance and recommend them for your favourable consideration.

I replied that no good would result from telegraphing these proposals to you, and that I understood from previous conversations that the Chinese Government had entertained no special objections to the draft Convention except on the point of the boundaries, but China was now introducing the question of administrative control in Inner Tibet. In reference to an observation that Sir A. McMahon had assured Mr Ivan Chen that China would be allowed a free hand in the consolidation of her authority in Inner Tibet, I said that this assurance had been qualified by the reservation that the political and geographical entity of Tibet should nevertheless be preserved. My instructions did not permit me to discuss the Tibetan question—and his discussion, informal as it was, was already a step beyond my instructions—and the only result of telegraphing these proposals to London would be, in my opinion, to expedite the signing of the Convention by the British and Tibetan Delegates. I gave Mr Sun the sense of Government of India's telegram of 12th June, which had been brought in to me at that moment, to the effect that the Tibetan Delegate was urgently desirous of returning to Lhasa, and suggested that if the Chinese Delegate received no authority to sign on a fixed date, viz., 15th June, the Convention should be thereupon signed by the British and Tibetan Representatives. The telegram, I said, confirmed me in the belief that to concede Mr Sun's request would merely hasten the conclusion of the Convention by Great Britain and Tibet.

Mr Sun repeated his remarks as to the extent of China's concessions, and declared that, if still more were required, it would be impossible for China to be a party to the Convention. Although no Parliament existed at the moment it was still necessary to consider Chinese public opinion and the President did not want to give a handle to the party of disorder in China.

I rejoined that it would be a source of keen regret to me if the Convention was dual only and not tripartite, for at the outset of the Conference Great Britain had done all she could on China's behalf. There had been very great difficulties in the way of inducing the Tibetan Plenipotentiary to consent to the terms as initialled and it

would not be possible to persuade him to exceed these limits. Moreover the Indian Government had shown great kindness and generosity to the Chinese soldiers at a time when they were being driven out of Tibet and now when those dark days were over China had forgotten her obligations, and, so far from allaying, had been fomenting unrest in Asia by her Tibetan policy. An opportunity was offered by the Tripartite Convention to secure the peace of Asia so far as China and Tibet were concerned, and yet the Chinese Government were endeavouring to stir up further trouble by these proposals. I pointed out that under the Convention China would recover her right to station an Amban and escort at Lhasa, and it would be folly to throw away such an advantage over the mere question of the boundary.

Mr Chen said that the right to station an Amban at Lhasa seemed to him but an empty gain; China would not recover the right to send troops into Tibet; and for this she was being asked to surrender a huge tract of country under Chinese rule.

I enquired to what particular territory he referred and, his mentioning Batang, Litang and the Kham zone, I retorted that it was evident China coveted the lands raided by Chao Erh-feng and Yin Chang-heng. I reminded him that in 1904 Lhasa was occupied by British troops, but we had not encroached upon any Tibetan territory: India's frontiers were wide enough, and so were those of China in my opinion.

Mr Sun wished to put aside the story of these raids, and referred to the evidence of Chinese rule over the territories in dispute. The Tibetans affected to think that they had rights over all places inhabited by Lamaists, but this was not so: the lamas might have ecclesiastical authority, but this did not necessarily mean that these places belonged to Tibet.

I said that the question of evidence had been exhaustively examined in India, and masses of Tibetan evidence had been forthcoming. Surely Mr Sun would admit that the representatives at the conference were in a superior position to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this question of evidence than either of us at Peking. The closest scrutiny had been made by Sir A. McMahon, and much territory claimed by Tibet had been surrendered to China, as the final map drawn up by the British delegate would show. I told Mr Chen also that when the Dalai Lama was passing through Hsining in 1904 the Chinese Administrator had stated exactly the position of the

Sino-Tibetan frontiers of Kokonor.

Mr Sun replied that this office had no power to make an authoritative statement of this nature, and once again he entreated me to submit the Chinese memorandum for your favourable consideration.

I repeated my warning that the only result would be to expedite the conclusion of the Convention by the British and Tibetan Governments, and I begged him to reflect over the grave consequences such a course would bring to China.

The interview lasted nearly two hours and was marked by great earnestness on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs who, while appearing to realise the great responsibility of his position and displaying an evident anxiety not to break off negotiations, was unwilling to recede from his original attitude.

The Chinese proposals as to boundaries in the enclosed memorandum represent practically no advance beyond those put forward at Peking on 21st April (reported in my telegram No. 92) and at Simla on the same date. The only apparent difference is that the buffer zone of Kham and a portion of what was claimed as Chinese Kokonor now make up Inner Tibet within which area China, while managing not to create new military posts, appears to claim the right to consolidate her authority.

A glance at Major Robertson's memorandum will show that the region known as the Chang Tang and the country between the Kunlun and the Altyn Tagh to the west of the Tsaidam are almost uninhabitable and little more than a barren waste of no present value to India, China or Tibet, either on strategic or economic grounds, and useful only as a neutral buffer zone. Chinese passports have been provided for foreign travellers through the Kokonor country for many years past, and the only portion reported by travellers to be inhabited has already been conceded to China by the decision of Sir A. McMahon.

Had the Chinese proposals embodied in the memorandum been confined to the inclusion of Batang and Litang and that part of the Kokonor north of the Kunlun range from Longitude 86 to 97, I should have been inclined to submit them for your favourable consideration on the clear understanding that China would accept the rest of the Convention in its present form. It seems to me, however, to be important that the areas through which the northern and southern roads to Lhasa pass from Jyekundo and Chiamdo, respectively, should remain within autonomous Outer Tibet.

5. *Memorandum handed by Sun Pao-chi to Sir John Jordan on 13 June, 1914 in Peking*¹

1. The Government of China recognizes that the boundary of Inner Tibet starts from the intersecting point of 86 E longitude (Greenwich) and 36 N latitude and follows the Kunlun range eastwards straight to the Brukan Buddha range; thence follows in a south-easterly direction to Tachienlu, thence turning westward in a straight line close to 30 N latitude till it reaches the Ningching hills near Batang, thence following the course of the Yangtse towards the south and proceeding in a south-westerly direction till it reaches Mekong; from which point it ascends the lower course of the Salween to the Tangla range, then continues in a north-westerly direction till it terminates at the intersecting point of longitude 86 E and 36 N latitude at the foot of the Kunlun range.
2. The Government of China shall have a free hand in the administration of Inner Tibet for the consolidation of her position and the civil and military officers at present stationed therein shall continue to exercise their rights and carry on their duties as heretofore.
3. The Dalai Lama shall continue to enjoy in Inner Tibet the rights of appointing the higher ranks of priests and of maintaining the Buddisht religion.
4. The Government of China recognizes that the boundary of Outer Tibet starts from Mekong, ascends the lower course of the Salween to the Tangla range and thence extends in a north-westerly direction till it terminates at the intersecting point of 86 E longitude (Greenwich) and 36 N latitude at the foot of the Kunlun range. All territory west of this boundary line comes within the sphere of autonomous Outer Tibet.

¹Encl 2, Proc 373, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

6. *Breakdown of Negotiations—British and Chinese Positions: Memorandum, dated Peking, 25 June, 1914*¹

On 6th June His Majesty's Minister had the honour to address a Note to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that His Majesty's Government had instructed him to communicate to the Chinese Government their decision that, after the fullest consideration of the Tibetan situation and after a recent exchange of views with the Governments of Russia and Tibet, the terms of the Convention as initialled at Simla on 27th April by the three Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, China and Tibet formed the only possible settlement on a tripartite basis, and that, should China persist in her dissentient attitude and decline to sign the document which would conclude the Conference, China will naturally be debarred from privileges contemplated in the Tripartite Convention.

At an interview on 13th June His Excellency the Foreign Minister handed to His Majesty's Minister certain proposals of the Chinese Government embodied in a memorandum communicated to His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Minister has now received instructions to inform the Chinese Government that the status of Inner Tibet given in the Memorandum of the Chinese Government is taken for granted, but the Chinese proposals, which would bring the boundary to within 200 miles of Lhasa, are wholly unacceptable.

A substantial concession has already been made in Kokonor and, as the Chinese Government have been informed, that the line proposed by His Majesty's Government was based on very careful consideration of the evidence advanced by both sides and represented the utmost territorial concession which they thought Tibet could in justice be asked to make. Nevertheless, if instead of trying to re-open the whole boundary question again, the Chinese Government had confined themselves to asking for such a modification as the substitution of the Kunlun range for the Altyn Tagh in the north and if in return for that they had been willing to withdraw all other demands and sign the Convention immediately without further discussion or modification, His Majesty's Government might have consented to use their good offices with the Tibetans to secure this

¹Encl. 2, Proc 377 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

further substantial concession.

As it is the patience of His Majesty's Government is exhausted and they have no alternative but to inform the Chinese Government that unless the Convention is signed before the end of the month, His Majesty's Government will hold themselves free to sign separately with Tibet.

In that case, of course, the Chinese will lose all privileges and advantages which the Tripartite Convention secures to them, including the recognition of their suzerainty, and the return of the Amban to Lhasa will be indefinitely postponed and His Majesty's Government will render Tibet all possible assistance in resisting Chinese aggression.

His Majesty's Minister is also instructed to ask for a reply to this Memorandum in writing.

7. Memorandum from the Wai Chiao Pu to the British Minister, Peking, 29 June, 1914¹

The Wai Chiao Pu have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir John Jordan's Memorandum of 25th June which was personally handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Sense of Memorandum quoted)

It is observed that the tripartite negotiations took their origin in the advice given by His Excellency's Government. The Chinese Government was grateful for Great Britain's kindly mediation and considered that the question of Tibet would reach an early decision.

The words 'tripartite negotiations' show that the sphere of negotiations was limited to the three parties taking part therein and could not extend to any party outside those three. Consequently this Government cannot admit the 'exchange of views' with the Russian Government^a referred to in the note previously received from the British Government. Further inasmuch as the negotiations were opened as between the three countries, it is still more impossible to recognize a signature of the Convention by Great Britain and Tibet without the concurrence of the Chinese Government.

¹ Encl. 2, Proc 386 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

This Government has several times stated that it gives its support to the majority of the articles of the Convention. The part which it is unable to agree to is that dealing with the question of boundary. The very last concession which the Chinese Government has made was the placing of the country south of the Kuenlun range in Inner Tibet.

The Wai Chiao Pu observes that Chinese soldiers have hitherto been stationed in the regions of Chiamdo and the Thirty Nine Tribes. At the beginning of these tripartite negotiations this Government yielded to His Excellency's request undertaking that the Chinese soldiers will simply hold the places where they were quartered, and would not cross to the west of Chiamdo. But it is absolutely impossible to take territory which historically belongs to China and, moreover, in which Chinese soldiers are now quartered, and place it on the map of Outer Tibet.

It is presumed that the reference by His Majesty's Government to a boundary 'within 200 miles of Lhasa' refers to the region of the Thirty-nine Tribes. Again, showing her exceptional friendliness for Great Britain, China will make of that region a special area of Inner Tibet; only civil officials will be sent there, accompanied by reasonable number of troops to guard them, and no large bodies of troops will be stationed there, in order to show that the objectionable feature of proximity to Lhasa does not exist. Apart from this no further concession by the Chinese Government is possible. The Wai Chiao Pu feels sure that His Majesty's Government will be able to take this fact into consideration, and it is consequently impossible for it to be coerced into signing the Convention; the reason is that it has no option in the matter.

Although the Chinese Government does not sign the Convention, it is urgently necessary to declare that it has absolutely no desire to terminate the present negotiations, and that it is unable to regard the initialling of the Convention by its special Envoy, Mr Chen Yi-fan, which took place without its instructions, as effective. It is earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government will still consent to continue in its original intention to act as mediator between China and Tibet, in order that the questions between these two countries may reach a harmonious conclusion. If the Tibetans do not cross the Chinese boundary, the Chinese troops will continue to hold the places in which they were originally quartered, and no advance or acts of invasion whatever will take place.

The Chinese Government further has full confidence that in view of the friendship between China and Great Britain, His Majesty's Government will, under no circumstances, go so far as to assist Tibet, to the detriment of a friendly country.

The Wai Chiao Pu trusts that His Excellency will forward this reply to his Government.

8. *The Wai Chiao Pu to the British Minister,
6 July, 1914 (Translation)*¹

Sir,

I have received a telegram from Mr Chen Yi-fan, Special Plenipotentiary for Tibetan negotiations, stating that the Tibet Convention was signed on the 3rd instant by the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries.

I have the honour to observe that this Government gave way to the desire of His Majesty's Government to mediate as regards Tibet and consented to the opening of negotiations in India. It is much to be regretted that the boundary question, and that alone, has prevented an agreement, with the consequence that six months' negotiations have proved barren of result.

The Chinese Government now explicitly declares to Your Excellency that it is impossible to cede China's territory, and that for this reason it is unable to agree to and sign the Convention; further, it is unable to recognize the Convention signed by Great Britain and Tibet to which China has not assented, or any document of similar nature. Strong bonds of friendship have long united China and Great Britain, and it is earnestly hoped that future negotiations will result in finding a method of settlement completely satisfactory to all parties. I have the honour to request Your Excellency to communicate the above to His Majesty's Government.

¹Encl 2, Proc 378, (Encl in Sir John Jordan's No. 259 of 6th July, 1914), in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

9. *Limits of Inner Tibet: Rockhill's changed views*

Government of India to Lord Crewe, Secretary of State for India, 20 August, 1914¹

We have the honour to refer to the memorandum on the Kokonor and the 'Chang Tang' forwarded with the despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No 235, dated the 16th June 1914, and to his telegram, dated the 21st June 1914, communicating the opinion held by Mr Rockhill in his 'Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet in 1891 and 1892', that 'politically speaking Tibet begins at the Tangla'.

In this connection we would invite attention to Sir A. Nicolson's despatch No 561 dated the 17th October 1909 in which it was stated that Mr Rockhill, who was at that time the United States Ambassador at St Petersburg had given it as his opinion that Tsaidam was outside of Tibetan limits and 'any one who had been in the localities would at once see that the range of mountains immediately to the south of the Tsaidam swamps formed the natural boundary of Tibet'. His Majesty's Minister at Peking was apparently unaware of this later opinion of Mr Rockhill's, which, we would point out, favours a boundary identical with that assigned to Outer Tibet on the map annexed to the Convention signed by the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries on 3rd July 1914.

10. *Breakdown of negotiations: newspaper comment*

a. *The Peking Daily News, Wednesday, 8 July, 1914²*

China and Tibet

Regret will be expressed that the protracted Conference at Simla between representatives of China and Tibet and a representative of Great Britain in the capacity of 'honest broker' has proved abortive, and that hopes of a settlement amicable to all parties have been

¹Proc 384 in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

²Encl. 2, Proc 387 in *Ibid.*

doomed to disappointment. Though our news item on the subject is brief, it is terse and significant. It indicates to those who have followed the events in Simla that an awkward situation has arisen, but awkward though it be, those who have faith in China's future will believe that the difficulty thus created will be surmounted. The impasse has been brought about by the apparently irreconcilable claims of the principal parties regarding the territory which should comprise Outer and Inner Tibet. China had conceded about 800 miles of territory east of Giamda, which she originally claimed as the boundary of the Tibetans, that the whole of Kokonor and the territory to the south-east of the Salween river, should be included in autonomous or Outer Tibet. Neither was China willing to consent to the territory, now marching with the Szechuan frontier, being included in Inner Tibet. China was ready to concede that the territory included in autonomous Tibet while the southern part of Kokonor and the territory about 500 miles east of Chiamdo should be included in Inner Tibet. Those who have any knowledge of the boundaries of the Chinese Empire will appreciate the conciliatory attitude of China in the Conference. Kokonor has long been a dependency of China and the territory east of the Salween has long been under her jurisdiction while her troops govern Chiamdo and the country westwards of the Salween. Moreover China points out that at the outset of the Conference it was understood that Chinese troops were not to advance westwards, the understanding being that China was to retain the territory under her control. That this has not been recognized by Tibet is no fault of China. In the days of Viceroy Chao Erh-sun the boundary of Tibet was fixed at Giamda, all the territory eastwards of that point being under his jurisdiction as Viceroy of Szechuan. In these circumstances, it will be appreciated that China should insist at the Conference that the outlying limits of the boundary of Tibet should be at Giamda, and also that Kokonor was absolutely independent of Tibet, being in fact governed by the Viceroy of Kansu. After much pressure China agreed to the boundary being brought back to the Salween river though she had 6,000 to 8,000 troops in the Chiamdo territory, but Tibet wants Inner Tibet to extend to the Szechuan border. In other words, China is willing to concede such territory as is not effectively controlled by her. China insists that the Jyade territory to the west of Chiamdo, is the country of the thirty-two (actually thirty-nine) tribes, the descendants of Chinese, a territory which never formed

part of Tibet. China consented to the Salween being the boundary of Outer Tibet and that from the Salween about five hundred miles east of Chiamdo should be included in Inner Tibet, but these concessions have not been accepted. Consequently, the Conference has had to be ended, and other steps will have to be considered.

b. *Extract from Reuter's Government and Press telegrams, 11 July, 1914*¹

London, 11th July. During his statement on Foreign Office vote in House of Commons today Sir Edward Grey said: Action of China in practically attempting to conquer Tibet forcibly and turning it into Chinese province, just when Great Britain and Russia had mutually agreed not to interfere in Tibet, thereby making China's position there perfectly secure, an action carried so far that Indian frontier was becoming unsettled, was most unreasonable action for which we had great cause to complain. He regretted that China had not hitherto signed Tibetan Convention and that no agreement with regard to the boundaries had been proposed. He hoped that China would eventually sign. If she did not, but resorted to aggressive policy, consequences must be disastrous to China and there would certainly be serious trouble on Indian frontier compelling us to take up matter with Government of China itself.

11. *Resuming Negotiations?*

*Leu Yuk Lin (Chinese Minister in London) to Sir Edward Grey (British Foreign Secretary), 21 July, 1914*²

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received a telegram from the Wai Chiao Pu, a translation of which is as follows:

Your telegram of the 10th is received.

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, October 1914, 134-396.

²Encl Proc 394, in *Foreign*, October 1914, 134-396.

The British and the Tibetan delegates have already left India.

We deeply appreciate the fact that the British Foreign Office reciprocate our hope that other means must be found to settle the Tibetan question.

As the British and the Tibetan delegates have already left India, delegate Ivan Chen must necessarily be recalled to Peking.

You are earnestly requested to enquire of the British Government which they prefer; to delegate Sir John Jordan to negotiate with us or to negotiate direct with our Minister in London.

You are also requested by the Government to communicate to the British Government their strong desire to continue this negotiation at the earliest possible date and to have this question most satisfactorily settled.

Please reply by wire.

Wai Chiao Pu, July 18th.

I should be very much obliged if Your Excellency would be so good as to give me an early reply to the question contained in the above telegram for transmission to the Wai Chiao Pu.

XII

Nepal and the Simla Convention

1. *McMahon to Manners-Smith, British Resident in Nepal, 27 May, 1914*¹

I send you very confidentially copies of the draft Convention regarding Tibet and of the draft Tibet Trade Regulations.

They have been initialled but not yet signed and cannot therefore yet be communicated to any one, but, as it is desirable to let His Excellency Sir Chandra see them at the earliest possible opportunity before they are published, I send them to you now in their present form so that you can show them to him when I am in a position to telegraph to you asking you to do so. Every care, as you know, has been taken to avoid anything in these agreements which will affect Nepalese interests in Tibet and the present drafts differ little if anything from those you have already seen.

Pre-existing agreements between Nepal and Tibet are not affected by these documents.

Please keep these papers in safe custody until you hear from me that they can be shown to Sir Chandra.

2. *Telegram from the Resident to the Foreign Secretary, 12 July, 1914*

From The Resident in Nepal
To The Foreign Secretary, Simla

Tibet. Please refer to Sir H. McMahon's demi-official letters of 27th May and 8th July. I would suggest that I may be permitted to inform the Prime Minister of Nepal how the China-Tibetan question now stands. Also that I be permitted to communicate to him the contents of the Convention signed by the Tibetan and British Representatives.

There would appear to be no objection to the Resident communicating the purport of the Convention very confidentially to the

¹Foreign and Political Department *Notes*, Secret External, 134-396.

Prime Minister, Nepal, and explaining how the case stands. But His Excellency the Viceroy's orders should be taken.

A. H. GRANT

17.7.14

The communication of the purport of the Convention to the Nepalese Government was contemplated in Sir Henry McMahon's demi-official letter of the 8th July. It is for consideration whether in view of Colonel Manners-Smith's recommendations there is any reason for delaying the communication. As long as it is made confidentially and unofficially for the present, there seems to be none. Your Excellency will perhaps concur.

P. Z. COX

17.7.14

HARDINGE

17.7.14

3. *Telegram from the Foreign Secretary to the Resident, 17 July, 1914*

Demi-official. Tibet. Please refer to your telegram of 12th instant, No. 53 S. You may communicate purport of Convention and explain unofficially and very confidentially to Prime Minister of Nepal.

4. a. *Manners-Smith to the Foreign Secretary, 27 July, 1914*

Confidential

With reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 17th July, I write to report that I have acted upon the permission accorded me to communicate the purport of the Tibetan Convention to the Prime Minister unofficially and very confidentially.

In discussing the situation, Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumshere at once seized upon the point dealt with in Article 5 of the Convention viz., that the Government of Tibet engages not to enter into any negotiations or agreement regarding Tibet with China, or with any other Power, except only with Great Britain in regard to certain matters provided for by the Peking Convention of 27th April 1906.

The Prime Minister said that the Tibetan Government would

certainly take advantage of this restraining clause to refuse in future to deal with Nepal about matters arising out of the existing agreements between the two countries and that these would gradually cease to have any binding force on Tibet unless Nepal be allowed to fight for her rights which he quite realized might not be agreeable to Great Britain to permit. His feeling evidently is that an explicit reference to the fact that Tibet and Nepal already have certain treaty agreements, should, in the interest of Nepal, have been made by us in the new Convention, and that to prevent future trouble it will have to be made clear to Tibet that the pre-existing agreements are not affected by the recent negotiations.

McMahon—as a matter of fact—authorized me when leaving Delhi in March 1914 to assure the Prime Minister that Nepalese interests in Tibet would not be adversely affected by the new agreement which he was negotiating. This I did at the time verbally, and have also now pointed out to Sir Chandra that mention of Nepal having been entirely omitted in the Convention, it stands to reason that pre-existing arrangements between Nepal and Tibet hold good. This, however, will not satisfy Nepal unless it is officially confirmed, and we may expect an explicit reference for an assurance on this point from the Prime Minister as soon as he is at liberty to address me officially about the new Convention between Great Britain and Tibet.

I suppose that the withdrawal of China from the Tripartite negotiations will have an effect on our Tibetan policy and will give us a freer hand in dealing with the Lhasa Government. However this may be, it would, in my opinion be expedient to consider carefully now whether it will be politic in future to let Nepal deal directly with Tibet diplomatically and otherwise for the maintenance of her privileges in that country, or whether it would not be better to come to an understanding on the subject with both states by mutual agreement while the future position of Tibet, vis-a-vis China and Great Britain is being decided.

4. b. *Foreign Department Notes: A. H. Grant, 24 August, 1914; and P. Z. Cox, 1 September, 1914*

The question raised by Colonel Manners-Smith is for the time being more or less academic.

In view, however, of the ready cooperation which has recently been shown by the Prime Minister of Nepal in connection with the European crisis, we might without further delay give him again an informal assurance in regard to Article 5 of the Convention.

In this connection the notes on pages 4-10 of Secret E., July 1911, Nos 693-703, should be read.

There was no intention whatever of interfering in any way with the existing agreements and arrangements between Nepal and Tibet when Article 5 of the Convention was framed. Nor indeed does the wording of that article in any way affect such existing agreements. Whether or not, Nepal could enter into fresh agreements with Tibet in the face of Article 5 of the Convention, is a more difficult question that might well be avoided. There is no obvious necessity for her to do so, and should the point come up in a concrete form, it could be dealt with at the time. It has hitherto been ruled that Nepal is not a 'Power', and would not therefore be affected by the article in question.

We might reply to Colonel Manners-Smith something to the following effect.

For the time being any discussion of the effect of the Tibetan Convention must be more or less of academic interest only. You may however assure the Prime Minister again that nothing in the Convention is intended or will be allowed to affect existing agreements or arrangements between Nepal and Tibet. Indeed there is nothing in Article 5 in regard to which the Prime Minister has some apprehensions to justify the assumption that these agreements or arrangements will be affected. Further, there would appear to be no necessity, should the Convention come into force, to make any specific reference in it to Nepal. But the Government of India will be prepared in this event, to give the Nepal Durbar an official assurance that the existing agreements referred to are not affected, and that the Government of India will endeavour to arrange that the interests of Nepal arising from these agreements are in no way prejudiced by the operation of the Convention.

A. H. GRANT

24.8.14

I have taken His Excellency's instructions. Demi-official reply on above lines may be drafted to Resident, Nepal.

P. Z. COX

1.9.14

XIII

Lu Hsing-chi, Peking and Ivan Chen: 1913-14 *Selections from Intercepted Telegrams*¹

1. *Lu Hsing-chi to Peking, 7 May, 1913*

The following despatch from Tibet: 'The Tibetan Ministry of Interior to Lu Hsing-chi: We were much relieved by the receipt yesterday of the President's despatch to the Dalai Lama, forwarded through the firm Pang Ta Ch'ang.

We have already sent several despatches to the President through this firm, while our telegrams are sent from Gyantse as the most convenient and speedy route. Although we have received no orders from the President regarding (you) Lu Hsing-chi being deputed to enter Tibet to hold a Conference. . . . But the entry of a Chinese official into Tibet fighting against us in Kang Pa (Kham?), will aggravate the suspicions of the populace. We have therefore decided upon Darjeeling as a more suitable place of meeting.

It is much to be feared that a second outbreak of hostilities (as a result of Chinese depredations in East Tibet) will occur and that the Tibetans will be compelled to rely upon foreign assistance and that a great change will come over public opinion.

2. *From Suez to Peking, 10 May, 1913*

The Tibetans, encouraged by the foreigners, are growing prouder and more intractable; I hope the Government will lose no time in sending a plenipotentiary officer of high rank at the head of several yings (battalions) to Chiamdo, there to hold conference with the Dalai Lama's representatives and discuss all questions of reform and relief; when these matters are satisfactorily settled, it will be time to begin negotiations with the British; we must exclude them from any participation which may prejudice our plans.

3. *From Lu Hsing-chi to Peking, 11 May, 1913*

During the Manchu regime the English translated as 'Resident' the

¹*IOR, Pol. & Secret Subject Files, 2350/1913, 'Tibet: Intercepted Telegrams.'*

title of Imperial Resident in Tibet (literally Resident in Tibet administering Great Minister) this translation ignored the word 'Administering'. My idea is to take the opportunity of the Government's negotiations with the British Minister, to adopt such a translation of the term Administrator as will in effect restore our sovereign rights.

4. *From Lu Hsing-chi to Peking, 13 May, 1913*

According to the reports of agents the Dalai Lama was adverse to submission after the receipt of the President's orders, neither were the Tibetan people disaffected towards China, it was only the Shachas whose property had been destroyed during the Manchu regime, who remained obdurate. . . . Their latest request that the Conference take place in Darjeeling is in pursuance of the same policy; if we grant this request we shall absolutely forfeit the whole of our sovereign rights over subject territory. To restore the situation will then become doubly difficult.

Since however the Dalai Lama still retains his respect for the President, let him be informed that I have been appointed Administrator in Tibet and let him be directed to send officials to India to escort me into Tibet where I can restore the status quo and finally settle the whole question. This request will force him to show his hand.

The Dalai Lama has never categorically stated that he does not want a Chinese officer to come to Tibet, while the Tibetan official classes dread the inevitable arrival of Chinese troops; for this reason on the close of the disorders in Tibet, there was general discussion as to the advisability of sending an officer to Peking to settle the Tibetan question by a return to the status quo. Again, it was the Shachas who on their return from Tibet opposed this proposal.

I suggest that the Government take advantage of this lack of unanimity; let the President direct the Dalai Lama to arrange for my safe conduct into Tibet; discussion will then be easy and we shall have gained a distinct advantage for our negotiations with Great Britain.

If the Dalai Lama disobeys the order, we can settle the question by force of arms; the Tibetans will then be able to blame the Shachas only and we shall retain some foothold from which to restore our status in Tibet.

We must check the influence of the British and draw the Tibetan officials into closer communication with ourselves and dispel their tendency to rely on foreigners by revealing to them the oppressive nature of British administration.

5. *From Peking to Lu Hsing-chi, 18 May, 1913*

To Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to—titles—Dalai Lama:

The recent disorders in Tibet were due to the maladministration of Lien Yu and Chung Ying; these officers have now been recalled and I have appointed Lu Hsing-chi, Administrator in Tibet...

I trust Your Holiness will not delay to send officers to meet and escort the said official (Lu) into Tibet, where he will be able to discuss and carry out all measures for future reform and for the restoration of the old system of administration; all contention will thus be allayed, general prosperity will reign and Your Holiness's hopes of spreading Buddhism and of protecting life will all be realized by your compliance with this request.

Begging the favour of an early reply.

President

6. *Lu Hsing-chi (Calcutta) to Teng-yueh, 25 May, 1913*

When Chung Ying reached Kalimpong in India, he intended to make a protracted stay, but the Government of India compelled him to leave the place and on the 15th he accompanied by Shih Yu-ming (Suez) came to Calcutta and hired a house, making preparations for a lengthy residence. He has not yet sent me the seal of office.

His opinion is that the Tibetan question can be settled only by the use of force direct or indirect. Before Chung Ying's arrival, I and the officers incharge of recent Conference lived and worked on the premises of the Tien I (Thinyink) Coy.

7. *President to Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to Dalai Lama, 4 June, 1913*

Chiamdo and the other places mentioned were included within the limits of Ssu-chuan in the closing years of the Manchu dynasty.

Last year the National Assembly in drawing up the schedule of

electoral areas, designated these localities as constituting the 8th ward of Ssu-chuan.

Territories subject to the late Manchu dynasty have devolved upon the Republic, their status cannot be altered.

As regards Darjeeling as the place of meeting to discuss future reform, no agreement has yet been made with Great Britain; I therefore directed Lu Hsing-chi to cooperate with you.

Any questions regarding Tibet which require discussion, you should first discuss with the said Administrator who will then communicate with the Central government; this will be a more speedy method than the despatch of delegates to Darjeeling would afford.

8. *Lu Hsing-chi to Liang Yen-sun, Private Secretary to the President, Peking, 28 May, 1913*

Fortunately the Dalai Lama has not hitherto categorically disclaimed allegiance to the Central Government; the British also continue to regard Tibet as a dependency of China; we must cling to these threads of opportunity.

I had previously advocated methods of persuasion as I did not desire that the ruin of a state should endanger the whole body politic.

(Alluding to his previous request for \$ 500,000) to be used solely in connection with my entry into Tibet...the situation in Tibet exercised a profound influence on the whole state; do not let us lose this opportunity; do not let us abandon the whole enterprise because of a slight obstacle... Information from Tibet indicates the existence of a favourable opportunity of action; I beg you therefore actively to recommend the remittance of the sum I have requested....

If...my request cannot be granted, it only remains for me to tender my resignation.

9. *From President to Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to Dalai Lama, 7 June, 1913*

I have now decided to send an officer into Tibet via India, and have come to an agreement with the British Minister. When the time comes all questions of future reform can be discussed.

As regards Chiang Ka, Chiamdo etc. these places were included within the limits of Ssu-chuan...they cannot therefore be con-

sidered subject of Tibet. Territory formerly subject to the Manchus is now subject to the Republic and no alternative can be made in its status.

(I would warn) that you will not hanker after the restoration of ancient boundaries, a course which may lead to the gravest of consequences.

10. *From President to Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to—title—
Dalai Lama, 11 June, 1913*

(Alluding to Tibetan forces and their activities against the Chinese in East Tibet, Tibetan threats to Chinese commanders in East Tibet and Tibet purchasing large quantities of munitions of war). All this indicates that not only do they (Tibetans) wish to upset the boundary as it existed at the close of the Manchu dynasty, but also to abolish the frontier as it existed in the reign of Yung Cheng (1723-36).

Territory formerly subject to the Manchus is now subject to the Republic which cannot countenance any change.

11. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President and the Cabinet, Calcutta to
Teng-yueh, 6 June, 1913*

Letter from the Tashi Lama (while accepting the President's gift and title of 'Most Loyal Exponent of Transmigration'):

I respectfully prepared an incense altar in the monastery at Tashilhunpo, and after lighting the incense and making nine prostrations, humbly received the patent in a kneeling posture and rendered thanks for this mark of Celestial favour.

A letter also from Wang Chung Hsieh, a Chinese holding the position of a Tibetan official of the 4th rank:

My special officer reported to me that the Tibetan officers en route are exercising the strictest surveillance and that the Tashi Lama and others do not venture to send their correspondence freely; for this reason there is great dearth of news regarding Ulterior Tibet (Tashilhunpo).

If we are successful so far as external relations are concerned, a final settlement should present no difficulty.

12. *From Lu Hsing-chi to the President and Cabinet, Calcutta
to Teng-yueh for transmission to Peking, 9 June, 1913*

Now that our forces in the Eastern districts have made good

progress and that Pomed has been subjugated I beg that Governor Yin be instructed to make earnest arrangements for the permanent occupation and protection of these regions; from them the whole of Tibet can be dominated, just as the British by retaining large forces in the North West Province control the whole of India. . . .^a

The power of our troops in the Eastern districts^b will be sufficient to prevent the Tibetans from daring to harbour thoughts of revolt and to prevent the foreigners from venturing to indulge in ambitious schemes.

The frontier question can then be considered settled.

13. *President to Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to—titles—Dalai Lama, 23 June, 1913*

As regards Chiamdo etc., it is impossible to alter their status as subject to Ssu-chuan. . . . I trust that you will not again raise the question of the boundary; you will thus avoid provoking a second outburst of dislike and suspicion between Chinese and Tibetans, and making it doubly difficult to effect a pacific settlement.

14. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President and Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh for transmission to Peking, 23 June, 1913*

That party among the Tibetans which desires to submit to China is rapidly gaining strength, secret strife between the two factions is growing very acute and before long will break into civil war.

The Dalai Lama previously asked me to come to Darjeeling and there confer with a Tibetan delegate, but I felt sure that the delegate would make use of the foreigners to support claims for power and increased territory; I accordingly replied that the President's instructions to me were to enter Tibet. . . . I dwelt upon the fact that. . . Tibetan territory was subject to the Republic and therefore not a matter for contention and finally that it was a singularly infelicitous proceeding to drag quarrels about power and territorial boundaries into a foreign country (for discussion). . . .

The Sha-cha (Shatra) has hitherto made use of the Dalai Lama to obtain for himself supreme power in Tibet, he is extremely hostile to China, and has distinct leanings towards the foreigners. . . . Now that he is coming to the Conference he will no doubt act accordingly.

I now propose to send a messenger secretly to him to persuade

him to come to India and have a personal interview with me; anything requiring discussion can then be communicated to the Central Government for decision; if his demands are excessive there would be no difficulty in orders being issued from China, directing him to return to Tibet.

Further, India is a very extensive country and the eyes and ears in it are very numerous; the British official(s) will hardly dare to be too overbearing and I ought to be able to find means to induce Shacha to adopt a friendly attitude.

15. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President, the Cabinet, the Board of War, the General Staff and the Governors of Ssu-chuan and Yunnan, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, 9 July, 1913*

Since Chung Ying's failure to maintain his position there have been in Tibet neither Chinese officials, nor Chinese troops and the independence of the country is already accomplished.

The Dalai Lama's anxiety to expedite a Conference . . . the aspirations of the Tibetans are in no way altered by their desire for a Conference.

Whatever may be the condition of our troops in the Eastern districts, their supplies and munitions of war, I beg that ample preparations be made to enable them to achieve much for our country; if we can by force of arms reach Chiangta there will be some hope of restoring the situation in Tibet; if not, then not only shall we lose Tibet, but also Pomed, Fu-yu, Pien-ma and other localities will be lost to us.

The year before last when the British attacked Ap (Abor) their troops reached our station Limao (Rima) in E-wu and other places . . . these officers surveyed the country and decided upon a line of frontier, which running beyond the mountains is to include Pomed, Fu-yu, Pai-ma-kun (Pemakoi), E-wu and other places; all this with a view to hampering the operations of our troops in the Eastern districts; they will undoubtedly make this line of the frontier effective; is this the time for Ssu-chuan and Yunnan to remain inactive?

The Viceroy of India once stated that the defence of India was formerly concerned with Russia, but that now it was concerned with China, he was no doubt thinking of Ssu-chuan and Yunnan.

16. *Cabinet to Lu Hsing-chi, Peking to Calcutta, 16 July, 1913*

We have now received details by telegraph from Governor Yin that the whole of the Marches have been recovered and that Upper, Central and Lower Hsing-cheng have been pacified. . . you should publish in Tibet the substance of Yin's telegram that the Marches are now completely recovered and pacified. It is important that a correction should be furnished to the press to prevent misunderstanding.

17. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, 18 July, 1913*

(The Panchen Lama wanted to send a representative to meet Lu Hsing-chi and thank the President) but that unfortunately he is so closely watched by the Tanguts (inhabitants of Lhasa and districts) that he finds it almost impossible to send anyone; he requests that a telegram be sent to the President requesting that an order be sent to Tashilhunpo through the Tanguts, directing that a representative be sent to the conference in India to take part in the negotiations between China and Tibet.

This course would greatly benefit both parties. . . . He desires that it should not be made known that he wants to send a representative.

I accordingly forwarded the telegram for your consideration.

18. *Cabinet to Lu Hsing-chi, Peking to Calcutta, 24 July, 1913*

. . . your proposal that the Tashi Lama be instructed to send a representative to the Conference must wait until delegate Ch'en reaches Peking; in the meantime it has been privately transferred to the Board of Foreign Affairs.

19. *Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, 18 July, 1913*

The Tibetan Sha Cha Kalon has early been approached when at the capital^a with a view to ascertaining his willingness for elections to the Assembly.^b

20. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet and Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau, Peking to Calcutta, 1 August, 1913*

The Sha-cha is now Chief (of) the Tibetan Treasury and will

certainly not agree to go to Peking. The ten odd Tibetan officers and representatives of Lamas who are now accompanying him to Darjeeling will gravely hinder the progress of our negotiations; once they have experienced exceptionally good treatment at the hands of the British, their attitude will be easy to divine. . . .

In my opinion the delegates should necessarily hold the views of the people at large. In the present confused state of Tibet it is impossible to distinguish who is well and who is ill-disposed. It is well to hold the vacancy open until after the Conference is finished.

21. *Lu Hsing-chi to President, Cabinet, Vice President, Board of Foreign Affairs, Advisory Council, Army Board, Governors of Szechuan, Yunnan and the Marches, the Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau and Pacificators, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, 12 August, 1913*

News of the civil war in China has now penetrated to Tibet, the Tibetans are ignorant of the real state of affairs in China, the foreigners make use of false reports in the newspapers to increase their suspicions; the Dalai Lama is plotting for independence and disaffection is being fanned into flame. . . .

During the past month I sent numerous letters and telegrams to the Dalai Lama, hoping to draw him into closer communication with us; to not a single one have I received the answer.

I hear that the Dalai Lama has been prompted by the foreigners to assert that Tibet cannot receive letters and telegrams from China; that it holds an independent status; that in the forthcoming conference at Darjeeling the Chinese representative is to be treated as an equal; that if, after the Conference, Chinese troops enter Tibet, the British will take action; that Great Britain and Tibet are now on very intimate terms and that they will afford each other mutual assistance.

The Sha Cha (Shatra) has hitherto influenced the Dalai Lama and in reality enjoys supreme power. . . . There is also a constant succession of urgent letters secretly forwarded to the Dalai Lama both from Nepal and from the Government of India, the whole affair being covered with unprecedented secrecy. It is impossible to say what the outcome of these negotiations will be.

(Referring to the Secretary of State's supposed reply about the Conference and that China was not to treat Tibet as a province) if the above be true, then in drawing up a new agreement between the three parties, China, Great Britain and Tibet, as that which we

regarded as of most importance i.e. the restoration of the status quo, is precisely that which the other parties desire to obliterate.

(The President should) order Governor Yin to occupy that place (Chiang-ta) as soon as possible; Chiangta being close to Lhasa its occupation would afford a counterpoise to the Conference. Failing this I fear we shall find it very difficult to regain our sovereign rights.

Please let me know by telegraph when our delegate is starting. I cannot express my grief at the outbreak of internal disturbance while we are still threatened by external dangers; I can only forward to you the reports I have received from my agents and humbly beg you to lose no time in deciding upon the course of action which will safeguard our Republic.

I await your instructions with the utmost trepidation.

22. *Lu Hsing-chi to Liang Yen-sun, Private Secretary to the President, Calcutta to Teng-yuch, 18 August, 1913*

I was appointed Administrator of Tibet, resident in India. Last June Chung Ying handed over to me the seals of office and the archives for just on two months. I have controlled various officers, have rented buildings, instituted means of publishing proclamations in Tibet, communicated officially with the Viceroy of India and in short transacted every kind of business.

(There had arrived a message from the Police that his appointment as Administrator of Tibet was not recognized) 'while resident in India (was) strictly forbidden to correspond with Tibetans; should you disregard this prohibition, you will be ordered to leave India.'

Ask the Viceroy of India to relax his attitude. Failing this our national prestige will suffer and we shall have increased difficulty in handling the Tibetan question.

23. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, 26 August, 1913*

... Now that the Government of India refuse to recognize me as Administrator and forbids me to correspond with Tibetans, I shall carry out the publication of your last telegram by sending a special messenger and thus avoid the restriction.

24. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President, Cabinet and Board of Foreign Affairs, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, 28 August, 1913*

(When Sha-cha Shatra, visits him—Lu Hsing-chi—in Calcutta, he was certain to be accompanied by a British official). It is to be feared that what the British official slights will be held in small esteem by the Tibetan official, our national prestige will be set at nought by both parties while our sovereign rights over subject territory will be greatly prejudiced.

I beg the Board to come to an early agreement with the British Minister and to telegraph me instructions accordingly.

25. *Lu Hsing-chi to Board of Finance, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, August 31, 1913*

...that the sum of 10,000 dollars which I received last May has been exhausted by the purchase of presents for Tibetans and by expenses connected with the despatch of intelligence agents into Tibet.

My intelligence agents in Tibet and my staff in India have been without pay for several months. Our need is most pressing. Please make me a telegraphic remittance of 20,000 dollars to meet immediate requirements.

26. *Lu Hsing-chi to Premier of the Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, August 13, 1913*

It would be wise to settle the Mongolian and Tibetan questions as soon as possible.

The Dalai Lama harbours disloyal designs to which he is prompted by foreigners; it is to be feared that many complications will arise if there is any further delay.

I hope you will instruct delegate Chen to come to the Conference without loss of time so as to settle the Tibetan question.

27. *Lu Hsing-chi to the President and the Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, August 31, 1914*

The telegraphic expenses of submitting my periodical reports on the situation in Tibet are very considerable; there are in addition the

charges for presents to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan officials, the cost of sending intelligence agents into Tibet and the expenses of carrying on official hospitality in India; for several months past I have, owing to lack of funds, been unable to pay the salaries of my staff.

28. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet and Board of Foreign Affairs, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, September 1, 1913*

Today he (Wang Chu-tse, Acting Commissioner of Customs at Yatung) reports that the Sha-cha also is pressing him in a very threatening manner and that the affair has assumed a most dangerous aspect.

I now feel compelled to beg for immediate instructions and to request that the Inspector General of Customs^a be instructed to order Acting Commissioner Wang not to leave his post without authority; there is no question of armed conflict occurring in Yatung and he is not in the slightest danger.

29. *Cabinet to Lu Hsing-chi, Peking to Calcutta, September 4, 1913*

Delegate Ch'en will leave Shanghai on the 13th. When the time comes it is hoped you will explain everything to him personally.

The duties of the Administrator in Tibet should be temporarily held in abeyance for the present. Neither is there any necessity to announce (the appointment).

30. *Cabinet to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, September 8, 1913*

It is hoped that you will give the said Commissioner of Customs (Wang at Chumbi) strict injunctions to remain quietly at his post and on no account to leave the country without permission.

31. *Mongolian Tibetan Bureau to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, September 2, 1913*

The official seal for the Administrator in Tibet has now been cast and is ready for use.

32. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, September 9, 1913*

(The Acting Commissioner for Customs at Yatung has already abandoned his post). The Yatung Customs station has been established for 20 years and maintained at considerable expense in order to protect and assert our sovereign rights and covertly to restrain the importation into Tibet of Indian tea while upholding the privileges and profits on Szechuan tea trade.

The question is therefore one which intimately affects commercial relations between Tibet and India; if we can find an officer to carry on the duties of the Customs station it will have a most beneficial influence upon the situation in Tibet. I therefore entreat you to take measures for the preservation of this post, this is my earnest prayer.

33. *Cabinet to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, September 14, 1913*

To be retained and handed over to Pacificator Chen. A telegram from Shih Yu Ming has been received as follows:

The three Great Monasteries of Lhasa have hitherto enjoyed the chief administrative authority; their influence will be much felt in the preparation of the forthcoming agreement; to enlist their loyalty towards China it is first necessary to excite their gratitude.

I therefore request that these three Great Monasteries be instructed to send representatives to India to take part in the Conference.

In drawing up the Indo-Tibetan Agreement of 1904 the three Great monasteries played a leading part; it is for the consideration of the said Pacificator *after his arrival in Tibet*, whether or not this course should be adopted.

34. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, September 14, 1913*

I have secretly bought over certain of the Tibetan officers' retinue, partly with a view to keeping him under observation and partly that they may, when opportunity permits, persuade him not to attempt to cast off allegiance to our country.

Fen Chu has been very active in spreading his propaganda secretly, but he is almost at the end of his resources and it is to be feared that if the arrival of the Special Commissioner be delayed much longer, there will be a change for the worse.

I earnestly request you to give them your close consideration and to devote your attention to the situation in Tibet so as to prevent the British taking advantage of our unpreparedness and following the example of Russia in Mongolia.^a

I have already made preparations to hand over personally to delegate Chen all important despatches, telegrams, documents, records, together with the latest reports on Anglo-Tibetan affairs so that when the Conference begins he will be *au fait* with all necessary information.

35. *Cabinet to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, September 17, 1913*

The said Customs station (Yatung) involves questions of the greatest importance, steps should of course be taken to ensure its preservation as being intimately connected with the status of Tibet.

36. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, September 17, 1913*

. . . The three monasteries will, I consider, undoubtedly influence the results of the forthcoming Conference.

There are, however, no representatives of Ulterior Tibet (Shigatse).

As the present question affects the whole of Tibet, please inform me whether the Tashi Lama should be instructed to send representatives.

37. *Lu Hsing-chi to Pacificator (Ivan) Chen, Calcutta to Simla, October 8, 1913*

(News regarding President Yuan taking over).^b On receipt of the above I inform you accordingly, I hope that you will lose no time in communicating this to the Tibetan official for his guidance and also that he may instruct all Tibetan officials and people to act accordingly.

38. *Lu Hsing-chi to Pacificator Chen, Calcutta to Simla, October 9, 1913*

Further, I do not know whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is repeating to you the numerous telegrams which I have lately been receiving from the Cabinet.

39. *Lu Hsing-chi to President, Calcutta to Peking, October 7, 1913*

In the name of the Tibetan people and of the Chinese Residents in India, I pray for 10,000 years of life to you and to our Republic.

40. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet and Minister of Finance, October 13, 1913*

Europeans in their promotion of industries in Asia, required India as the great field for commerce; all the foreigners have early established Consuls-General here; we alone have neglected to do so.

I consider that we should take advantage of Chen's presence in India as negotiator of the Tibetan agreement, to cause the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring up this point and to come to an agreement with the British Minister, who should telegraph to the Court of Great Britain for instructions to be sent to the Government of India.

At the same time Chen could be directed to discuss the matter with the Government of India.

41. *Ivan Chen to Lu Hsing-chi, Simla to Calcutta, October 21, 1913*

I presume that you have received my letter of the 16th and that it accords with your views, please let me know by telegraph whether you can come here and discuss matters with me.

42. *Lu Hsing-chi to Ivan Chen, Calcutta to Simla, October 22, 1913*

Your telegram (No. 41) and your letter of the 16th.

I am much gratified to hear that the Tibetan official is in difficulties. I ought really to follow your directions and do as you suggest; but there is no remedy for the restrictions placed upon me regarding Tibetan territory; otherwise we should be successful.

43. *Ivan Chen to Lu Hsing-chi, Simla to Calcutta, October 25, 1913*

If you have a map of Tibet,^a I should be grateful for the loan, could you send a trustworthy person to me with it.

44. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, October 29, 1913*

(Regarding representation of Tashi Lama at Conference). The Conference has already opened. The representatives sent by Tibet were recommended by Great Britain; they were neither nominated nor sent by China.

It would appear better not to cavil at distinctions between Anterior and Ulterior Tibet, since both China and Great Britain have accepted the said representatives it follows that they represent the whole of Tibet.

Now that the Conference has begun, there is no advantage in our raising questions of this nature; on the contrary it is to be feared that complications would ensue.

45. *Lu Hsing-chi to Military Governor Hu (Ching Yi) and Administrator Yin (Chang Heng), Chengtu, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, October 30, 1913*

If you have any detailed maps of the Tibetan frontier or other documentary proof, please send them as soon as possible by insured post so that they may be examined.

The above is of the greatest importance to the Tibetan question.

46. *Lu Hsing-chi to Cabinet, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, November 13, 1913*

(Great Britain has no desire for territorial expansion). From this it would appear that Great Britain has really no intention of usurping Tibet, she is content merely with rendering that country assistance.

But there exists in the Government of India a section using present opportunity to increase its power and privileges.^b

I think that if, at the present conference, we can show some strength and can hold out for a short time, we may reap the fruit of success.

As regards boundaries, if we can use as proof the map prepared by Fu Sung-mu, former Warden of the Marches, which shows Chiang-ta as the frontier, not only shall we be able to include several thousand li extra but every important strategical point will come into our possession.

It will also be easier to maintain connection with the 39 Banners, while a still more important influence will be exerted upon Pomed and that stretch of country.

This map^a has already been given to Commissioner Chen, but there are in this place no accurate or detailed maps of the regions on the various frontiers of Tibet, a matter which is of still greater importance in regard to the Kokonor and Turkestan boundaries.

If there are any such maps in Tibet, please lose no time in sending them to Commissioner Chen for his perusal.

In obedience to your instructions to me to advise and assist Commissioner Chen, I hold periodical secret discussions with him, to which I hope he will give effect.

I have lately heard that the British official has been inciting the Tibetans to risk a decisive battle with us in the Marches, saying that if by good fortune they were successful it would benefit them very greatly at the present conference.

I do not know whether or not this is true, but those people are full of treacherous plans and we ought to be on our guard.

Please telegraph in cipher to Administrator Yin (Chang Heng of Szechuan Marches) to make secret preparations. This is important.

47. *Cabinet to Lu Hsing-chi for transmission to Commissioner Chen, Peking to Calcutta, November 20, 1913*

(Repeating 45 above)

His (Lu Hsing-chi's) statement is receiving attention, you should also examine it and act upon it as circumstances dictate, or opportunity offers.

48. *Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, December 1, 1913*

(According to a statement of Tashi Lama's representative in Peking, the Lama has decided to visit Peking and 'beg for an interview' and the Bureau was to move the President. The latter has sent the following reply:) 'The said Lama has ever been an advocate

of peace and has from first to last shown his loyalty in a most commendable manner. His request to visit Peking is granted.

The Cabinet should instruct the Bureau to issue the necessary passport.'

You are requested to communicate secretly with the Tashi Lama and ascertain if he is really able to undertake this journey. Also please enquire secretly by what route he should travel and find out what conditions prevail in the places through which he will pass.

It is important that you should render every assistance and report in cypher by telegraph from time to time.

49. *Yao Hsi Kuang (at the Chin Kiang guild) to Brother Yun Ch'iu (Lu Hsing-chi), Peking to Calcutta, December 3, 1913*

I am glad to hear that when negotiations are so difficult and the state of Tibet is graver than ever, you are seeking means of entering the country and that you propose to employ Yang Fen to assist you in your project. The matter has been communicated to the Government but I hope you will again telegraph to the President, the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry and the Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau so that Yang Fen may be speedily placed at your disposal for assistance.

When Yang Fen left we had neither an open understanding nor a private understanding.

50. *Lu Hsing-chi to Mongolian-Tibetan Bureau, Calcutta to Teng-yueh, December 7, 1913*

I will send a special messenger with a despatch to hold a secret interview with the Tashi Lama.

If the Tashi Lama really dares to make this journey to Peking, the situation in Tibet will no doubt be vastly improved. But the Tashi Lama secretly fears the Dalai and has the greatest dread of the British, so it may be that he is undecided and will in the end do nothing.

If Mongolian Tibetan Bureau informs Tashi Lama's representative in Peking that if he (Tashi Lama) really decides to carry out his journey, Ulterior Tibet will be greatly benefited.

If he travels through India, Britain will 'devise means' of impeding his progress.

I must urge you to hold secret deliberations upon the means to be adopted.

51. *From Lu Hsing-chi to ex-Assistant Chief of the Mongolian Tibetan Bureau (Peking), Calcutta to Teng-yueh, December 8, 1913*

Delegate Chen is so skilled in foreign negotiations that he will certainly be able to make use of opportunities.

Communication via India is still completely blocked and I have not yet been able to send anyone; I hope you will make allowances.

52. *Peking to Ivan Chen, December 24, 1913*

Your telegram of the 22nd instant.

The Tang dynasty stone monument^a should not be quoted as an authority because the Chang Ching (821-5 A.D.) epoch of the Tang dynasty was that in which the Tu-fan (Turfan) power was at its greatest height; and then not only included the Szechuan marches and Kokonor but also...and 18 Departments i.e. 8/10 of modern Kansu province.

The inscription on this monument should therefore on no account be referred to as an authority.

53. *Sha Chung or Wangi Hsi (incharge Tashi Lama's Bureau in Peking) to Administrator Lu, Peking to Calcutta, December 27, 1913*

(President's sanction for journey to Peking of Panchen Lama) 'I beg your Holiness to decide on making this journey and to appoint a date for your start. You will be accorded a most joyful reception here, so on no account hesitate. Please send all details to Lu Hsing-chi who will transmit them.'²

54. *Lu Hsing-chi to Military Governor Hu (Chengtu), Calcutta to Teng-yueh, December 28, 1913*

The Conference has not as yet arrived at any conclusion, the British disregard the question of our sovereign rights in Tibet and insist on first discussing the boundary between Tibet and Szechuan.

The Tibetan representative, Sha Cha, has been induced to assent to this; his intention is to claim a boundary for Tibet which will include Tachienlu and Kokonor.

I have telegraphed a cypher to the Government and also to Commissioner Chen advising them to hold resolutely to that map of Fu Sung Mu's in which Chiang Ta constitutes the boundary; I do not know whether they will be able to maintain this claim because the Dalai Lama relies on British support. While the British use the Sha Cha as a puppet.

Our country is at present in an enfeebled condition; our external relations are involved and difficult and our finances encumbered. Nevertheless, Tibet is of paramount importance to both Ssu-chuan and Yunnan and we must exert ourselves to the utmost during this conference.

You, Sir, are the pillar of Ssu-chuan, you should be able to devise means for its protection, I earnestly hope that you will periodically send me your instructions so that I may be in a position to assist.

It would appear indispensable to station a strong force in Chang Ta (official name for Chiamdo) to check Tibetan incursions. If a force could be secretly introduced into Pomed it would afford the very best means of safeguarding the frontier.

(Referring to the British survey parties) To judge from appearances not only will Tibet fall within the limits of their (British) influence but the borders of Ssu-chuan and Yunnan will also be prejudiced, it will become more difficult to repress disorders and this again will render our relations with Great Britain increasingly difficult.

55. *Chegtu to Lu Hsing-chi, January 6, 1914*

(Reference 54 supra) We already have large bodies of troops stationed in Chiamdo and the neighbourhood while preparations are actually in progress for the despatch of a force to Pomed for garrison duty and protection of the frontier.

56. *Lu Hsing-chi to Military Governor Hu (Chengtu), January 21, 1914*

(Tunguts—Tibetans—pressing the Drepung monastery hard to surrender its rifles and munitions of war) The latter (Drepung) are sorely pressed. Can you enter into relations with the native chiefs

(Tu-ssu of the eastern districts) with a view to inducing some of them to enter Tibet secretly and there prevail on the people to make peace and prepare the way for us? I entreat you to give detailed attention to this proposal.

57. *Peking to Ivan Chen, February 3, 1914*

(Referring to perceptible advance made by Tibetan troops in East Tibet) it is not understood how the Tibetans could venture to offend by advancing their troops in this manner.^a

It is hoped that you will secretly enjoin upon the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries to send immediate orders by telegram forbidding the Tibetan troops to invite hostilities in this manner.

58. *Lu Hsing-chi to Military Governor Hu (Chengt'u), Calcutta to Teng-yueh, January 21, 1914*

I have received your telegrams; the Government in its solicitude for the West, will doubtless be greatly relieved by your arrangements for placing a large body of troops in Chiamdo and for the garrison of Pomed.

Please inform me in what locality the Pacificator is to be stationed. Commissioner Chen holds fast to his claim that Chiangta should be the boundary; it is at first difficult to surmise what the British will adduce to refute this claim.

(Drepung sorely pressed to surrender its rifles and munitions of war) can you enter into relations with the Native chiefs (Tu-ssu) of the Eastern districts with a view to inducing some of them to enter Tibet secretly and there prevail on the people to make peace and prepare the way for us? I entreat you to give detailed attention to this proposal.

59. *Ivan Chen to Wai Chiao-pu, February 19, 1914*

As regards Inner Tibet, China is to regain the status which she has long enjoyed there, but this is not to prejudice the territorial integrity of Tibet as a whole.

Outer Tibet is to be granted the right of self-government and the continuance of the political status which it has held hitherto.^b

I have already personally informed the British official that these

questions will have to be again discussed when considering the drawing up of a treaty.

Will your honourable ministry kindly favour me with your views on the above points to assist me to arrive at a definite conclusion?

XIV

Tibet Conference

1. *Memorandum regarding progress of negotiations from 6 October to 20 November, 1913: excerpts*¹

1. As the Tibet Conference has now reached the end of what may be termed the first stage of its negotiations, it seems desirable to record a brief, but informal, account of the history and doings of the Conference up to the present time.

2. At the commencement of the year 1913, Tibet was in arms against her neighbour and suzerain China; the Chinese Resident with his escort had been driven from Lhasa, and Tibet had declared her independence. China on her part was harrying the Tibetans in the March country, and endeavouring by intrigues and force of arms to re-establish her position. Unrest and anxiety on our Indian frontiers followed as a natural result upon these disturbances, our treaties with Tibet and China were rendered of no effect, and the good offices of His Majesty's Government were at length invoked, with a view to the restoration of peace in the Tibetan territories.

3. On 23rd May, invitations to a tripartite Conference in India were issued to the Governments of China and Tibet and, on their acceptance, it was agreed that representatives of the three countries, invested with full powers, should meet in India on 6th October to discuss and settle the questions then at issue. I had the honour to receive a Royal Commission as the representative of His Majesty's Government, Monsieur Ivan Chen was deputed by the President and Government of China, and Lonchen Shatra, the Prime Minister of Tibet, was selected as the representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

4. A British Representative at Lhasa, and direct relations with the Tibetan Government, appeared to me the only solution of the difficulty, a decision in which I was mainly influenced by the following considerations:

- (i) Japanese subjects were resident in Lhasa and in intimate relations with the high authorities there; Russian Consular students were in training at Kumbum Monastery^a on the Tibet

¹For the full text see Encl. 3, Proc. 36 in *Foreign*, May 1915, 36-50.

Frontier; a large number of Russian Buriat monks had recently been enrolled in the Lhasa Monasteries; and Russian Buriat monks were training the Tibetan troops. The detention and frustration of such foreign intrigues^a apparently needed our consideration.

(ii) Our Treaty rights and privileges had been constantly disregarded both by the Chinese and Tibetans, notwithstanding the presence of a British Trade Agent at Gyantse.

(iii) The conclusion of the Urga Protocol and the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912, the Mongol-Tibet treaty of January 1913, and the Russo-Chinese Agreement in regard to Mongolia of 5th November, 1913, placed in the hands of Russian Buriat and Mongolian subjects commercial and industrial rights from which we were debarred by existing treaties. The collapse of Chinese power in Tibet, and the activities of Russia in Mongolia, had caused indeed within the last two years a complete change in the status quo in Tibet, which was clearly prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain, in spite of the fact that our geographical position and our extended frontier line forced upon us a closer relation with Tibet than could be claimed by any Foreign Power.

5. The Mongol-Tibet Treaty,^b although not officially recognized in Europe, appears to be an accomplished fact, and it is certain that its privileges and obligations are jealously regarded by my Tibetan Colleague. This Treaty and the Urga Convention, when read together, give to the Russians an indirect but a real power of intervention across the Mongol-Tibet frontier.

6. By Article 4 of the Mongol-Tibet Treaty, Mongolia has bound herself to afford to Tibet 'assistance against external and internal dangers'. The Government of Urga is now dominated by Russia, the Mongol army is being trained by Russian officers, and the Tibetan army is being trained by Russian Buriat monks. The position of Russia vis-a-vis Tibet is therefore directly influenced by this provision.

7. By Article 5 of the same Treaty, Mongol subjects are allowed to travel officially and privately in Tibet.

8. By Article 6 of the Treaty Mongolia is free to trade and to find industrial establishments in Tibet; and by Article 2 of the Urga Convention Russian subjects enjoy the right to export and import, and to trade freely, without payment of dues. The trade route from

Urga to Lhasa has already been used for the transport of Russian rifles into Tibet. Russia has thus obtained an open door for her trade across the northern frontier of Tibet, and the right for Russo-Mongolian subjects to take part in Tibetan industrial enterprises. She has indeed secured by way of Mongolia an actual though indirect method of overcoming the restrictions imposed upon her by Articles 3 and 4 of the Anglo-Russian Convention.^a

9. I expressed my intention in order to save time to commence in the meanwhile an examination of the Tibetan frontier evidence with the Lonchen Shatra. It is unnecessary to remark that this examination of territorial claims based as they are on voluminous documentary evidence can be made to take as long or as short a period as circumstances demand. Whether the Chinese delegate will obtain permission to take part in this I do not know but I am inclined to think that the disadvantages of our ex-parte enquiry will elicit that permission.

10. They both complain to me of the inconvenient curiosity shown in all their doings by the members of the Japanese Consulate-General. It is hoped that the Japanese will find access to them more difficult in Delhi than it is in Simla.

2. *Memorandum regarding progress of negotiations from 21 November to 24 December, 1913: excerpts¹*

1. It was held by the British representatives that as boundary lines had been indicated on the skeleton map both by the Chinese and Tibetans, any country lying between the two lines was clearly within the scope of the discussion, and that it would be in the interest of the three parties concerned to acquire all possible information, and to produce all available evidence, concerning any portion of the disputed territory.

2. Mr Chen relied entirely upon extracts from the pamphlet of General Fu Sung-mu, recording the frontier campaigns of Chao Erh-feng (communicated in Sir John Jordan's despatch No. 131 of 2nd April 1913), and on the published works of foreign authors, notably of Sir Thomas Holditch.^b The Lonchen whilst expressing his

¹For the full text see Encl. 2, Proc. 36 in *Foreign*, May 1915, 36-50.

interest in the opinions expressed by these authors, refused to accept as conclusive any statements which lacked the weight of an official seal. In support of the Tibetan claim he produced a large number of original archives from Lhasa, tomes of delicate manuscripts bound in richly embroidered covers; he confronted his opponent also with the official history of Tibet, compiled by the 5th Dalai Lama and known as the 'Golden tree of the Index of the sole ornament of the World', a work of great scope and colossal dimensions.

3. For some days Mr Chen showed evident signs of panic; he protested that his Government would never consent to the production of evidence in regard to the country east of Batang or the discussion of Kokonor; he telegraphed to Paris for an official copy of the 'Institutes of the Manchu Dynasty'; and he stated that he relied on China's position in international law, by which Chao Erh-feng's effective occupation of the country cancelled any earlier Tibetan claim.

4. It appears to me desirable in the interest of the three contracting parties to take cognizance of the whole of this country but to limit the autonomous area to Outer Tibet. This would possibly satisfy China, if the comments now appearing in the Chinese press are an indication of the attitude of the Government of Peking; it would prevent the absorption of Inner Tibet as a Chinese province, and so perpetuate and safeguard existing Tibetan (and indirectly British) interests there; and it would prevent the inclusion of any portion of the country within the undefined frontiers of Outer and Inner Mongolia, in which other Powers have now acquired spheres of political interest; it would also tend to the creation of an effective Chinese Zone, between Tibet proper and the encroaching spheres of foreign influence on the North and East, a result which is generally desirable in view of the recent changes in the balance of power in Asia.

5. Such a boundary would serve the desired end of including within Outer Tibet the whole of Chiamdo, a State in which a number of difficult passes occur, and which is consequently the point of greatest strategic importance between the Chinese headquarters and Lhasa. The only Chinese troops reported by Mr King to be still in occupation of points to the west of this line, are the small garrisons at Chiamdo, Enta and Gartok in Markham. The withdrawal of these garrisons will doubtless present considerable difficulties but I regard it as of such importance that I should be willing to consider

any reasonable quid pro quo in order to secure the acquiescence of China in the inclusion of Chiamdo within autonomous Tibet.

6. The terms of these powers are as full and explicit as those conferred upon Lonchen Shatra himself for the present Conference. There appears to be strong internal evidence that the Treaty was actually signed and, in view of the fact that Dorjjeff claims in the preamble that he was acting with full powers, that Mr Korostovetz reports the communication of its terms to the Dalai Lama, that the Treaty came into force on the date of signature and that no specific provision was made for ratification, the Dalai Lama will probably find difficulty in repudiating its provisions, even should he desire to do so.

7. The new interests which have been acquired by Russia over a large tract of Eastern Asia have completely altered the *status quo* of Tibet since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention. New responsibilities have been forced upon us both as regards our Indian frontiers and our broader imperial interests, and I see no possibility of avoiding an even heavier responsibility in the future, unless we are in a position to watch events and to check adverse developments in their initial stages, by providing for a recognized British Representative at Lhasa, which is already a centre of foreign intrigue.

3. *Memorandum regarding the progress of negotiations from 25 December, 1913 to 30 April, 1914: excerpts*¹

1. I desired to leave no loophole to the Chinese for claiming that their representations had received insufficient consideration, and I accordingly instructed Mr Rose to call on Mr Chen on 9th March to explain the reasons which had prompted my statement of 17th February; and to add that I was unable to recede from my previous position, in view of the fact that no evidence of a substantial nature had been subsequently produced by Mr Chen or by his Government. His objections were dealt with carefully and in some detail, and he was informed that a meeting would be called on the 11th March.

2. My statement of the 17th February and the communication of

¹For the full text see Encl. 3, Proc. 36 in *Foreign*, May 1915, 36-50.

our draft Convention of the 11th March evidently stirred the Chinese to activity. I learned confidentially that Lu Hsing Chi, the Chinese Agent in Calcutta, had advised his Government that the internal situation in India made it impossible for us to force upon China any agreement which was distasteful to her, and he urged upon them a categorical refusal of our demands at Delhi and a direct appeal to His Majesty's Government. The authorities in Peking appear to have acted upon his advice, for the Chinese Minister in London approached the Foreign Office whilst their representative in Peking invoked the good offices of His Majesty's Minister on several occasions in the hope of obtaining better terms for China. It was explained in both capitals that we were endeavouring to provide an adjustment of the present difficulties which would recognize the legitimate interests of the three countries concerned, and that no intervention could be expected, whilst the Conference was sitting.

3. In spite of this warning Mr Chen convened a meeting of the Conference on 7th April, when he laid before us a document purporting to convey the final attitude of his Government. The river Salween was indicated as the boundary between Szechuan and Tibet and no mention was made of Giamda, but the document was so worded that it offered no hope of finality and no prospect of a settlement. At the close of the meeting I took the opportunity of a private interview with Mr Chen to summarize the course of our negotiations, and to impress upon him the difficulties that must always attend any settlement which would prove equitable to the three countries concerned, and the critical situation which was likely to be created by the action of his Government.

4. On the day before the proposed meeting Mr Chen called at the Foreign Office and stated that his Government was extremely anxious to secure a postponement if only for a few days. He was informed that such a request at so late an hour could not but place me in a very difficult position vis-a-vis my Tibetan Colleague, but he was so insistent in his request, that a postponement for one week—until 22nd April—was eventually conceded. He was warned however that the draft Convention and the map of the 17th February would then be laid upon the table to be initialled in full Conference and that, should he not be prepared to initial the draft, there would be no alternative but to withdraw the present proposals entirely. He asked if there was no concession which could be made to him, and a slight modification was indicated on the map in order

to meet the susceptibilities of the Chinese by the exclusion from Tibet of the Lake of Kokonor and the towns of Tachienlu and Atuntze.

5. The interview was mainly interesting however in that the issues raised by my Chinese Colleague were of little real importance: they appeared indeed to be solely inspired by a desire to secure a text which would be palatable to the Chinese and calculated to save their position in the eyes of the outer world.

6. I accordingly decided to withdraw the draft Convention, and it was removed from the table with as much ceremony as possible. This incident gave me an indication of the real situation. The tention had become very marked and when the documents were actually removed, the usually placid and inscrutable faces of my Colleagues showed for a moment the most intense astonishment and agitation. I waited for some time to give them an opportunity of initiating some suggestion but, finding no help from them, I decided upon a fiction of adjournment, as I was determined that the meeting should not be formally closed or its conclusive character changed. In making my announcement in regard to the adjournment I told my Colleagues that the withdrawal of the Convention would not be absolute until the meeting actually terminated, and I hoped they would endeavour to avoid the rupture which then appeared to be so imminent.

7. In the meanwhile, Mr Chen and his staff had been closeted with Mr Rose in a neighbouring room. It appeared that Mr Chen found himself in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, his Government, though fully informed of the conclusive nature of the meeting, had given him no indication of their willingness to accept our terms; on the other hand, he saw the possibility of losing the Chinese seat in the tripartite Conference and the danger of the conclusion of an agreement between Great Britain and Tibet alone. Mr Rose had communicated to him the results of my interview with the Lonchen, and had now left him with the doubly-initialled documents for a brief period of quiet consideration.

8. The disavowal by the Chinese Government of their Plenipotentiary's action in concluding an agreement is somewhat difficult to explain. I have reason to believe that the Chinese have obtained all that they really need, and even more than they expected, as a result of the Conference. I can only attribute their action to their proverbial inability to recognize finality in any issue, even though,

as in the present case, it has been under discussion for many years, from the date indeed of the signature of the Peking Adhesion Convention on the 27th April 1906, the eighth anniversary of which was celebrated by the initialling of the present Convention. I have endeavoured to meet the views of the Chinese in every possible way, to safeguard their prestige, to restore to them an honourable position in Tibet and an effective buffer state for the provinces of China proper. Any further territorial concessions would be unfair to Tibet, detrimental to ourselves and subversive of the fundamental principles underlying the Convention, which aims at securing a lasting peace in Tibet and on our frontiers.

9. After prolonged discussions between Mr Bell and my Tibetan colleague, the latter and I exchanged notes, dated the 24th and 25th March which have at last formulated upon a large scale map a clearly-defined frontier extending for some 850 miles along the North-East Frontier of India, from the Irrawaddy-Salween Divide on the east to Bhutan on the west. The conclusion of an agreement in regard to this vast tract of tribal country, and the acceptance by the Tibetans of a recognized boundary, will so lighten our responsibilities, and so materially strengthen our position, that I cannot but regard this definition of the Indo-Tibetan frontier as not the least important and valuable of the results which have been achieved by the work of the Conference.

4. *Memorandum regarding progress of negotiations from 1 May to 8 July, 1914: excerpts*¹

1. The confidence of the Chinese Plenipotentiary in Simla had been so shaken by the strictures of his Government in regard to his action in initialling the Convention on 27th April that it was regarded as useless to urge him to any further independent action. It was remembered, moreover, that the action of the Chinese Representative, who had ventured to meet the views of his British colleague when examining the Burma-China Frontier in 1905, had resulted in his dismissal and degradation; and that in consequence we had met with nothing but obstruction from every Chinese official who has since

¹For the full text see Encl. 4, Proc 36 in *Foreign*, May 1915, 36-50.

been stationed on that frontier. A recollection of this fact, now prompted a decision to invite the Peking Government to accept the direct responsibility for the signature of the Convention, and to instruct their Plenipotentiary accordingly.

2. I was somewhat uncertain however as to the exact intention of His Majesty's Government in regard to final action: on the one hand, I had been informed that a dual signature of the Convention with Tibet would be undesirable; and on the other hand, the last communication to the Chinese Government appeared to indicate that we were prepared to proceed to such a dual conclusion. There was no time for a further reference to London and I accordingly decided that, if the Chinese Plenipotentiary refused to co-operate at the last moment, I would not sign with Tibet but would initial the amended Convention and map in concert with my Tibetan colleague, at the same time covering the initialled document by a formal Declaration under which the terms of the Convention would become binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet. This decision was prompted by a realization that Article 10 of the text had been altered since the previous initialling on 27th April and that the document had possibly become invalidated in consequence. I believed that this procedure, however, would sufficiently safeguard our position. It would avoid a dual signature of the document drawn up on a tripartite basis, whilst at the same time the covering Declaration would assure to Great Britain and Tibet, and would preclude from China so long as she refused to sign, the privileges contemplated by the Convention.

3. It is with great regret that I leave India without having secured the formal adherence of the Chinese Government to a tripartite Agreement. Their views have been met with tireless patience for nine months, but they have confined themselves entirely to destructive criticism, and their attitude has shown no change since the convening of the Conference which sought to remedy the existing chaos in Tibet. The same obstruction, the same procrastination which made a settlement of the Tibetan problem impossible in Peking, has met us in India. When the Chinese Plenipotentiary initialled the Convention on 27th April, there can be no doubt that he did so with a feeling of great relief. He admitted that he had obtained more favourable terms than could reasonably have been expected in view of the actual position in Tibet and the complete collapse of Chinese power and prestige in the country. His Government however have

subsequently displayed their traditional dislike of finality and concluded agreements, and have repudiated his action. They must now either resort to ruinous military expenditure in the hope of retrieving their position by force of arms, or regain their lost privileges in Tibet by a late, and therefore somewhat ungracious, participation in the Treaty.

4. As far as our own position is concerned, an entirely satisfactory solution has been found in the agreement which I have been able to conclude with Tibet. By that agreement our frontiers are safeguarded and our political interests secured. It now remains only to take such practical steps as will convince the Chinese that we are determined to secure the fruits of our Agreement—peace and security upon our North-east Frontier—and a cessation of the unrest and bloodshed which have marked the history of the past three years in Tibet.

5. *Final memorandum: excerpts*¹

1. Up to the eve of our departure from Simla the Convention has been accepted only by the Tibetan Representative and myself and is, therefore, only in force between our two Governments. At the same time there appear to be so strong a probability that the Chinese will record their adherence in the near future that I shall discuss the Convention as a tripartite rather than a dual agreement.

2. No sooner had the Chinese forces arrived in Lhasa than it became evident that China was scarcely in search of those peaceful and neighbourly relations between India and China, which had been contemplated by His Majesty's Government when concluding the agreement of 1906. Our Treaty of 1904 was ignored, obstructions of every description were placed in the way of our Trade Agents and our frontier trade, and the peace of our North-East Frontier was seriously menaced by a series of Chinese aggressions along the whole of the border line from Bhutan to Upper Burma; whilst it became evident that a Chinese Tibet would involve incessant intrigues with the States of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

3. At the commencement of the year 1913 Tibet was in arms

¹For the full text see Encl. 5, Proc. 36 in *Foreign*, May 1915, 36-50.

against her neighbour and suzerain China; the Chinese Resident with his escort and troops had been driven from the country, and Tibet had declared its independence. China on her part was harrying the Tibetans in the March country, and endeavouring by intrigue and force of arms to re-establish her position.

4. It is sufficient to say that, in the month of March immediately preceding the assembling of the Conference, a draft Convention had been prepared in London as a basis for negotiation. This draft, however, had not contemplated the possibility of Tibetan participation in the discussion, and during the six months which intervened before the first meeting in Simla on a tripartite basis, it had become evident that the draft contemplated a more restricted area of Tibetan territory and a greater measure of Chinese control than the Tibetans could be induced to accept. My first task therefore was the preparation of a new draft which was telegraphically communicated to His Majesty's Government on 10th November 1913. In this draft I foreshadowed the appointment of a British Resident at Lhasa as some offset to the foreign influences which were actively at work in the Tibetan capital, and as a prop to the Government of the Dalai Lama which appeared to be somewhat lacking in stability and definite purpose.

5. My decision amounted in fact to the division of Tibet into two zones; the Outer zone, which included Lhasa, was to be autonomous; the Inner zone, though remaining an integral portion of Tibet, was to be subject to some degree of Chinese control. This proposal was approved by His Majesty's Government and on 11th March 1914—after five months of negotiation on side issues—I was eventually able to place upon the table a draft Convention. It was based upon my proposals of 10th November, but contained certain modifications which were considered desirable by His Majesty's Government, including the substitution of the right of our Agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa when necessary, in place of the original suggestion for a permanent Resident at the Tibetan capital.

6. At no time during the Conference indeed have any constructive suggestions been made from the Chinese side. They have confined themselves entirely to destructive criticism, showing no appreciation of the existing conditions in Tibet, and no desire to bring to an end the collisions in the March country which had been the direct cause of the convening of the Conference.

7. At the last moment our Chinese Colleague decided to act with

us and before the conclusion of the meeting he added his initial to the document also, rather than risk the conclusion of an agreement in which China would have no part. There can be no doubt that he realised that the terms obtained by China under the Convention, as thus initialled, were more favourable than could reasonably have been anticipated in view of the actual situation in Tibet. The suzerainty of China over the whole country was recognized, her prestige was secured, and legitimate interests in the border country were adequately safeguarded. I was somewhat surprised therefore when the Peking Government repudiated the action of their Plenipotentiary in accepting the Convention and in contravention of international usage declined to recognize in the act of initialling the definite conclusion of a Treaty between Britain, China and Tibet.

8. Their proposals indeed were so unreasonable, so utterly out of harmony with the actual condition existing in Tibet that for the third time^a His Majesty's Government was obliged to offer them the alternative of co-operation with us or of seeing the conclusion of an independent agreement with Tibet.

9. The Chinese attitude, however, has been obstructive and unreasonable throughout: they have maintained those extravagant territorial claims which ignored actual conditions in Tibet, which were rejected by us in Peking before the Conference was convened.

10. The Inner belt, which includes all the March country and is limitrophe with the Chinese provinces of Szechuan, Yunnan, Kansu and Chinese Turkistan, may be regarded as a buffer State for China; recognition is accorded to the right of the Chinese to re-establish such a measure of control within this Inner belt as will restore and safeguard their historic position, without in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as a geographical and political entity. The Outer Zone becomes autonomous under the direction of the Government at Lhasa, and the Chinese are precluded from introducing military forces, administrative officials or colonists into this portion of the country. The suzerain rights of China in Tibet are formally recognized, but in the Outer Zone they will extend only to the stationing of a Chinese official at Lhasa with a personal escort of 300 men, in place of an Amban with an unlimited military escort and those Chinese representatives at the Trade Marts who have proved in the past so effectual a hindrance to any satisfactory commercial relations.

11. The mutual relations between Tibet and ourselves have been

materially affected by the Convention in that it provides for (1) the freedom of direct negotiation; (2) the settlement of our mutual frontier; and (3) the freedom of commercial and industrial enterprise.

12. The settlement of our mutual frontier. I now come to the question of the frontier, as defined during the course of the Conference, and, whilst the future status of our neighbour Tibet has been the first political object of our negotiations, I believe that the delimitation of that line which forms the boundary between India and Tibet along some 850 miles of our North-Eastern Frontier will prove to be not the least valuable of the results which have been achieved by the Simla Conference.

13. In order to understand the full weight of the position it will be well to glance back at the position of this frontier in the year 1910. The provinces of Assam and Upper Burma were then separated from Tibet and China by a belt of wild tribal territory which was almost unknown to us geographically, but which had served for many years as a satisfactory buffer between us and our then peacefully dormant neighbours. The limit of our administered territory extended only to a loosely defined line some 25 miles to the north of Sadiya, and little was known or heard of the Abors, Mishmis, Miris and Kachins who occupied the difficult jungle-clad hills on our North-eastern border. These conditions were entirely satisfactory, and it had been the policy of the Government of India to abstain from any interference with the outlying tribes so long as our subjects were unmolested, and the valuable tea gardens of Assam, the numerous European lives and interests of the Assam belt, and the British lines of control in Upper Burma were free from molestation.

14. This policy of inaction however was rendered impossible by the activity of the Chinese. No sooner had the troops of Chao Erh-feng succeeded in reaching Lhasa, than a series of aggressions along our whole line of frontier convinced the Governments of Assam and Burma that we must be prepared to meet the forward policy of China by some immediate action, or incur responsibility and military expense which would rapidly involve the creation of a situation in the North-east of India similar to that which had grown up on the North-west frontier.

15. For the purpose of the present argument it will be sufficient to state that the entire tribal belt has been explored during the past three years by a systematic and costly series of military expeditions,

political missions and explorations by individual officers, and that their work has placed us in possession of such complete geographical knowledge as has enabled us to ascertain and define the frontier which will best accord with our political interests and reduce our responsibilities to a minimum.

16. In conjuncture with the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, I have sealed an agreement and map defining in detail a boundary between India and Tibet which stretches from Bhutan on the west for some 850 miles as far as the Irrawaddy-Salween Divide on the east. The mutual acceptance of this clearly-defined frontier line will now enable us to maintain our position with the minimum of expense and responsibility. It is hoped indeed in the light of past experience that, with the recognition of a definite frontier line, it may be possible to leave the tribes very largely to their own devices, intervening as little as possible in their internal affairs and confining ourselves to keeping open communications, whilst demanding only such an obedience and allegiance as will demonstrate our control and free the country from any danger of foreign absorption such as was evinced by the unfriendly acts of the Chinese in the course of their progressive Tibetan policy in 1910.

17. I come now to new routes which the Indo-Tibetan frontier settlement now opens to trade. The shortest road between India and Lhasa is that from Odalguri and Tawang. This road once formed a natural artery of traffic, and along it large quantities of gold then found their way to India. Its usefulness has been crippled however in recent years by the exactions of the Tawang monastery, and the raids of the Loba tribes in its vicinity. The pacification of the tribes, and the lamas of Tawang, should materially assist the development of this route, and I trust that the creation of a new political district in this section of the frontier, and the presence of a British officer, will safeguard the trade from the severe handicaps under which it has laboured in the past.

18. Tawang District. In defining the new Indo-Tibet boundary the wedge of country to the east of Bhutan, which is known as Tawang has been included in British territory. This secures to us a natural watershed frontier, access to the shortest trade route into Tibet, and control of the monastery of Tawang, which has blocked the trade by this route in the past by undue exaction and oppression. The future welfare of this section of the frontier will depend very largely on the steps which are taken at the outset to put the new

district on a satisfactory basis.

19. The treatment of the monastery and the surrounding country will require great care and tact in order to avoid friction with the Tibetan Government, and in order to open the road and prevent raids from the neighbouring tribes without undue interference with the vested interests of the monastery. I would prefer for the present to withhold any detailed suggestions in regard to the treatment of this tract, and would only recommend that a British officer with experience of administration in tribal country be directed to proceed to Tawang for a period, with a good native assistant of Tibetan experience and a native medical attendant, and that the settlement of the future administration of Tawang be decided after he has had an opportunity of thoroughly investigating the local conditions.

20. It has often been doubted in the past whether the barren uplands of Tibet were worthy of the consideration of the great powers on their borders, so long as they remained dormant and impenetrable, we were well content to leave them to work out their own destiny. History has proved, however, that a political vacuum is impossible in nature, and the realization of this truth has been forced upon us in regard to Tibet, until we have been compelled at last to take a personal interest in its fate.

21. The living forces in Asia grow ever more restless, the conflicting interests ever more strong, and we have learnt by experience that, if we would secure our Imperial Asiatic interests, we must take part in the process of political evolution, not by importunities and aggressions, but by strengthening the weaker units on our borders and by using our imperial influence to stimulate and help them to a national consciousness.

XV

Louis King in East Tibet: excerpts from reports¹

No. 2.

Tachienlu,
November 3, 1913

Yin^a is a capable man who has however never taken his position here seriously. From the first he has had his eye on the Governorship of Szechuan, the post which he vacated to carry a Szechuan army to Lhasa. He thought at that time that he would return with enhanced prestige and resume his position as Governor. He had however in his brief tenure of that office shown a disposition to make light of the authority of the Central Government, notably in the course of the anti-foreign loan agitation.

His substitute, Hu Ching-i, proved a willing servant of the Peking Government, and was recently given the substantive post of Governor of Szechuan, Yin being made Administrator of the Marches. The latter was ordered to confine his activities to the March region. The humdrum and never-ending task of pacifying turbulent tribesmen is however one that does not appeal to him. He hopes no doubt that he will be able to persuade Yuan Shih-kai to reinstate him in his old office.

Yin has handed over to Yen T'an, the Intendant of the Eastern March region, who will be Acting Administrator of the Marches until Yin returns or a new officer is appointed. I understand that General Ku of Batang is on his way here to take command, under Yen, of the Chinese forces in the Marches. Yen is an official of the old school, having held office for some years under the Manchu regime. He is said to have little or no influence with the troops; Ku however has shown himself an officer of ability and determination.

Yin's departure does not indicate, in my opinion, any abatement of China's military activity in the Marches.

It would appear that the President is interesting himself actively in the re-establishment of China's control of these regions. In August he sent up tls.^b 200,000 to Chungking for the Administrator, but this sum did not reach its destination, being either secured by the rebel

¹*IOR*, L/P & S/10/150.

General Hsiung, or deflected to pay the Kueichou General Huang's expenses back to Kiueyang.

Hampered by lack of money and supplies, the troops here are merely marking time, while Peking is urging the speedy re-subjugation of the whole March region.

No. 3.

Tachienlu,
November 5, 1913

1. The duties of the commissary consisted in arranging for the transport of supplies to the Imperial Resident and troops at Lhasa; in the forwarding of despatches and the provision of transport facilities for official travellers. He was in no way concerned with the administration of the country. The native chiefs and overlords administered their own affairs and were responsible to the commissary only for the due supply of transport facilities. On these terms China offered to the chiefs actual independence under a nominal sovereignty; and by their acceptance the latter secured to themselves absolute autonomy, and protection from all interference on the part of Lhasa.

The action taken by the Indian Government in 1903 to 1904 would appear to have caused China to contemplate the possibility of a British protectorate over Tibet, and steps were at once taken to earmark as much territory on the western border of Szechuan as possible.

2. The first step Chao took was to secure the absolute control of the roads. The routes in the March region are few and are of immense strategic importance. They form the only means of inter-communication between the various tribal districts, and along them is carried the tribesmen's necessities of life. None of these districts are self-supporting; buttered tea is, with tsamba, the staple diet of the people and all the tea is imported, and paid for by the export of musk, gold-dust, skins and deer-horns. As he swept along these routes Chao placed strong garrisons at all the strategic points. The tribesmen were as powerless then as now to oppose the advance along these roads of any appreciable Chinese force. Nor does the road lend itself easily to permanent destruction; it can be blocked at places by felling trees across it, but the Chinese have found little difficulty in removing such obstructions.

It is this power of moving troops along the roads that has enabled China to send forces to Lali and Chang Ta, Zayul and Pome, and to base thereon extravagant claims regarding the location of the western frontier of the Marches. It would appear that the Tibetans are now awake to the necessity of holding their roads in strong force, for there is a Tibetan army at Shuo-pan-to, which for the moment effectually blocks any Chinese advance west of En-Ta.

3. The Chinese force sent to Chiangta would appear to have merely augmented the commissary's bodyguard; the latter made no attempt to assume administrative power. The Banner country was never entered by Chinese troops or officials. With these two exceptions, Chinese officials with nominal administrative powers were set up at all the places named. At all places east of the Mekong, except Chamuto, the officials put in were the regular Chinese civil magistrates (Fu, Chou, Hsien and Ting). At Chamuto the commissary was given administrative authority. At the places west of the Mekong the official was merely the commandant of the local garrison.

On the face of it Chao's campaigns would appear to have been crowned with remarkable success. He imposed on the whole country an administration akin on the surface to that of the ordinary Chinese province.

4. Throughout his campaigns Chao showed a remarkable insight into the political conditions obtaining in the Marches. He thoroughly understood the tribesmen's attitude. He kept a close hold over his officials, and maintained the strictest discipline amongst his troops. And when military action was necessary he acted with great promptitude and decision. Had it not been for the lamas, Chao's work would undoubtedly have met with lasting success.

5. At the time the Warden left the Marches for good the position was as follows:

No alteration had occurred in the administration of the March region except that taxes were paid to Chinese officials instead of to the chiefs. The tribesmen were contented with a change that left them as much as ever to their own devices. The magistrates were exercising the greatest tact and were refraining from all interference with the people. Across the border were thousands of dispossessed lamas waiting for an opportunity to regain their own. And finally the Chinese troops in the Marches were becoming openly rebellious; they had been long disaffected, but

had been kept in hand with a ruthless severity; two mutinies on a large scale had occurred, one at Lamaya in 1908 and the other at Hsiang Ch'eng in 1910; on each occasion the mutineers had been wiped out.

6. I am of opinion that the establishment of the province of Hsi K'ang is a move on China's part to secure as large a buffer territory as possible on her western frontier in case of some such eventuality as a foreign protectorate over Tibet. China no doubt hopes that the western boundary of this new administrative area will be accepted as the frontier of China and Tibet. When that is done she will withdraw to a large extent and leave the management of this difficult country to the tribesmen, their chiefs and their lamas. The various chiefs are said here to have been recently informed that they will be re-instated in due course.

No. 24.

Tachienlu,
February 2, 1914

From these figures it would appear that the annual revenues amount to some tls. 330,000 made up of tls. 200,000 from ordinary taxation and tls. 130,000 from the Tachienlu likin office. There are at the moment twenty-two magistrates in office, excluding the Lu Ting Hsien official but including the newly created Tan Pa Hsien magistrate. Each of these officials has four to eight clerks, and several pao-cheng in his pay, as well as a body-guard of 30 men, who have to be paid, fed and clothed. Unlike their fellows in China proper, the magistrates in the Marches depend entirely on a supply of funds from the Administration, their position being too precarious to allow of 'squeezing'. This works in two ways: the magistrates have to be supplied with funds, and the Administrator, deprived of the usual perquisites from his subordinates, is compelled to look elsewhere for his personal profits, and finds them in the only independent source of revenue—the likin collectorate.

No. 25.

Tachienlu,
February 3, 1914

I have it on good authority that in one of the President's tele-

grams on the subject of Yin's dismissal there occurs a remark to the effect that that official's dilatoriness at a most critical period in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations has done irreparable harm to China's position in Tibet. This can only mean that if Yin had recovered all that part of the frontier which lies west of the Mekong before Great Britain intervened, China's position at the Conference would have been immensely strengthened. Unfortunately for China Yin's energies were first to last directed to regaining his position at Chengtu instead of to re-establishing China's authority over the Tibetans. It would be safe to surmise that a very large portion of the two million taels found its way into the coffers of his political party at Chengtu.

*From Tachienlu to Kantzu: Excerpts from
Louis King's report¹*

Thus it can be seen that little change has occurred in the actual administration of these tribal districts beyond the substitution of the magistrate for the t'ussu.

The various reforms initiated by Chao Erh-feng have all fallen into desuetude. Chao's schools are attended by Chinese and half-breeds only; the mass of the tribesmen are without education, while a small minority send their children to the lamasery for such instruction as is to be had there. The Chinese laws forbidding polyandry and other native practices—notably concerning the disposal of the dead—are ignored. The tribesmen have not adopted the Chinese calendar nor the Chinese designations of the various places. Nor have they taken the least notice of the proclamation calling upon them to take Chinese surnames. In no way have they responded to the efforts of the Chinese to impose Chinese laws and customs and language on them, and the magistrates have not felt themselves strong enough to attempt coercion.

Left to govern themselves the people are more than content with the Chinese supremacy, which is less onerous and less erratic than was the former t'ussu administration. The magistrates are content to see the pao-cheng and ts'un-chang manage the country, provided the taxes are paid, that ula is promptly forthcoming and comparative law and order maintained.

¹Encl. in Louis King to Jordan, January 18, 1914, in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/150.

Revenues of March Districts¹

This list of Hsien corresponds to that given in my despatch No. 3. Amounts are in taels.

K'ang Ting Hsien	10,000 and likin 130,000.	Ya Chiang Hsien	1,749
Lu Ting Hsien	Only recently incorporated into Marches.	Huai Jou	10,837
		Lu Ho	9,612
Tao Fu Hsien	6,300	Kantzu	14,228
Shih Ch'u.	13,878	T'ung P'u	8,762
T'eng K'o	11,918	Kung	3,567
Te Hua	9,372	Ch'a Ya	10,876
Pai Yu	8,896	Ning Ching	9,231
Pa An	18,500	Wu Ch'eng	1,241
I Tun	2,998	Yen Chieng	9,497 (1910)
Li Hua	11,508	En Ta	No revenues
T'ao Ch'eng	12,078	She Tu	Ditto.
Ting Hsiang	15,662 (1910)	Chia Li	Ditto.
Kung Ke	No figures available.	T'ai Chao	Ditto.
Te Jung	3,486 (1910)	K'o Mai	3,689 (1910)
Ch'ang Tu	14,080	Tsa Yuu	3,231 (1910)

¹Encl. in Louis King to Jordan, 22 January 1914, in *IOR, L/P&S/10/150*.

XVI

1. *Excerpts from the covering note regarding 'History of the Creation of Hsi-Kang Province' by General Fu Sung-mu, followed by excerpts from the book¹*

1. General Fu Sung-mu has set himself the task of defining the area of the province of Kham, which he describes as the territory lying between the Kokonor district of Sining on the north and the town of Wei-hsi in Yunnan, whilst it stretches from Tachienlu on the east to the Tanta Range on the west, a territory considerably larger than Szechuan, and, indeed, equal in size to the remaining area of anterior and ulterior Tibet.

2. In about the year 1730 the Chinese succeeded in establishing a post road through Kham and on to Lhasa, with a line of courier stations and a number of commissary officers who exercised, however, no administrative functions, and whose jurisdiction extended only to their Chinese subjects. The natives have remained throughout under the sole control of their own officials, the sway of the princes being closely bound up with the spiritual power of the great lamaseries. Any control which may have been exercised either by Lhasa or Peking in the eighteenth century has certainly been largely modified in the course of the last fifty years, and the congeries of little states forming the territory of Kham has been for all practical purposes independent of any suzerain power.

3. There seems little doubt that Chao Erh-feng was mainly concerned with the formation of a buffer State between Western China and the zone of British activity; that his real energies were directed to the strengthening of the frontiers and the extension of Chinese Administration as far west as the col of Tanta, and as far south as the Indian border; that the Zayul Valley was to have been included in Kham; and that he was determined to secure a strong political position at Lhasa, as the simplest and surest method of controlling the fortunes of the country through the agency of the Lama Church.

4. At the same time the reacceptance of the Ching-ning Range i.e. immediately to the west of Batang as a frontier would leave at least three difficult passes in the hands of the Tibetans between

¹Jordan to Grey, April 2, 1913, *IOR*, L/P&S/10/150.

Lhasa and the Chinese border, and would probably prove the most satisfactory boundary which could be recognized by His Majesty's Government as the limit of Chinese expansion towards Tibet.

5. An interesting light is thrown by the author on the position of the Amban, and we learn incidentally that his bodyguard was officially recognized as consisting of only 200 men.

2. *From the 'History of the Creation of Hsi-Kang Province', by General Fu Sung-mu*

1. Thus we have Kham, Anterior Tibet, and Ulterior Tibet: Wei* is now lost; Tibet has concluded a treaty with the British, only Kham remains in its integrity. Tibet might represent the hair, as regards Szechuan and Yunnan. If Tibet be the outer fence, Kham is the house door. This being the case, the Government of China and the people of Szechuan and Yunnan can assuredly not afford to ignore Tibet; Kham, however, is of incomparably more importance to them.

2. In the year 1906 the Government realized the need of exploiting this territory and created the office of Boundary Commissioner, who was to fix his residence in the central locality of Batang and thus became Resident of Kham. The Government blundered in not giving him this title of Resident of Kham: instead he was styled commissioner for Szechuan and Yunnan boundary affairs owing to the proximity of Kham to these provinces.

The genesis of this blunder was in the preceding year, 1905, when Hsi Liang, Viceroy of Szechuan asked the Throne to sanction Chao Erh-feng proceeding to Batang in charge of military affairs. Instead of referring to 'military affairs of Western Kham', he spoke of 'military affairs on the Tachienlu Marches'. Thus this double blunder has induced ignorant persons to persist in including Kham in Tibet. The vast area of Kham has come perilously near to disappearance as a separate entity, so that the error in the title has been fraught with far-reaching consequences. How so? Because the Thibetans, under the influence of foreign agitation, have long meant to seize this pretext for incorporating the Kham territory. In the autumn of 1908

*Translator's Note. According to the author Wei is the Darjeeling region, not Lhasa as in *Mayers*.^a

the Thibetans asked the then Resident at Lhasa, Lien Yu, to forward a memorial to Peking which wantonly claimed that Thibetan territory extended up to Ch'uing Chou in Szechuan. Lien Yu, in conjunction with the Boundary Commissioner, Chao Erh-feng, and the Viceroy of Szechuan, Chao Erh-hsun, forwarded the text of the Thibetan memorial to the Government, and expatiated upon the treasonable designs harboured by the Thibetans.

3. Formerly, the Government authority in Thibet was vested in the Resident: to-day the Thibetans are practically independent. If political authority is restored to the Dalai, the position in Tibet will be one of danger. In that event Kham will not be a whit better off than Thibet, and the sequel to the Anglo-Thibetan treaty may well be an Anglo-Kham Treaty following hard upon it, unless Kham be separated from Thibet. How then can there be any question about the necessity of prompt action?

4. Yet we Chinese are blind to what every foreigner knows, so much so that Chinese travellers in Kham and Thibet call the Ching-ning Range the boundary. Are they not aware that this range is the boundary between Batang and Kiangchia, the latter place having been presented by the Manchus to the Thibetans? Chiamdo and Basu are not Thibetan territory though on the other side of Kiangchia. Hence the Ching-ning Range cannot possibly be the boundary, as must be obvious to the veriest simpleton, if he did not ignore the facts. If the Manchus presented land to the Thibetans, it was in consequence of the superstitious devotion to Buddhism on the part of officials, who would ask the Throne to present Chinese territory to the Dalai so as to win momentary favour whilst oblivious of later woe. Perusal of memorials and decrees under Kang-hsi and Chien-lung inspire one with bitter regrets.

5. Szechuan is surrounded by provinces on every hand except the west: they act as an outlying defence, only towards Thibet is there danger. It was to provide against this that Residents were appointed in Thibet, though 6,000 li. away, as well as a secretary for dealing with the barbarian races. Salaries were furnished by Szechuan and Szechuan maintained the postal service. The commissariat officials throughout Thibet, the magistrate at Ching-hsi, the military officers, sergeants, corporals, and privates, were provided and paid by Szechuan. As Thibet is so intimately connected with the province, the latter naturally has a special responsibility in its regard; frequently, however, excessive distance apart caused lack

of co-ordination and communications became interrupted.

6. Thus the position of Szechuan vis-a-vis Thibet was one of perpetual danger. The operations of 1905 and 1906, in suppressing rebellions at Batang and Litang, proved conclusively that the only way to secure the safety of Szechuan and to provide reinforcements for Thibet was to have ample commissariat supplies and an efficient force in Kham. The post of Boundary Commissioner was accordingly created for the purpose of reclaiming waste lands and settling them with troops. These two points were specially emphasized in the decree of 1906, appointing the Commissioner.

7. In the spring of 1909 Chao Erh-feng asked and obtained the sanction of the Throne to cancel his appointment as Resident in Thibet and to occupy himself exclusively with frontier affairs. Lien Yu then handed over the Chiamdo region to Chao's charge.

8. Owing to the uncertainty of the position in Thibet, Chao's request to introduce Chinese administration in Chiamdo and Jaya was not considered for the time being. Despite this refusal, Chao visited Jaya and ordered the hutuktu to reform his methods of taxation and to abandon extortionate practices, much to the delight of the tribes, who urged him to place Chinese officials in charge of the administration of justice.

9. For Viceroy Chao:

I am much obliged to you for sending a ying to Thibet. The Bomed (Pomed) savages are most formidable, and Chung Ying has had to retreat to Gongbu. Please instruct General Fu to despatch an extra ying with all possible haste via Shobando to save the situation.

For Commissioner Chao Erh-feng:

Doubtless you have acceded to my request to send a ying from your frontier force to co-operate in attacking Bomed. I have ordered Secretary Lo to proceed to Bomed, and the troops from Thibet have also started for the region. Please arrange with General Fu for sending another ying. This renewed importunity is necessary owing to the danger of the whole situation becoming jeopardized by the slightest neglect which might intensify the difficulty. I cannot explain the conditions of the tribes, and can read my meaning. Pray accede to my prayer.

28th day.

LIEN YU.

10. To the Cabinet:

Lien Yu has telegraphed us for troops. Owing to the difficulties of

the country and to the fact that the Thibetan troops have already been beaten back, we feel that two ying are insufficient for the expedition. We, therefore, propose to send a battalion of the Kham expeditionary force to advance from Shobando in conjunction with the ying already despatched from the new army. We are also holding reserves at Chiamdo and are sending another ying via Chawa-kang, so as to cut their connections. Feng Shan will proceed to Shobando, while it was my (Chao Erh-feng's) intention to notify the tribes at Chamdui of your Majesty's generous feelings before returning to Szechuan. Owing to the danger of the Thibetan situation imperilling the frontier, I shall now slightly delay my return to Szechuan until Fu Sung-mu has completed the arrangements.

Chamdui, Hsuan T'ung, 3.6.3
(June 28, 1911).

CHAO ERH-FENG and
FU SUNG-MU.

11. On the appointment of Chao Erh-feng as acting Viceroy of Szechuan, he took over nine more native chiefdoms on his return to the province, and the few tribes still remaining, and the savages who had not yet tendered submission, were dealt with successfully by myself after Chao's departure. There still remains ten or more places where officials have been appointed, but prefectures and districts have not yet been formed. Thus, despite the fact that provincial administration does exist in many places, the fact that an imperial commissioner is naturally of the nature of a sojourner passing from point to point renders the timely creation of a properly constituted province essential, so that the administration may be extended and the marches made secure.

12. This March region was formerly known as Kham, and as it lies to the west of Szechuan I would propose the name 'Western Kham' for the province, which, once duly created, would be a screen for Szechuan and Yunnan and a foundation parapet for Thibet. I would not venture to suggest so far reaching a change, were it not for the fact that Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, when President of the Ministry of Posts and Communications, submitted a memorial asking that this frontier region should be converted into a province in the interests of the situation in the west.

13. Now the March region is Kham; Kham was formerly quite distinct from Tibet, and the original boundary between the two should be restored. The creation of Kham as a province will thus secure territorial annexation as well as supplying a distinguishing

name.

14. This March region extends from Tachienlu to the Danda Range and from Hsining in the north to Wei-hsi in Yunnan, comprising an area of 4,000 li in length by 3,000 li in breadth. Eighty to ninety departments and districts should therefore be established, but without a central administrative organization arrangements will miscarry and future trouble will be engendered. The Viceroy of Szechuan is separated by too remote a distance to be in a position for exercising efficient control, and, should rebellion break out, we should find repeated instances of waste of Government funds and ostentatious, but ineffectual display.

15. As Mencius says, the savages have been converted into Chinese. To-day, mighty cities of China were once the haunt of barbarians, even as the tribes of Kham before their acquisition of Chinese citizenship. On the creation of a province out of Kham, it too becomes part of the 'glorious empire', and in its turn Kham has savage tribes on its frontier. The tribes of Olosoda on the north have now tendered allegiance, but beyond them are the communities under native chiefs near Kokonor; on the south-west are the savages beyond Zayul, which adjoin British territory. These regions, as well as Thibet, become henceforth the frontier of Kham, and are strategically of vital importance. Let us see to it that we defend them with due vigour.

16. In 1909, 2,000 Szechuan troops were stationed in Thibet and were hindered from advancing by the Thibetans. A decree then ordered Chao Erh-feng to chastise the hostile natives and to take over as Chinese territory Kangchia, Sangang, Zayul, Leiwuchi, Lolungjong, Pienba. In February 1910 Chao's force safely reached Kangda, and Chao asked that this place should be constituted the frontier between Kham and Thibet.

17. Between Thibet and Szechuan lies Kham, which holds in bold embrace the upper region of the Yang-tsze and presses on the throat and neck of Yunnan and Szechuan. More complete knowledge of this country has long been desired by patriots anxious for the safety of the Marches, for the Kham of today differs from that of centuries ago. Its area has widened, it is situated on an important highway, and it is largely inhabited by Chinese. Its history has passed through many vicissitudes, which began with the first appointment of Chinese officials; once more, conditions changed when foreigners cast covetous eyes upon the region. A new heaven and a new earth

were created when this dominion was incorporated in China Proper; a new policy becomes necessary to deal with a changed situation. What wonder, then, if existing authorities fail to dwell on questions vitally affecting the Marches of today? We have waited long for the historian of Kham!

18. The author of this volume, General Fu, comes of an old martial stock: second Ma Yuan, he will spend a day on horseback chasing rebels and dismount to indite a brilliant despatch. None knows this March land so well as he. During the past autumn I have had the privilege of discussing our frontier policy with him, and he expatiated in most convincing detail on what he conceived to be its main lines. I accordingly urged him to write this narrative in the interests of national defence and as a guide for us in Szechuan when dealing with this frontier question. He complied with my request, and speedily compiled the foregoing narrative, which I now hand to the printer.

XVII

The Simla Conference

1. *Selections from Jordan's Private Papers, 1910-11*¹

1. *Jordan to Grey, 11 January, 1910*

The activity which China has recently shown all along her extensive frontier line is a significant feature of the present situation. The Russian Minister tells me that every inch of debatable territory between Siberia and Chinese possessions in Mongolia and Tibet is being hotly contested, and we are experiencing the effects of Chinese attempts at expansion on the border regions of Tibet. In this respect we have been very fortunate in carrying through the expedition to the unadministered regions in the north of Burmah at a moment when the whole attention of the Government here was concentrated on the proceedings of the National Assembly.

2. *Jordan to Campbell, 19 January, 1911*

The Pienma (Burmah-Yunnan) question is one where we can apply the big stick and I hope you will use it with judicious effect. We are *beati possidentes* and that is better than any amount of argument. . . . It is a satisfaction, in view of China's attitude towards Nepal and Bhutan, to find that we have forestalled her activity on at least one portion of the frontier.

3. *Jordan to Alston, 14 February, 1911*

What a pity Hertz left Pienma and allowed the Chinese to step in. It was the objective of the expedition and ought not to have been evacuated until we had forced the Chinese to enter into negotiations on our basis. The Chinese would never have ventured to challenge our occupation.

4. *Jordan to Campbell, 6 April, 1911*

Our troops have withdrawn beyond the extreme limits of the territory claimed by the Chinese and that in itself means in Chinese eyes the abandonment of our claims to the regions in dispute. It will be of little use my telling the Chinese that we may return there. . . .

¹*Private correspondence between Sir John Newell Jordan and the British Foreign Office, PRO, FO/350.*

The country may not be worth a row of pines or the loss of the few mules which the Government of India view with apprehension, but why did we not discover this any time during the last five or six years and avoid the necessity for a movement which must react seriously upon our whole relations with China.

You may think that I am unduly pessimistic, but I really do not see how on the morrow of such an incident, we can expect China to agree to any basis for a frontier.

5. *Jordan to Campbell, 26 April, 1911*

Why we should not give whatever is necessary to settle it (Pienma)? . . . I feel sure you will realize the difficulties of the men on the spot who have to think not merely of this question but of the effect it will have on other matters all round. The telegrams from Yunnan show recrudescence of Chinese authority since the Pienma incident and Rose,^a who is an excellent man, is having a hard time of it with the Taotai, who is one of the prominent exponents of the forward frontier policy and a protege of the brothers Chao.^b

I confess that I find it hard to turn the corner in this question. For nearly five years I have told the Wai-waou Pu over and over again that we should insist upon the watershed frontier and in doing so I was acting under the firm conviction that I was merely carrying out my mandate.

Now a change of stance. . . . It is far easier for a man in my position to follow the line of least resistance and make concessions to the Chinese, but British interests are (not) advanced by a *volte face* of this kind.

We have established our House of Lords (Grand Council, etc.) and started a new stable with the old horses. As one of the Ministers put it to me, the shop sign has been changed, but the members of the firm are the same as before.

6. *Jordan to Campbell, 4 August, 1911*

I fully agree with what you say in your letter of the 15th July about what our policy should be on the Indian frontier, but I am not sure that we have not, to some extent, lost the opportunity of enforcing such a policy without considerable risk. At any rate Chinese activities and Chinese press agitation are becoming serious factors and the Pienma incident has encouraged the chauvinistic feelings. These rival expeditions to the Abor country may possibly bring matters to a crisis. I certainly hold with you that actual

administration is likely to produce far better results than expeditions but India will probably object to the cost. Whatever we do let us decide beforehand to go through with it.

By the way I think Rose who did admirably at Teng-yueh deserves some recognition at the hands of the Government of India who have repeatedly recognized his exceptional services. He was at a lonely post in a very trying time and acquitted himself right well. I feel sure that the Viceroy and the Government of Burmah would endorse my opinion that he thoroughly earned a C I E and it would be a great encouragement to find that work of this kind was appreciated.

7. Jordan to Campbell, 20 August, 1911

I am immensely pleased with the recent appointments in Yunnan and hope you will accept them as evicence of a more friendly spirit on the part of the Chinese. It is a decided gain to have a man like Ivan Chen on the frontier.

8. Jordan to Alston, 31 August, 1911

I have no doubt that when Hao Erh-chien and Ivan Chen get settled in Yunnan a serious effort will be made to settle the boundary question, but it is becoming a big affair involving not merely the frontier between Northern Yunnan and Burmah but between Tibet and Assam in regions which are amongst the most unknown in the world. However with steady patience and perseverance we will get there in time.

9. Jordan to Campbell, 5 September, 1911

I advised him (Ivan Chen) to go by way of Rangoon. . . . But in the interests of a friendly settlement I urged him strongly to see if he could not induce the W W P to agree upon a basis of a frontier before he left. Otherwise his presence at Teng-yueh would not advance a settlement and the question would drag on indefinitely. We had all the materials in Peking for arriving at a preliminary settlement, and that point settled, a Delimitation Commission might be expected to do the rest. He quite agreed that the method of procedure would facilitate his task and promised to submit the suggestion to the W W P,^a although he was not sanguine about their accepting it.

10. *Jordan to Campbell, 22 September, 1911*

My views of frontier matters are in such complete agreement with your own that there is little to say. Lack of proper intelligence and the exaggerated importance attached to China as a military power appear to have had a good deal to do with the Pienma fiasco. . . . This Szechuan affair ought to do something to explode the earlier idea. The spectacle of Chao Erh-feng, the hero of the Tibetan campaign, being besieged for days in his own Yamen by a rabble of yokels should convince our military experts that China's modern drilled army is not to be taken at its face.

11. *Jordan to Campbell, 10 November, 1911*

Prince Ching assured me that there would be no massacre. His sole hope lay in the early arrival of Yuan.^a He said he had written him several letters with his own hand imploring him to save the Empire but admitted that Yuan showed great reluctance to come and that it was now very doubtful whether even his influence would have much effect. He said that Yuan's dismissal three years ago was the work of the Prince Regent and that his advice given after the event, was disregarded. He gave me to understand that the Court had made no preparations for the flight.

12. *Jordan to Campbell, 17 November, 1911*

It was strange that not a single member of the ruling class went to the station to meet the man whom the court had for weeks past been imploring to come and save them. The Manchus can stoop to a good deal of humiliation in the shape of paper decrees, but their acts do not correspond with their professions and the country knows it.

The impression I gathered from a long talk (with Yuan) in which we were quite alone, was that Yuan will watch events and do whatever the country requires him to do. He may champion the Manchu cause for a time but his advocacy must be rather lukewarm at the best.

13. *Jordan to Campbell, 19 November, 1911*

I must say that the prospect of the Chinese Republic frightens me as likely to lead to endless friction and internal dissensions.

14. *Jordan to Campbell, 27 November, 1911*

But I don't believe he (Yuan) has any real intention of effacing himself, and in the end he will probably keep to the winning side if he does not fall between the two stools in the meantime. We talked glibly of the 'national will' but nobody knows what the country really wants nor does it know itself. Confusion reigns supreme from Canton to Peking and from Manchuria to the confines of India.

15. *Jordan to Campbell, 4 December, 1911*

The idea of Foreign Representatives here, who cannot even agree upon a simple question like the Whampoa conservancy, trying to arrange the affairs of China, is too appalling to contemplate.

2. *Selections from Jordan's Private Papers, 1913-14¹*1. *Jordan to Langley, 30 November, 1913*

In this connection I should like to add that I entirely agree with Alston and the Indian Government that Bruce should be eliminated from the negotiations. Aglen assured me that Bruce had gone there merely to look into the Customs accounts and that he would not stay more than a few days, instead of which he has remained for months. But apart from this, since 1893 when Sir Robert Hart sent his brother to India, the Customs interference in the Tibetan question has only caused misunderstandings and the modern educated Chinese are quite capable of looking after themselves.

2. *Jordan to Langley, 29 December, 1913*

We had a visit from Yin 'Tutu',^a the hero of the Tibetan campaign, a few days ago. He struck me as the worst specimen of new China I have come across and the impression was confirmed by his boasting that he had shot Chao Erh-feng with his own hands.

Speaking of Tibet, I doubt if the terms 'Outer' and 'Inner' Tibet, invented by India, will appeal to the Chinese. They rest on no recognized geographical boundaries as was the case with India.^b

3. *Jordan to Langley, 8 February, 1914*

Yuan Shih-kai has thrown off the mask and is attempting to govern China very much on the British Crown Colony system. . . .

¹ *Private correspondence between Sir John Newell Jordan and the British Foreign Office, PRO, FO/350.*

He will worship Heaven and do the other duties proper to an Emperor, but there seems no reason why he should seek the throne when he has all the power that any occupant of it could wish for. He is President of the Republic that exists purely in name and owes his election to a National Assembly which has ceased to exist and cannot elect a successor.

4. *Jordan to Langley, 23 February, 1914*

For the last month or so I have been holding aloof from the President and speaking very strongly to his Ministers about their profuse professions. This has had the desired effect, for today Yuan Shih-kai sent the Master of Ceremonies to say that he wanted to have a private talk with me. This may not produce much, but it shows that they feel the necessity of propitiating us. Unfortunately our entanglements^a curtail our freedom of action at many points. We could have the Peking-Jehol and other lines at any moment if we were free to take them.

5. *Jordan to Langley, 8 March, 1914*

What we really seem to want is an industrial combination which will appeal to the Chinese as the Banque Industrielle does now and as the Sino-Japanese one being organised is intended to do....The Americans followed the same principle in their oil concession and we cannot accept success on the old line of exclusively British concessions....Our people are slow to adopt new methods...As it is, the auction of China is going on apace and all the best of lots will soon have been sold...

To him (President Yuan Shih-kai) and to every member of the Government, I have said that whatever they may do elsewhere, we claim a right to examine these doings in the Yangtse valley. I am afraid, to be candid, that I have used much stronger language at times, and it has apparently made some impression. But they are giving things away with both hands and with an irresponsible recklessness which brooks no control.

6. *Jordan to Langley, 6 April, 1914*

Tibet: The Chinese have been worrying me a good deal about the Tibet negotiations and my position has been rather a delicate one. I have told the President quite frankly that his whole Tibetan policy seems to me to be a great mistake and that Chinese energy would

be far better employed on consolidating their position at home than in pursuing barren conquests in the wilds of Tibet. I have even reminded him of his own experience in Corea and of the disasters which a similar policy of attempting to enforce shadowy claims brought upon China in the past. But he is largely in the hands of youngmen who run the Tibetan policy of the Government and look upon the abandonment of Chao Erh-feng's pseudo-conquests as a national disgrace.

7. Jordan to Langley, 4 May, 1914

I have kept clear of Yuan Shih-kai lately on account of the Tibetan question in which he is anxious to get my support and in which I am equally anxious to stand aloof. It was clear to me from the outset that tripartite negotiations in India afforded the only hope of a solution and McMahon seems to me to have handled the question with great ability and skill. It would be folly to transfer the negotiations to London or Peking in either of which places they could not fail to be hampered by influences and considerations which are entirely absent in Delhi. The only point on which I should be inclined to make any concession, and then only to avoid an actual rupture, would be inclusion of the southern portion of Kokonor in China. It is a barren, uninhabitable waste, and the proposal would, I understand, involve no objections from a Military point of view. It might help to facilitate matters in the Yangtse region where we must be prepared to expect competition sooner or later.

8. Jordan to Langley, 1 June, 1914

The Chinese appear to be sore about Tibet and think that Ivan Chen was more or less coerced into initialling the Convention. I confess I do not altogether like the idea of an independent arrangement with Tibet and am afraid we might be subject to reprisals here. Their objections apply exclusively to the boundary arrangements and more particularly to the inclusion of Kokonor within Inner Tibet. There is a good deal to be said for their contention and the authorities are almost exclusively on their side. The region is a barren waste and, speaking quite personally, I should be inclined to let them have it rather than jeopardise our immensely more important interests in the Yangtse valley and elsewhere. The Military Attache assures me that strategically it does not matter whether Kokonor belongs to China or Tibet, as it is uninhabitable, its value

to any country is worthless. I have always regarded it as part of China and for many years WCP have treated it as such in issuing passports. However the matter will doubtless be decided before this reaches you.

9. *Jordan to Langley, 15 June, 1914*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me on Saturday about Tibet and submitted the proposals, a summary of which was telegraphed and the text of which goes by this mail. I did my utmost to persuade him that the Convention offered a fair and liberal settlement to China, but he maintained that it handed over the southern section of Kokonor and other portions of Chinese territory to Tibet, and that the President's position would become untenable were he to commit the country to such a surrender. I felt pretty certain that the Chinese would object strongly to the alienation of Kokonor but I was not prepared for their taking such a decided stand regarding the southern part of the frontier and if I could have shaken them on the latter point I would have been inclined to take the responsibility of reconsidering some concession regarding the former. But the Foreign Minister had evidently been given no discretionary powers and would not recede an inch from the attitude which had been adopted by the President and the Cabinet. I spent some two hours in trying to convince him that China's best interests would be served by the immediate signature of the Convention; but it was all labour lost. He finally said that the boundary question had never been negotiated and that China would not sign the Agreement imposed upon her in such an arbitrary way. My earlier impression was that the Chinese would sign rather than face the prospect of a bipartite agreement, but their pride is evidently hurt and they seem to have taken the bit between their teeth and decided to withhold signature. My personal view is that even their last proposals might have formed the basis of a satisfactory arrangement had they been put forward earlier in the ordinary course of negotiation, but I do not see how we can very well yield now after all that has passed. I am much disappointed as the hitch will materially react unfavourably on all our other negotiations here and that at a time when Japan and other powers are doing all they can to secure the goodwill of China with a view to obtaining concessions. But it is one of the penalties we have to pay for the complexity and multiplicity of our interests.

10. *Jordan to Langley, 28 June, 1914*

I am writing this at the hills where I have come for the week-end.

Tibet: My part in this has been confined to delivering your ultimatum. The Foreign Minister promised a written answer and I shall be pleurably surprised if it proves to be a favourable one. I frankly admit that I have some misgivings on the subject and could have wished to see us taking up a perfectly sound position before making such a grave intimation. But no one who knows China can conscientiously say that we should be justified in using force to secure the inclusion in 'Inner Tibet' of such places as Litang and Batang which our own authorities have publicly admitted to be part of China. Louis King^a who is at Tachienlu, was asking for a Chinese passport for these places at the moment Sir Henry McMahon was denying them to China, and in so doing he was only following the example of Hosie^b and other travellers.

Whether China signs or refuses to sign the Convention, the future outlook seems to be very unsatisfactory. If she signs she will do so with a bad grace and with very little intention of observing it. If she refuses to sign, the position will be more acute and perhaps call for more immediate action. The Indian Government are pledged to give material assistance to Tibet and doubtless the threat has been made after fully considering all the consequences it may entail. Apart altogether from the effect such a step would have on our vast commercial and industrial interests in China, I do not myself see how it is practicable. We can scarcely, I imagine, contemplate marching British troops across Tibet and we can hardly propose to take an independent part in a border warfare in which the vanquished usually pay the penalty of having been skinned alive. However, all this is beyond my province.

I wish the frontier negotiations had not been so abruptly closed and that we could have reached a settlement which would have given some hope of permanency. I know the immense difficulty of Sir Henry McMahon's task and have had as much experience as most people of the provoking delays and disappointments connected with all Chinese negotiations.

It may very possibly have been due to the late and imperfect information which reached us, but somehow the Delhi negotiations conveyed to us an impression of lack of reality. It looked as if the British and Tibetan representatives knew each other's cards through-

out, and as if Ivan Chen was not too loyal to his own Government. The methods of the Government of India are similar to those which Russia and Japan have tried but have found of so little service that they seem fit to abandon them.

It is just possible that I may return to town tomorrow morning to find that the Chinese have accepted the Memorandum and that will at all event be a temporary relief and source of satisfaction. But the idea of an 'Inner Tibet' had never much attraction for me and a closer acquaintance with this artificial arrangement does not make me like it any better.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and two other members of the WCP have just sent word from a neighbouring temple that we are out here for the Sunday and are coming to afternoon tea. I hope they will not talk *Tibet*.

P.S.

The Vice Minister did talk *Tibet*. I had purposely gone to the hills to avoid them. He came with messages from the President which he entreated me to telegraph to HMG. Although I told him repeatedly that the last word had been said, that I would telegraph nothing but the bare text of any written reply they might send, and that it was perfectly useless to continue the conversation, he kept on repeating old arguments and imploring me to save the President from the humiliation which the abandonment of China's territory would imply.

Incidentally he mentioned Chiamdo as a district which the President would never give up. He invited an explanation of what point was indicated by the reference to the frontier proposed by the Chinese being only 200 miles from Lhasa, said that China would agree to station no troops in Jyade, and added that there was no necessity for the unfriendly threat contained in the Memorandum as in no case would the President move any Chinese troops to the west of their present positions.

I listened to all this and far more without making any reply beyond occasionally repeating the written reply of the Chinese Government. I am not reporting this conversation officially as the message was supposed to be an informal one, but of course I have no objection to this letter being treated as official. My position is a delicate and difficult one and naturally I do not care to obtrude my views.

11. *Jordan to Langley, 12 July, 1914*

Tibet was only mentioned to me once during last week. The Foreign Minister with whom I was discussing other questions said as I was leaving: 'what a pity about Tibet!' I said it illustrated the delays and dangers of Chinese methods. Some eight months were spent in fruitless discussions.

One of the Secretaries when discussing the Mixed Court question with Macleavy, turned to the Tibetan affair and evinced some anxiety to ascertain what consequences the rupture of negotiations would entail. They are doubtless uneasy on the subject, but whether the feeling is strong enough to induce them to sign the Convention, remains to be seen. That they will observe it, even if they did sign it, is, I fear, unlikely.

P.S. 13 July

The Russian Charge d'Affaires is making enquiries about the Tibet Convention of which he has a copy. I came in from the hills this morning with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, who interviewed me there a week ago, but he never mentioned Tibet. Reuter's telegrams have brought me a summary of Sir Edward's statement in the House which has been published in local newspapers but so far without comment. The Japanese correspondents are evincing an ominous interest in the matter with the view doubtless of turning it to account. The French have secured an extension of their Concession at Shanghai (they call it a rectification of boundaries, I believe) and the International Settlement will probably follow.

But Fraser tells me that opinion is fairly divided at Shanghai on the subject and that a large proportion of the foreign community are inclined to think that the extension is dear at the price.

12. *Jordan to Langley, 27 July, 1914*

You know my views about the abortive Tibet negotiations and I need not repeat them. I should have jettisoned Litang and Batang and taken a firm stand upon Chiamdo. But I know how easy it is to criticize and how difficult it is to achieve anything where China is concerned. The amount of writing is generally out of all proportion to the amount of the actual work done and I have sometimes thought that their sense of importance would be considerably diminished if we were told to report only accomplished results.

(Alluding to the achievement of Pauling's railway agreement) I am not sure that the terms will prove altogether satisfactory, but it is a great relief to have the thing settled especially as the Tibet question is a severe handicap in obtaining concessions.

This and the distracted state of Home politics are telling against us just now in China and not since the dark days of the South African War^a has our task been more difficult in the Far East.

13. *Jordan to Langley, 17 September, 1914*

The only thing of much interest since I last wrote (September 4, 1914) is an apparent revival of interest in the Tibetan question. The Chinese are making vague enquiries about a possible settlement but seem still to hanker after a reopening of negotiations, which is, of course, out of the question. It would be a great mistake to pay any serious attention to these overtures which will probably come to nothing in the end. An attitude of passive indifference is the only one that will make them reconsider their decision to abstain from signing the Convention.

Rose spent some days with me here and I had an opportunity of going over the whole question with him. I told him that, in my opinion, the cardinal mistake was the inclusion of Litang and Batang in Inner Tibet and enquired how he came to assent to such a course seeing that his experience in Szechuan should have taught him that we and other Powers recognized both places as an integral part of China. His answer was that the Tibetan claim was supported by documentary evidence and that as China could do practically what she liked in Inner Tibet, it was immaterial whether the places were included in Inner Tibet or regarded as China. But this method of argument takes insufficient account of the fact that 'Inner Tibet' is a new geographical expression to Chinese ears and that the arrangement will sound like a surrender of Chinese territory. I lay some stress on the point because it marked the difference between myself and the Government of India on the whole question. However, the Chinese are anxious to secure our goodwill for the eventual settlement of the Kiao-chou business and there is a bare possibility that an anticipatory sense of favours to come may induce them to sign. At any rate, I shall watch quietly for an opportunity that may offer. Tibet is now really the only outstanding question and it should be got out of the way.

14. *Jordan to Langley, 2 October, 1914*

I had a very long talk with Yuan Shih-kai one day this week after a *tete-a-tete* lunch. He may be a deceiver but he spoke of England and Englishmen in terms too flattering to repeat. Personally I have no doubt whatever that he really trusts us and he has every reason to do so as China would have gone to pieces had it not been for the honest work done by Englishmen in the Customs and the Salt Administration. Yuan told me, amongst a number of things, that the Japanese had pressed him to take a loan of £ 10 million for the establishment of a Bank and had offered him any sum up to £ 50 million. He could not understand where the money was to come from and seemed suspicious about the gift. He was anxious that we should set about the development of our concessions in the Yangtse valley as soon as the War was over and repeated more than once his confidence in England as the only hope for the future of China.

3. *Selections from the Hardinge Papers 1911¹*

Morley to Hardinge, 11 April, 1911

I could wish the Williamson expedition had never been allowed, and I am shocked to find that it was sanctioned in my virtuous days. I dare say you will make the most of it, and I have complete confidence that nobody could be more anti-forward, either among those excellent Abors or elsewhere, than you are sure to be.

Hardinge to Crewe, 9 October, 1911

The Abor expedition has made its start under great difficulties, owing to the Monsoon being so late, and to our desire to cut in before the Chinese, the troops at the front have suffered terrible discomfort and hardship. The rivers have risen to an abnormal height and there has been a great deal of sickness and fever. Matters are, however, improving every day.

Crewe to Hardinge, 3 April, 1912

We have to telegraph to you that the Rotung post cannot be established at any rate now. I can quite believe that *in vacuo* it would be the most reasonable course, bearing in mind the essential difference between such a post and a scheme of administration. But that diffe-

¹*Private Correspondence of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst* (on microfilm) NMML, New Delhi.

rence is not clear to everybody, and after talking the whole question over with Asquith, whom it specially concerned as a House of Commons question, I concurred in the above conclusion. I hope that the practical difference may not be important, while the distinction for purposes of discussion between a post within our Outer Line and one outside it in our sphere of influence is very clear.

Crewe to Hardinge, 26 April, 1912

In the Abor country, of course, we have not got the complication of a European neighbour; but for Heaven's sake let us keep as many savages between ourselves and China as we can. It (defiance of HMG by local commanders/officials) is highly inconvenient when it is operated on a large stage, as by Francis Younghusband in Tibet; and we object to it ourselves when Russian officials make advances and their Government does not disavow them; I was looking but yesterday at a case of the kind, in Sarikal, near the Pamirs.

Crewe to Hardinge, 2 May, 1912

I am interested to see that your wish for posts in the Abor country is confirmed by what you saw in that frontier (*viz.*, North-west Frontier); I shall show that part of your letter to Asquith, but I cannot help feeling that the different character, both of the tribes themselves and of the formidable neighbour in the background, may differentiate the two cases to a great extent.

Crewe to Hardinge, 12 July, 1912

I had a long talk with General Bower^a this week, and liked him. He does not seem at all sore about the Rotung post, though retaining the opinion that it would be a useful point for observation and influence. . . . Bower was strong on the necessity of going slow, and not alarming the tribes, with whom hostility in his opinion always is the offspring of terror.

Hardinge to Crewe, 15 February, 1912

I am sorry that the Abor expedition has not been able to completely fulfil its expectations from the point of view of exploration. I think it is necessary however to accept the General's views and come away at the end of March. It is quite evident that the process of exploration has been very much more difficult than was antici-

pated, owing to climatic difficulties and the very uneven form of the country. The comfort is that that country will make a splendid frontier since it is almost impossible to traverse it in large numbers.

Hardinge to Crewe, 2 May, 1912

I am sorry that you adhere to your view that about the post at Rotung in the Abor country, but there is nothing more to be said, and I have already issued orders for their recall. I hope it will not entail further operations later on.

Hardinge to Crewe, 16 May, 1912

(Rotung post) I may tell you privately that it came as a surprise to me when I heard that the post had been established, as I perfectly realized that this was contrary to our policy. However I do not grumble at all, and the post has, I believe, already been withdrawn. It will, in any case, be a good lesson to people at the front not to force the hands of Government.

Hardinge to Crewe, 8 August, 1912

I notice that in reply to a question in the House of Commons by Colonel Yate as to the retention of a post at Rotung, Montague is reported to have said that the Government of India had acquiesced in the withdrawal of that post. I think you will agree with me that this is not quite correct,^a as we have twice asked officially that the decision of the Government should be reconsidered.

Hardinge to Crewe, 8 October, 1912

I do not quite agree ... that we should not be stiff over Chinese control in Tibet, by whatever name described. It is just because we were so easy-going as to the interpretation by China of the meaning of suzerainty that they seized the opportunity to enforce rights of sovereignty, I think that the position of China in Tibet should be very carefully defined, the number of troops for the protection of the Amban at Lhasa being specified.

Crewe to Hardinge, 30 May, 1913

Buchanan^b is over here and we have had some conversation with him and the Foreign Office people on Russian relations so far as they affect our Asian interests. The suggestion is to open a conversation by talking about Tibet...(Developments there have been

modified by) Chinese interference and claims to interference further still; and secondly by the new Russian position in Mongolia, which, *ipso facto*, alters the position of Tibet itself. In other words, the Tibet about which we agreed in the Convention, is not the same country as the Tibet of today. That Tibet was hinged on isolation, which we desired to maintain. This Tibet with sovereignty claimed by China, and with easy access by a high road from Mongolia, is another country, and its international treatment may easily be different. The question then arises, supposing we desire to acquire the right, in certain circumstances, to place an agent at Lhasa, whether we must argue against the Russians doing likewise. Personally I think not, though I would steadily continue to assert our preponderating interest in Tibet, if only on purely geographical grounds. On the other hand my Political Department would greatly dread the idea. . .

Hardinge to Crewe, 6 March, 1913

On the North-East Frontier the Chinese have accepted the *fait accompli* as regards Pienma; in fact they are under the impression that we have always had 50 men in Pienma, and that we have now increased the garrison to one hundred men.

Hardinge to Crewe, 19 June, 1913

It is fairly certain that for any concession made to us in Tibet, we should be asked to give counter-balancing concessions in Afghanistan.

Hardinge to Crewe, 17 September, 1913

(Referring to Russian proposal that in negotiations regarding Tibet, information be given to the Russian Consul General) I am very glad that you put your foot down. . . We fully realise that his presence in Simla when the delegates arrive, will be source of difficulty, and as I shall be leaving Simla on the 14th of October, we intend to arrange that the Government of Bengal should demand his presence in Calcutta, and that he should be told that with my departure, the Government of India is no longer resident in Simla—a broad hint that he should take himself off.

Hardinge to Crewe, 9 October, 1913

The Tibetan and Chinese delegates have arrived and the Conference will open on Monday next. I know the Chinese delegate

quite will, as he was in London for over ten years as Foreign Secretary of the Chinese Legation. The Tibetan delegate struck me as a particularly able man, with a thorough knowledge of his subject and very decided views. If all Tibetans were like him, they would be a race to be proud of.

Crewe to Hardinge, 1 January, 1914

Grey's absence from London has prevented me from doing anything more final as regards Tibet and the possible communication to Russia, but he knows what our general views are.

Crewe to Hardinge, 1 May, 1914

The Chinese proceedings over Tibet, and their repudiation of their representatives' signatures seem to be very much *à la chinoise*. I suppose after local experience of them one learns what is the proper blend of cajolery and brutality required in order to get anything done, unless one goes mad in the process of acquiring this knowledge. I remember years ago spending a fortnight in buying a rug in the bazar at Cairo for which I was first asked £ 800 and which I at last secured for rather less than £ 80, paying probably a full value or more at the time, though now I daresay the price would be greater. McMahon's job has been of this kind for months, I take it and I hope he will get his rug in the long run, though the discussions must be complicated by the Tibetans having a rug of their own which they also try to sell exorbitantly.

Hardinge to Crewe, 9 April, 1914

The Tibetan negotiations drag on their weary course, and at present I see no end to them. The Chinese as usual appear to be behaving badly and to be advancing in Tibet, while they make complaints of the Tibetans doing likewise which we believe to be untrue. I really think that the Chinese might pursue a higher line of morality in other questions besides that of opium smoking.

Hardinge to Crewe, 6 May, 1914

McMahon has managed his Chinese-Tibetan negotiations very well. He has had moments of difficulties with his colleagues, but he has surmounted them successfully. You may, I fear, have some difficulties with the Russians, but it is time that they made some concessions.

Hardinge to Holderness, 13 May, 1914

The quiet progress that we are making on the North-east Frontier is satisfactory. No trouble is anticipated in that direction, except possibly from small parties of Chinese. The inhabitants are everywhere friendly and glad to be recognized as under our administration. Places have been found on our new frontier of great richness and wealth which should eventually become health stations for Assam and Burma. The work of consolidation that we have been quietly carrying out during the last three weeks will, I believe, preserve us from much trouble in the future.

Hardinge to Crewe, 28 May, 1914

You will be amused to hear that the Chinese Plenipotentiary is fully persuaded that we are negotiating a separate agreement with Tibet in view of the repudiation by his Government of the agreement which he has initialled. He is perpetually talking about this and evidently telegraphed in the same sense to his Government, and we have not undeceived him. An announcement in *Reuter's* telegram a few days ago that transport had been provided for the Tibetan Plenipotentiary to return to Lhasa created quite a stir in the Chinese camp.

Hardinge to Crewe, 3 June, 1914

I think we must make the Chinese agree to sign the new treaty in the form initialled by their representatives. The terms are equitable, and it would, so McMahan assures me, be difficult to get the Tibetan envoy to accept anything for the benefit of China. It is quite certain that the Chinese will sign as soon as the Tibetan has done so, since what they want more than else, is to get an Amban into Lhasa. I do not agree with Jordan's view that, by showing weakness to the Chinese, we have a better chance of getting mining and railway concessions. The experience of the Russians is just the reverse. They have bullied the Chinese over Mongolia, and they are getting all the railway concessions they want from them.

Hardinge to Crewe, 11 June, 1914

Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan have been absorbing a good deal of our time of late.... They are extraordinarily difficult questions, and what makes them all the more complicated for us is our strong objections to a forward policy, into which Russia apparently is doing her very best to push us. We must resist it as long as we possi-

bly can, but I very much fear that the day is not far distant when Russia will actually drive us into undertaking in southern Persia an enterprise which is in reality beyond our means and strength.

Hardinge to Crewe, 25 June, 1914

What has agitated me and McMahon more than anything else during the past week has been the check that we have received in the Tibet negotiations. Knowing as we do the contents of the Chinese Plenipotentiary's telegrams from his Government, we are practically certain that the Chinese mean to sign in any case; and if they had wished to raise objections on the lines of frontier now embodied in the agreement, they could have done so several months ago. Their objections at the present moment are, we believe, due to foreign instigation, as we know that there is a project for a Belgian railway from Manchuria to Chiensi, and the Chinese have just discovered that the accepted frontier of Tibet would be a stumbling block to the proposed railway. Moreover after Jordan's attitude towards India in the opium question, I am not quite sure that we are not again being made a cat's paw for the sake of British commercial concessions in China proper. The matter is to India one of vital importance, and the line we have been taking is, we consider, best calculated to protect her interests without embarking on any scheme entailing obligations beyond our means to fulfil. There were the same difficulties with the Chinese government in 1906, and all that is required at the present moment is a little firmness on the part of the Foreign Office.

Hardinge to Crewe, 2 July, 1914

I was very glad to receive this morning your telegram authorising the closing of the Chinese-Tibetan negotiations. The action proposed is, I think, best calculated to bring the Chinese into line, as we know that their desire above all things is to get an Amban back to Lhasa, probably with dishonest intentions.

Hardinge to Crewe, 9 July, 1914

It was a relief to me when instructions at last arrived to close down the China-Tibet negotiations. I think we should have done better if we had closed down three weeks earlier, but Jordan evidently gave the Chinese the impression that there was a chance of modifying by negotiation the agreement arrived at. The Chinese delegate is absolutely convinced that his Government will come into line in the near future.

Notes

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^aArticle 9(d) lists 'concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights'.

^bMarts specified in Article 2 were those of Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung.

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^aDifficulties had arisen over James Henry Hart of the Chinese Customs Service stationed in Tibet when Durand as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India was negotiating the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention. Later Captain W. R. M'd Parr presented similar problems during the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa (1903-4). Parr's successor as Trade Agent at Yatung was V.C. Henderson who created difficulties for O'Connor (1905-6). All the three besides such as Taylor, Holison, Montgomery were British nationals who were members of the Imperial (Chinese) Customs Service headed by Sir Robert Hart.

Page 6

^aThese concessions had originally been incorporated in Article 9(d) of the Lhasa Convention of September 1904. Later Article 3 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 stipulated that these were to be 'denied to any state or the subject of any state other than China'.

^bOriginally Article 6 of the September 1904 Lhasa Convention had fixed the indemnity at Rs. 75 lakhs to be paid in an equal number of annual instalments. Later however when the Convention was ratified in November, 1904 the then Acting Governor General, Lord Ampthill, appended a declaration reducing the amount to Rs. 25 lakhs to be paid in three annual instalments.

Page 8

^aBy this exchange of notes, the two countries declared that they viewed it as important not to permit, unless agreed between them, the entry into Tibet of any mission of a scientific nature, in contrast to visits by groups of religious pilgrims, for the next three years. Both governments proposed to approach the Chinese government with the request that for a corresponding period, China would undertake a similar prohibition on Tibetan ventures. At the end of three years, Russia and Britain were to reconsider the question of scientific missions in Tibet and decide if any further measures were necessary or called for. Later asked to join in closing Tibet to scientific explorers, the Chinese affirmed that they had always maintained such a prohibition against the entry of foreigners and saw no point in the Anglo-Russian interdict to be operative for three years only.

Page 15

^a*Tatsienlu*, at the junction of the northern and southern roads to Lhasa; approximately 250 km south-west of Chengtu, capital of Szechuan.

^b*Batang*, approximately 320 km west of *Tatsienlu* on the southern road to Lhasa.

Page 16

^a*Talifu*, capital of Yunnan, on the Burma-China road.

^b*Derge*, a Tibetan province on the upper reaches of the Yangtse; its capital, Dege-Gonschen.

Page 17

^a*Litang*, approximately 150 km due west of Tatsienlu, on the southern road to Lhasa.

^b*Yenching*, also Tsakalo, on the eastern bank of the Mekong, approximately 80 km north of Atuntze.

Page 18

^aChinese Amban Lien Yu who succeeded Yu T'ai in 1906 and was later at the time of the revolt of Chinese troops in Tibet (1911) besieged and ousted by Chung Ying, commander of the garrison that Chao Erh-feng had despatched to Lhasa in 1909-10.

Page 20

^aChang Ying-tang was technically Imperial Commissioner, *not* Amban. He had arrived in Lhasa early in 1906 and preceded Lien Yu.

Page 23

^aThe Regent who acted for the Dalai Lama both in 1904 when the latter fled hot on the heels of British troops under Younghusband and again in 1910 shortly after Chinese garrisons entered Lhasa under Chung Ying.

Page 61

^aFor a discussion as to its veracity, see the author's 'The Mongol-Tibetan treaty of January 11, 1913', *Journal of Asian History*, Bloomington (Indiana), 3, 1, April 1969, pp. 1-22.

Page 62

^a'Shabinars' were serfs, even as the 'Albatu' or 'khmajilga', except that they owed loyalty or services to a religious rather than a secular authority and did *not* have to render military service.

^b'Hoshun' was an administrative sub-division like the district ('bag'), area ('somon'), region ('hoshun') and sub-province ('aimak').

Page 64

^aWith its declaration of independence by the Bogodo Huthukthu with the active help, if not connivance, of Tsarist Russia, Mongolia had completely broken away from China. It was this that underlined the need for Russian good offices to re-establish relations. For details see the author's 'Tibet and Outer Mongolia vis-a-vis China, 1911-36' in *Journal of Indian History*, XLII, October, 1964, pp. 727-64.

^bThe commercial protocol, not re-produced, runs into 17 articles and spells out at length the 'rights and privileges' of Russian subjects in Mongolia some of which 'they already enjoy'—as well as the reciprocal rights which the Mongols

were to enjoy in Russia. For the text *MacMurray*, II, pp. 993-96. Also see *China Year Book*, 1919-20, London, 1920, pp. 594-96 and *Far Eastern Review*, Manila, 1913, ix, 318.

Page 68

^aA picturesque hill-station just across the Sikkim-Tibet border was the venue, initially fixed (against Chinese demands for a place *inside* Tibet) for the *bi-lateral* Tibet-China parleys. After a good deal of jockeying for vantage position, the bilateral talks were to be *tripartite* and their venue, Simla, then British India's summer-capital.

Page 69

^aIn the wake of the declarations of independence by Mongolia and Tibet and their refusal to retract, coaxing and cajolery by Yuan Shih-kai notwithstanding, Peking hastened to paper over the far too obvious and embarrassing cracks in its *amour propre*. One of the devices employed for this purpose was the constitution of the 'Bureau' which, in sharp contrast to the existing situation, kept up the outer facade of Mongolia and Tibet being integral parts of a unified republic.

Page 75

^aAccording to Mayers (*The Chinese Government*, 2nd Edn., 1886), whose major source is the *Ta Ts'ing Hwei Tien* (or 'Collected Institutions of the Ts'ing dynasty') 'T'sien Tsang' or Anterior Tibet is part of the country 'nearest to the Chinese frontiers' and also known as K'ang (written by some as Kham) and Chamdo. 'Huw Tsang' or Ulterior Tibet is simply Tsang, containing the seat of the Panchen Lama.

Page 85

^aAn Imperial Decree issued in Peking in December 1908 had directed the Sining Amban as well as other Chinese officials *en route*, to escort the Dalai Lama, then on his way back home after nearly four years of 'wanderings'.

Page 104

^aLew Yuk-lin, Minister at the Chinese Mission in London.

Page 133

^aThe British Memorandum of June 25, 1914, *Supra*, Section VI, had referred *inter alia* to 'a recent exchange of views with the Governments of Russia and Tibet'.

Page 149

^aThe analogy is far from apt. The British retained large forces in the North-West Frontier Province (*not* North West Province) partly with a view to controlling the depredations of the tribes who were traditionally turbulent and invariably raided the settled districts. India was *not* controlled from the NWFP.

^bDistricts or areas to Tibet's east, would be to China's west.

Page 151

^aReference is to Calcutta. Shatra must have passed through the town on his way to Simla; technically, Calcutta had ceased to be the capital after 1912.

^bReference is to 'elections' for the National Assembly called by Yuan Shih-kai to legitimize his rule.

Page 155

^aSir Robert Hart, then Inspector General of Imperial (Chinese) Customs.

Page 157

^aIn Mongolia, the Chinese had lost the initiative almost completely to the Russians. For details see the author's 'Tibet and Outer Mongolia vis-a-vis China', *op. cit.*

^bAt a meeting of the National Assembly in Peking, Yuan Shih-kai was unanimously elected President of the Chinese Republic on 6 October, 1913.

Page 159

^aAn interesting commentary on Chinese preparedness! Their plenipotentiary did not have a map of Tibet showing its boundaries, nor for that matter did Lu Hsing-chi, 'Administrator of Tibet and China's Amban-designate at Lhasa'.

^bThe 'hawks' in modern parlance. Among these were the frontier officials and the Assam governor. Hardinge and, to an extent McMahon, were not averse to an increase in governmental influence.

Page 160

^aFu Sung-mu's map.

Page 162

^aShatra had, in his presentation of Tibet's case, referred to the Tang dynasty stone monument, but evidently the Chinese fought shy of it. If Ivan Chen at all referred to it, it would only show how poorly informed he was of his country's history vis-a-vis Tibet.

Page 164

^aTypical of Chinese attitude: how dare the Tibetans transgress limits!

^bBritish proposals for Inner/Outer Tibet were presented to the Conference at Simla by Sir Henry McMahon on 17 February (1914).

Page 166

^aA famous monastery and seat of Tibetan lamaism, situated on the traditional Sino-Tibetan frontier.

Page 167

^aFor a comprehensive view of Russian and other intrigue see the author's 'Tibet and Russian Intrigue', *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (London),

45, 1, January 1958, pp. 28-42. and its sequel, Alastair Lamb, 'Some Notes on Russian Intrigue in Tibet', *Ibid*, 1959.

^bFor the text, *Supra*, pp. 61-3.

For a commentary, 'The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty', *op. cit.*

Page 168

^aFor the text, see *Supra*, pp. 4-8.

^bTwo of his works are relevant viz., *The Indian Borderland: 1880-1900*, London, 1901; and *Political Frontiers and Boundary-making*, London, 1920.

Page 177

^aEarlier two territorial concessions had been made with a view to clinching a settlement. Thus on 27 April Nyarong and Derge were taken from Outer Tibet and placed in Inner (Tibet); on 25 June, it was noted that the Kuen Lun range was to be substituted for the Altyn Tagh as Tibet's northern boundary. For details reference may be made to the author's *The McMahon Line and After*, pp. 269-71.

Page 181

^aYin Chang-heng.

^bAbbreviation for tael, Chinese currency, weighing 1.208 English ounce of pure silver. Until about the end of the 19th century, 3 taels equalled one pound sterling and roughly five U.S. dollars. In 1894 the value of the tael dropped to 3s. 2d; ten years later to 2s. 10d.

Page 188

^aMayers, William Fredrick, *The Chinese Government*, 2nd. Edn., London, 1886.

Page 195

^aArchibald Rose who was later to be McMahon's principal advisor on Chinese affairs at the Simla conference (1913-14). It mainly fell to him to negotiate with Ivan Chen, the Chinese plenipotentiary.

^bChao Erh-feng and Chao Erh-hsun.

Page 196

^aWai-wu-Pu, Chinese Foreign Office.

Page 197

^aYuan Shih-kai; for details biographical notes.

Page 198

^aYin Chang-heng

^bThe reference is not clear. What was 'Inner'/'Outer' India?

Page 199

^aA veiled reference to frontier negotiations.

Page 202

^aAssistant to the British Consul at Tatsienlu.

^bSir Alexander Hosie, a veteran English traveller who in 1881 prepared the first known report of Tibet-western China trade, especially in brick tea.

Page 205

^aReference is to the Boer war, 1899-1902.

Page 207

^aGeneral Bower, leader of the Abor Expedition; details in biographical sketches.

Page 208

^aThe fact was that India's considered views on the subject were over-ruled by Whitehall.

^bBritish Charge d'Affaires in St Petersburg.

Biographical Sketches

BELL, Sir Charles Alfred

Born, Calcutta, 1880; educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford; 1889, entered ICS, and posted to Bengal; his first nine years in the plains and then (1900) transferred to Darjeeling; 1903-4, investigated the possibility of making a road from the Bengal border, through Bhutan, to the Chumbi valley, a project later abandoned on the score of expense involved; 1904-5, in charge of the Chumbi valley, twice acting as Political Officer; 1908-18, Political Officer, Sikkim thereby in charge of India's relations with Bhutan and Tibet; retired, 1918 but re-employed, 1920-21.

1910, negotiated a treaty with Bhutan, establishing friendly relations with that country; his close personal friendship with the thirteenth Dalai Lama formed during the latter's exile (1910-12) in India continued till the Lama's death (1933); in 1920-1, visited Lhasa on a special mission; on his departure (1921), the Dalai noted: 'We two are men of like mind'; re-visited Lhasa when, besides Tibet, he travelled (1933-5) in Mongolia, Siberia, Manchuria and China.

1913-14, acted as advisor to Sir Henry McMahon at the Simla conference and played an important role in concluding the India-Tibet boundary agreement and the new Trade Regulations; it was on foundations laid by him that British, and later Indian, representation was established at Lhasa.

His *English-Tibetan Dictionary*, first published in 1905, remains to-date 'the best practical guide to the spoken language'; his other works include *Tibet, Past and Present*, 1924; *People of Tibet*, 1928; *Religion of Tibet*, 1931; *Portrait of the Dalai Lama* (published, posthumously) 1946; died, 1945.

BOWER, Maj-Gen. Sir Hamilton

Born, September 1858; educated at Edinburgh Collegiate School and Royal Naval School, New Cross; entered Army, 1880; Captain I.S.C., 1891; Major, Indian Army, 1900; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1906; D A Q M G, Bengal, 1893-8; Commandant, Peking Legation Guard, 1901-6; commanding Assam Brigade, 1908-14; served in expedition to Dongola, 1896; leader of Abor Expedition, 1912 and awarded Founders Medal, Royal Geographical Society for explorations in Tibet; also travelled in Turkestan and the Pamirs; awarded Royal Humane Society Medal. Publication: *Diary of a Journey across Tibet*, London, 1894. Died, March 1940.

CHANG Ying-tang

1905, acted as Tong Shoa-yi's *locum tenens* at Calcutta to negotiate China's 'adhesion' to the Lhasa convention (1904), talks were deadlocked; 1906, High Commissioner in Tibet who acted 'vigorously' on the premise that the (1906) convention was a 'recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet'.

1907, submitted 24 articles to the Tsungli Yamen (viz., Chinese Foreign bureau 'with a view to consolidating and strengthening' Chinese rule in Tibet; in Lhasa, he humbled Amban Yu T'ai who, in his eyes, had helped Younghusband (1904).

1907-8, negotiated the Tibet Trade regulations in India; 1913, Britain rejected Chinese offer to appoint him plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference (1913-14).

CHAO Erh-feng

Chinese Tao-tai who, during the years 1905-11, completely transformed the political landscape in Tibet as well as on India's north-eastern frontier; succeeded Fung Chuan in 1905, as Warden of the Marches to punish and pacify the turbulent, lama-ridden tribes who controlled the twilight country between China and Tibet comprising the western districts of Szechuan, the northern areas of Yunnan and the province of Kham; 1905-6, his campaigns, short-lived and singularly successful, culminated in a seven-month siege of Changtreng; 1906, appointed Frontier Commissioner, equal in rank and status to the Imperial Residents in Lhasa and Sining; 1907-8, acting Viceroy of Szechuan; 1908, appointed Imperial Commissioner for Tibet, a second Amban; 1909, despatched Chung Ying, with 2,000 troops, to Lhasa; 1911, appointed Viceroy of Szechuan; 1912, murdered by the rebels who had earlier besieged him in his *yamen*.

COX, Sir Percy Zachariah

Born, 1864; educated at Harrow and Royal Military College; 1884, commissioned to the 2nd Cameronians, then stationed in India; seconded to the Political Department and held several minor positions in the Maratha states of Kolhapur and Savantwadi; 1893, appointed to the British Somaliland protectorate; 1895, Assistant to the Governor General's Agent in Baroda; later Political Agent and Consul at Muscat; 1904, promoted Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and Consul General for the (Persian) provinces of Fars, Luristan and Khuzistan; at Kuwait, strengthened relations with the ruler; 1915, successfully negotiated a treaty with Ibn Saud of Nejd, and helped to prevent rivalry between the latter and King Hussein of the Hejaz; after 1918, as acting Minister at Teheran negotiated Anglo-Persian treaty by which the then British Foreign Secretary, Curzon, set much store; October 1922, concluded treaty of alliance with King Feizal of Iraq as well as a boundary settlement between Iraq and Ibn Saud; retired, 1923; later, chairman of the Mount Everest Committee and President (1933-6) of the Royal Geographical Society; died in a hunting field near Bedford, February, 1937.

CREWE-MILNES, Robert Offley Ashburton, second Baron Houghton and Marquess of Crewe

Born, 1858; educated at Trinity College, Cambridge where he developed pronounced scholarly and literary tastes; at 27, entered House of Lords; 1883, Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Granville; 1892, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland where he developed a reputation for being assiduous, acute, uncommonly clear-headed, invariably cool, considerate, loyal; 1905-16, a member of the Cabinet, for most part (1905-15), Secretary of State for India, where occupied with planning the Delhi Durbar (1911), transfer of capital from Calcutta to Delhi and cancellation of the partition of Bengal.

In Asquith's coalition, May 1915, he was Lord President of the Council and, in 1916, President of the Board of Education; his position in office was one of exceptional authority, with the Prime Minister placing much reliance on his counsel; 1922-28, he was British ambassador in Paris, in succession to Hardinge; died, 1945.

A man of wealth and classical culture and long descent who devoted himself assiduously to parliamentary business yet deeply engaged in such country pursuits as racing, breeding cattle, building his library.

DALAI LAMA, Thirteenth

Born June, 1876 in the province of Takpo, a few days' journey south-east of Lhasa; enthroned, 1879, took over supreme control at 20 (according to Tibetan reckoning) in 1895; deposed by the Manchu emperor in 1904 (and again in 1910); in 1905-6 visited Outer Mongolia and later (1908) Peking; lived in exile in India, 1910-12; regained authority (1912) and returned to Lhasa; made efforts at modernizing his country and its administration, 1913-23; after a near-coup, reverted to traditional policy of 'no change'; used British good offices to reconcile his differences with Nepal, 1929; died, 1933.

FU SUNG-MU

1911, succeeded Chao Erh-feng as Warden of the Marches and submitted to Peking proposals to carve out a new province of Hsi-kang; 1912, his 'History of the Creation of Hsi-kang Province' was essentially a revival of Chao Erh-feng's earlier blue-print.

GRANT, Sir Alfred Hamilton

Born, 1872; educated at Fettes and Balliol College, Oxford; 1895, entered ICS; 1905, transferred to the NWFP as member of the foreign and political department acting as secretary to H. A. Deane, first Chief Commissioner of the province and later Sir George Roos-Keppel; 1904-5, accompanied Louis Dane's mission to Kabul; 1912, Deputy Secretary, Foreign Department; 1914-18, Foreign Secretary, New Delhi; 1919, chief British representative of delegation which met their Afghan counterparts at Rawalpindi to enter into preliminary negotiations for peace; retired 1922; died January, 1937.

GREY, Sir Edward, third Baronet and Viscount Grey of Fallodon

Born, 1862; educated at Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford; early in life discovered his great interest in bird observation in general and wild duck culture in particular; July 1884, private secretary to Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer); represented Berwick-on-Tweed in Parliament, whose people were completely dedicated to him; 1892-5, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign Office first under Lord Rosebery and later under Lord Kimberley; 1906-16, Foreign Secretary; his authorization of (1906) military conversations with France initiated earlier under Lansdowne; March 1906, at the Algeciras conference, he succeeded in securing U.S. friendship; principal author of the Anglo-Russian entente (1907); 1911, renewed the alliance with Japan; 1913, made an all-out effort to iron out differences with Germany on the Berlin-Baghdad railway and other hitherto intractable issues; 'Hated war' too much and was thus not rated as good a foreign minister in wartime; negotiated secret treaty of London with Italy, April 1915; retired 1916; 1916-33, never again in the forefront of affairs; too blind and too ill to lead a political party. Among his better-known books: *Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916*, 2 vols, 1925; *Fallodon Papers*, 1926; *The Charm of Birds*, 1927. Died, 1933.

HARDINGE, Baron Hardinge of Penhurst

Born, 1859; his grand-father first Viscount Hardinge, Field Marshall and Governor General of India (1844-48); educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge; 1880, joined Foreign Office and was attached to the German Department; 1881-84, served as Attache in Constantinople under Viscount Goschen and Lord Dufferin; 1884, Third Secretary, Berlin; 1885-86, Second Secretary, Washington; 1904, sworn of the Privy Council; returned to St. Petersburg as Ambassador; 1906, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; played important role in negotiating the Anglo-Russian entente (1907); 1910, appointed Viceroy and Governor-General of India and raised to the peerage; 1912, a bomb thrown on him in Delhi; in foreign affairs, established friendly relations with the Amir of Afghanistan; subject of controversy with regard to the status of Indians in South Africa and the import of opium into China; 1916, the ill-starred expedition to Mesopotamia ending in the surrender of Kut-el-Amara for which he as Viceroy and Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State, were held responsible; 1916, on return to England took over again as Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 1920-22, Ambassador in Paris; retired in 1922, lived at Oakfield near Penhurst where he died, 1944; among his books: *Old Diplomacy*, 1947 and *My Indian Years*, 1948.

IVAN CHEN (Chen I'fan)

1903-11, Secretary Councillor to the Chinese Legation in London, acquired good reputation for sobriety and reasonableness; 1911-12, participated in negotiations leading to the opium agreement; 1912, appointed Taotai on Burma-Yunnan frontier and later Commissioner for Trade and Foreign Affairs, Shanghai; 1913-14, Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Simla tripartite conference where, behind-the-scenes, he was over-ruled by Lu Hsing-chi; after 1914, melted away into political anonymity.

IZVOLSKI, Alexander Petrovich

Born, Moscow, 1856, of an ancient Polish family long settled in Russia; graduated at the Imperial Lyceum of St. Petersburg with the highest honours and entered diplomatic service; held appointments at Bucharest, Washington and the Vatican; later Minister Plenipotentiary at Belgrade, Munich and Tokyo; 1906, succeeded Lamsdorff as Minister for Foreign Affairs and continued until 1910; 1910-17, Russian Ambassador in France; died in Paris, 1919.

JORDAN, Sir John Newell

Born 1852; 1876, joined China Consular Service as student interpreter in Peking and passed his Chinese language examinations with credit; 1876-85, as Consul at various ports, acquired deep insight into Chinese character and ways of conducting affairs, tempered with considerable sympathy; 1886, appointed to British Legation in Peking; Assistant Chinese Secretary in 1889 and full Chinese Secretary, 1891; 1896, Consul General in Seoul; promoted Charge d'Affaires in 1898 and minister resident, 1901; his friendship with Tong Shoa-yi and Yuan Shih-kai dated to this period; 1906, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Peking in succession to Sir Ernest Satow; 1908, assisted by Sir Alexander Hosie formalized with Tong Shoa-yi negotiations regarding cessation of (Indian) opium

exports to China; 1914-18 set his face against civil war in China and used his influence to bring that country on the Allied side in World War I; retired in 1920; in 1921, accompanied Balfour to the Washington conference at which all the signatories affirmed China's territorial sovereignty; died in London, September, 1925; possessed of admirable gift of style; his despatches are said to have been models of conciseness, interest, lucidity.

Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington

Born, 1888; educated at Columbia University, New York; 1911-14, Secretary to President of China, Counsellor in Foreign Office; 1915, Minister to USA; 1919, attended Versailles Peace Conference as China's Plenipotentiary and later as head of Chinese delegation; 1920-22, delegate to the Assembly and China's representative on the Council of the League of Nations; 1921, Minister to Great Britain; 1921-2, Chinese Plenipotentiary to the Washington conference; 1922-4, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 1926, Finance Minister; 1926-7, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; 1927 and 1933, member, International Court of Arbitration at the Hague; 1931, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 1932-5, Minister to France; 1936-41, Ambassador to France; 1941-6, Ambassador to England.

LANGLEY, Sir Walter Louis Frederick Goltz

Born, February 1855; Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office from 1907; died, 30 September 1918.

MANNERS-SMITH, Lt. Col. John

Born, 1864; educated at Trinity College, Stratford-on-Avon and R M C, Sandhurst; 1883-85, Lieutenant, Norfolk regiment; appointed Military Attache, Foreign Office, Government of India; 1887, admitted Political Department; accompanied Sir Mortimer Durnad on his missions to Sikkim, 1888 and Kabul, 1893; 1889-1918, held political appointments in Kashmir, Bundhelkhand, Baluchistan, Rajputana, Central India and Nepal; served in NWF expeditions and won Victoria Cross on capture of Nilt position; 1891, Hunza-Nagar; 1897-8, Punjab Frontier and Tirah; died, 1920.

McMAHON, Sir Arthur Henry

Born 1862; 1890, joined Indian Political Department; 1891-3, Political Agent, Zhob; accompanied Durand mission to Kabul as political officer; 1894-6, demarcated boundary between Baluchistan and Afghanistan; 1899-1901, Political Agent, Dir, Swat, Chitral; 1903-5, British Commissioner, Seistan mission; 1907, developed intimate personal relations with Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan which stood the British in good stead during World War I (1914-18); 1905-11, Agent to Governor General and Chief Commissioner, Baluchistan; 1913-14, British Plenipotentiary to the tripartite Simla Conference; 1914-16, High Commissioner to Egypt; 1919, British Commissioner on the Middle Eastern International Commission; last of the (Indian) Foreign Secretaries who held combined charge of the Foreign and Political Department (after him the Political Department became a separate entity); a keen Freemason all his life; died, 1949.

NICOLSON, Arthur, first Baron Carnock

Born, 1849; 1870, entered the Foreign Office; 1872, Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Granville; 1874, Third Secretary, Berlin under Lord Odo Russell; 1876-8, Peking; 1879-82, in charge of Legation, Teheran; 1888-93, Consul General at Budapest; 1894, Agent to Sofia; 1895, Minister to Tangier; success of the Algeciras Conference (1905), largely his work; 1906, transferred to St. Petersburg and successfully concluded negotiations for the Anglo-Russian entente (1907); 1910, succeeded Hardinge as Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; significant part in settling the Agadir crisis (1911); remained in the Foreign Office as Under Secretary until his retirement, in 1916; for a time acted as liaison between the Foreign Office and Buckingham Palace but important city interests offered him employment; died in London, 1928.

ROSE, Archibald

Born, 1879; was present at the siege of Peking (1900) and received the China medal and clasp for defence of Legation; acted as consul at Chungking, Chefoo, Ningpo and Hangchow on the Burma-China frontier; widely travelled in China, Mongolia and Central Asia; represented British Foreign Office as expert on China at the Simla tripartite conference (1913-14); commercial attache, Shanghai, 1915; Peking, 1917; promoted first secretary, Diplomatic Service; retired, 1921.

SATOW, Sir Ernest Mason

Born, 1843; stiff Puritan education; 1861, competed successfully for a student interpretership to the Far East and assigned to the Consular service in Tokyo; 1868, appointed Japanese Secretary to the Legation and soon developed friendly relations with Marquess Ito; June 1895, appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, at Peking; responsible (September 1901) for the successful agreement between China and the powers regarding payment of Boxer indemnities; recalled from Peking, 1906 and made a Privy Councillor; 1906-12, British member of the Court of Arbitration at the Hague; his last diplomatic assignment, was to act as second British delegate to the second Peace Conference at the Hague, in 1907; accomplished both in theory as well as practice of diplomacy; D.C.L. from Oxford and LL.D. from Cambridge, 1908; gave the Rede lecture at the latter University; to-date the only Englishman who represented his country in both China and Japan and spoke the languages of each; died, 1929.

SHATRA, Paljor Dorje Kalon, more simply Kalon Shatra.

1894-5, visited Darjeeling where he obtained a shrewd understanding of British power and authority; later promoted a Kalon and member of the Kashag; 1904, he and his colleagues imprisoned for alleged pro-British leanings; 1908, re-appointed Kalon; 1910-12, accompanied Dalai Lama to India; 1913-14, Tibetan Plenipotentiary at Simla where he ably presented an extremely well-documented case on his country's behalf; on return home (1914), came under a cloud; died, 1923.

SHUCKBURGH, John Evelyn

Born, 1877; educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge; in 1900, passed in the first division the civil service examination and entered the India Office where

he was to spend 21 years, the last four as Secretary of the Political Department; 1921, selected as first Assistant Under Secretary of State in charge of the new Middle East department to administer and set up civil government in parts of the Turkish empire (Mesopotamia, Palestine, Trans-Jordan) which were then under British military administration as occupied enemy territory; 1922, appointed K.C.M.G. and, in 1931, Deputy Under Secretary of State; 1939, was to have succeeded Sir Bernard Bourdillon as Governor of Nigeria but continued in Colonial Office; 1942, retired but was re-employed in the Cabinet Office to write history of the colonial empire in the war; died, 1953.

TONG SHOA-YI

1904, Taotai at Tientsin when ordered to Tibet to negotiate China's 'adhesion' to the Lhasa convention (1904); 1905, arrived in Calcutta for talks which proved infructuous; returned home September (1905) leaving Chang Ying-tang as his *locum tenens*; January 1906, Minister in Chinese Foreign Office, responsible for successfully negotiating the Adhesion agreement (1906); 1908, negotiated successfully opium agreement banning import of Indian opium into China; 1908-9, Vice President of the Wai-wu-pu.

WILTON, Sir Ernest Colville Collins

Born, February 1870; 1890, Interpreter, China; 1903-4, employed with mission to Tibet; 1906, Consul General, Teng-yueh; 1908, British Counsellor for Tibet Trade Regulations; 1912-15, Special Opium Commissioner; Chinese Secretary, British Mission, Peking; 1916, Consul-General, Canton, 1923-25, Foreign Chief Inspector, China Salt Gabelle; 1927-32, President, Saar Governing Commission.

YUAN SHIH-KAI

Born, 1859; gained prominence in fighting the Nien rebels in the 1850s and 1860s; failed twice to obtain the chu- jen degree, second level of the traditional examination system; purchased a title and used family connections to acquire post with maritime defence unit in Shantung province; in Korea, after 1882, played a leading role; in 1885, Li Hung-chang nominated him commissioner of commerce and Chinese Resident; soon developed a reputation as skilful diplomat, a master of political intrigue and political organizer; after Sino-Japanese war (1894-5), commander of the 'Newly Created Army', descended from Li Hung-chang's Anhwei army, it was aided by German officers along western principles of training and organization and financed by the central government; this army was personally loyal to Yuan; following the Hundred Days reform (June-September, 1898), he is said to have betrayed the conspirators to the Empress and Jung Lu; December, 1899, Governor of Shantung, charged with handling the Boxer rebellion; used the emergency to augment his force without committing his troops to battle, thereby emerging as the strongest military leader in north China; by August 1907, hostile forces had deprived him of his high position and transferred from his command four out of six army divisions; January 1908, forced into retirement; October 1911 Revolution gave him his opportunity; acted as broker between the court and the revolutionists; in Peking, the infant emperor was forced to abdicate in favour of the Republic; in Nanking, Sun Yat-sen was persuaded

to resign as provisional President in his (Yuan's) favour; March 1912, inauguration; framed a constitution to enhance his personal power; a foreign loan of £125 millions helped him ban the KMT and seize provinces under its control; October 10 (1913) installed as full-fledged President; World War I and Japanese aggression on China with its 21 demands which he stalled for a time albeit later succumbed to all except a few; moved towards a monarchy; January 1, 1916 proclaimed Hung-hsien emperor; the 'empire' lasted only 63 days and brought the country to the brink of a civil war; died, 6 June, 1916 'of a broken heart'.

